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AHSTRACT 
A contcmpomry issue of concern to both external umli!ors and linancial stall:mcnt 
users is fnmd-dctcction by auditors. 'l11c ability of uuditors to detect muterial 
irrcguhrritics, including fraud, should be enhanced to emtble them to apply "reasonuble 
skill and care" in carrying out the audit. Such proficiency in fraud detection is needed if 
the profession is to avoid costly litigation, ever-increasing indemnity insurance and 
erosion of the profession's credibility. The thesis maintains that such enlmnccment can 
be achieved if auditors both utilise knowledge about the aetiology of fraud in 
psychology, sociology and criminology as well a~ by synthesising a broad range of 
approaches to fraud detection. 
The multidisciplinary discussion of the aetic;logy of fraud enabled the development of a 
three-component model. The model's three components are: rationalisations (R), 
opportunity (0) an~ a crime-prone motivated person (P~ hence the acronym ROP. 
Next, a close examination of relevant auditing guidelines and a number of fraud 
detection models that have been proposed were used to develop an eclectic fraud 
detection model {with the ROP model as one of its components). 
iii 
The applienhility of the lUll' model was dctcrrnincd in a study of SO major fi-aud m~cs 
investigated and prosecuted hy the Mt1jm Fraud <troup (MFO) <>fthc Victori11 police. 
The study identified a numhcr nf inter-relationships hetwecn ofJCncc, offender and 
victim characteristics. The findings obtained also confirmed the upplicabl!ity of the 
model in the field <md yielded a two-level aiminaf profile of serious fi-aud of!Cmlcrs 
which includes a new taxunomy of such of!Cnders. lhe taxonomy consists of twelve 
specific typologies. In addition, the MFG study findings cast doubt (I) on Gottli"cdson 
and Hirschi's (1990) assertion in their General Theory of Crime that white-collar 
offenders are not significantly different from common offenders and (2) on a biiSic 
premise of Loebbeekc et al.'s ( 1989) fraud risk-assessment model that all three 
components oftheir model need to be present for fraud to occur. 
The experience of auditors with deteeting six different types of material irregularities, 
including management frnud, employl;!e fraud and error, was investigated in a postal 
survey of I 08 auditors. The findings provide support for the applicability of the eclectic 
fraud detection model. The survey also found that: it is rare for even experienced 
auditors to encounter material irregularities; that different types of irregularity (e.g., 
management fraud) occur more frequ~ntly in some industries (manufacturing and 
construction) than in others; the irregularity is likely to take one fonn (e.g., window 
dressing and misappropriation of funds) rather than another; and management review 
and tests of controls are more likely to alert an auditor to the existence of management 
fraud. In support of earlier research findings, data analysis revealed tlmt the lack of ru1 
effective internal control system and the absence of a code of corporate conduct arc 
statistically significant correlates of an irregularity having a material impact on the 
.i v 
financial accounts of a company. In contrast to claims by l.ochlmckc ct al. ( I!JK\J), thu 
survey lindings show thatli'nud risk-assessment utilising rud llag~ alone is not cfkctivc 
nnd the presence of only two (and not nllthrec) of their model's components need to he 
present for management fraud to occur. 
Both the ROP model and the eclectic fraud detection model were further refined in the 
light of the findings from the two empirical studies. Without ignoring limitations of the 
two surveys, the work reported in the present thesis sheds new light on the aetiology of 
fraud, shows that neither audit experience nor red flags alone is sufficient to improve 
' 
auditors' fraud detection performance and provide another dimension to fraud risk-
assessment l11e new knowledge should be added to the auditor's rumoury to enhance 
the audit effectiveness and efficiency and to reduce the fraud detection component of 
the expectation gap. 
,, 
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INTRODLJC'I'ION 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
ll1is chapter discusses auditors' rcsponsibilitie~ for fraud detection and provides a 
motivation for the studies reported in this thesis. 
1.0 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
The Australian Accounting Research Foundation AUS 210 (AARF) (!995a, 
para.OS(a)), defines fraud "as any act which involves the use of deception to obtain an 
illegal advantage", i.e., the misappropriation of assets or intentional misstatements in 
the accounts by management, employees or third parties. Fraud may involve: 
manipulation, faJsification or alteration of records or documents; suppression or 
omission of the effects of transactions from records or documents; and/or recording,d 
" ·.;, 
transactions without substance; or misapplication of accounting policies (AUS 210, 
para.07). The key concept is deception intended to financially benefit the deceiver in 
one way or anothcr1• 
1 Acts that result In 11 materially misstated financial report arc ofplll1iculnr interest to auditors. Fmucl for or 
against a company can take the fonn ofrmudulcnt finnnciol reporting, also known ns mro~agemcnt fr~ud (i.e., 
'Intentional misstatcmcnts or omissions of ammmts or disclosures in financial stntcmentl") nnd 
misappropriation of assets or employee fraud, also known as dcfnlcation (i.e., "then of an entity's n.<sol<"). The 
!emlS "fmud' (including management and employee fmud) and 'irregularity" nn: 11scd in1en:hangenbly. 
' 
Auditors have responsibilities for detecting und reporting Jfaud. Amliting Stamlards 
and rulings hy the courts provide guidance on this matter. As li1r a.~ common law is 
concerned. a close examination of the relevant judicial pronouncements in Austmlia 
and the U.K.1 shows that it has been a mixed blessing for the auditing profession (sec 
Godse![. 1990 for a discussion). Over the years, it has clarified the auditor's 
responsibilities in carrying out an audit; it lms cast doubt on the auditor's abilit/ to 
safeguard the investors' interests by ensuring that fraud and error are detected, and has 
defended the auditor who is deceived by management~. The relevant common law also 
demonstrates that while auditors do not have a legal duty to detect fraud per se they 
have a legal duty to audit with due care and skill5 and that includes considering the 
possibility of fraud\ "if there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should 
probe it to the bottom''1, and reporting suspicions about fraud to the appropriate entit{ 
It should be noted that "what is reasonable skill, care and caution niust depend on the 
circumstances of each case"9• 
1 Until22 years ngo, d=vc:lopmcnts in tbe common law in Australia used to follow English precedent. Tod•y, 
even though deci~ions by courts In England and Wales are not binding on Australian courts, tbcy arc 
coruidercd relevant and are cited with approval. 
3 U Chclsmford in Spa~kman v, Evans (1868), 3 L.R. 171: Coleridge, U inArnoldv. Armitage 1885, 1 TLR 
670. 
~ Lopes, LJ in Re Kingston Callan Mill Ltd {No.2) [1896)2 Ch. 279, nt29Q. 
5 Lindley, U in lie London and G"eneral DanA (No.2} (1895}, 2 Ch. 677, at 682·683; i ":'CS, LJ in Re. 
Kings/an Callan Miff Ltd (No.2) 2 Ch. 279, at 284. 
6 U Denning in Famento (Stirling Area} Lldv. Se/sdan Fou/1/a/n l'eiJ Co 1./d [195811 All E.R. 11; Moffit, J 
in l'ac!fic AcccptaiJCC v, Forsyth & Oihers(l910) 92 W.N. (N.S.W.) 29. 
7 Lopes, LJ in Re Kings/an Callan Mill l.ld {No. 2) [1896] 2 Ch. 289; Alvcr.;tonc, LJ in Re City &]uimble 
Fire Assuram:c Company [1925] Ch. 406. 
! Pidgeon J in W.A. Chip and Pulp Ply Ltdv. Arthur Yaung& Co (1987) 5 A.C.L.C. at 1004. 
9 Lopes LJ in /le KitJgslol! Cellon Mil/at. 2M8. 
1 
Both locally 10 and intcrnntiunully11 , the Accounting l'roiCssion lmd govcrmw:uts have 
invested heavily in the issue of the cost of lfaud and li"aud detection by uudiwr~. The 
auditing profession in Austrnliu, U.K., U.S., together with the lnternutional Fcdcrution 
of Accountants, state in their auditing standanls" that the responsibility filr the 
prevention and detection of irregularities rests with management and that auditors 
should plan and conduct the audit so as to have a reasonable expectation of detecting 
fraud and other irregularities. It is explained further that while the auditor docs have a 
legal and professional duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in planning and 
conducting the audit, the auditor does not have a similar responsibility to detect 
irregularities that do not have a material financial impact11 . 
The ability of the external auditor to detect material irregularities, including fraud, is 
coming under increasing scrutiny and auditors are under considerable pressure to 
accept responsibility for detecting material fraud. A number of surveys have 
documented that audit beneficiaries want an e:<panded role for auditors as society's 
corporate watchdog and that this view contrasts with that of auditors themselves 
(Humphrey Moizer and Turley, 1992, 1993; Monroe and Woodliff, 1994; Porter, 
1° For Australia sec: the two Senate Commissions investigating the auditor's duties (Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into lhc Activities of the N0g1111 H1111d Group, 198.5; McCusker Report, 1990) 1111d one working party 
commissioned by the ASCPAilCAA which reported in 1994 (But sec Monroe and WoodliiT, 1994, for a 
critique). Tile two accounting bodies in Ausrmlia esL1blished a Fimu-.cing Reporting and Audit E~pectntion 
Gap Taskforce to report on the working party's recommendations. The report wa1 issued in 1996. 
11 For ~\e U.S. see: Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (CAR), (Cohen Commission), AICPA, 1978): 
National Commi~sion on Fraudulent Financial Reporting [Treadway Commission) (AICPA, 1987): Public 
Oversight Board Report (1993): For Crumdn sec the Macdonald Commi.;sion report (CICA, 1988). For tho 
U.K. sec: ICAEW (198S)nr.J Cadbury (1992) but see, nlso, Humphrey ct a\. (1992) for a discussion. 
t2 AUS 210, AARf (1955a, parn.9); Auditing Practices Board SAS 110 (APB), (1995, pam.!O): SAS R2. 
AI CPA (1997, parn.2); and International Federation of Accountants ISA 240, IFAC (1995, parn.5). 
13 Austmllnn auditing standards do not define wlwtls m~ant by reasonable care und skill. Howcl"or, Judge 
Rogers in AWA v. Da11ids. t/a Dclo!rte, Has kim & Sells & Or.; (1992) 10 ACLC 933 determined what is 
reasonable by ruking auditors in n similar tier fimr to the defendant to int~fjlrcl or outline what tlroy would 
have done under the same circumstances. 
,, 
191UI, 1993). The muliting proiCssion has hccn trying to reconcile! the public's 
expectation of umlitors with the potcntiul to safeguard the interest of investors with the 
fact that an audit cannot guarantee th:~t if there is a material irregularity such a~ lfuud it 
will necessarily be dc!l:ctcd .1 00% of the time (Chandler, Edwards and Andersen, 
1993). At the same time, the profession has endeavoured to minimise il~ lcgalliahility 
and costly litigation when failing to detect fraud or error. 
Accounting firms and auditors~' are facing a litigation crisis with ouL~tanding claims 
running into billions of dollars and as much again in settled claims11 • In such litigation, 
what is alleged against auditors is that they have breached their duty of care to their 
client and/or a third party in carrying out the audit and, consequently, failed to detect 
fraud that had been instrumental in causing significant financial loss if not the 
complete collapse of a corporation. Another financial impact is the fact that 
professional indemnity insurance is becoming "increasingly expensive and almost 
unacceptably high" 16 (Gill and Cosserat, 1996:97). 
14 The auditor ofRothwel!s, Louis Clll1cr was personally chnrged and convicted with conspiracy to dcf,mld 
the public by "deceitfully concealing and f~lscly ponrnying Rothwells' financinl position in three nnmml 
reports, plus half-yearly consolid~tcd st~tcment5 in 1988" {Sykes, 1996: I: nnd "Rothwclls omccrs", 1996:5). 
He was sentenced to 4 yean;' and 3 months' imprisonment and was eligible for parole in 17 months 
('Rothwells fraud pair", 1996:3). Caner lodged an nppcnl ag~inst the conviction, which was refused. 
ll The level of litigation against nuditors was one of the issues giving cause for concern in the United 
Kingdom's Auditing Prncticcs Board discussion p~pcr(APB, 1992). 
16 A submission of the Nntional Joint Limitation of Liability Task Force of the Institute of Ch:rrtcrcd 
Accountanl5 in Australia and the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants to the Inquiry into the 
Lnw of Joint nnd Severn! Liability, cstnblishcd by the Federal Attomcy-Gcncml and the NSW J\llomcy-
I 
According to fraud victimisation studies, it appears that the cost nf fhmd is very high 
and indeed it seems to be on the increase (Ernst and Young, 1996 and KJ>MG, I!J1J6, 
l995a). A company fraud victimisation survey by Deakin University (!IJ'J4) sampled 
1,500 medium m1d large corporations in Victoria. Of the 628 (42%) husincss entities 
that responded to the questionnaire, 71% reported fraud within their organisation and 
the cost of fraud was estimated at $941 million. In addition to the cost incurred by the 
victims, the cost of fraud includes the financial costs arising out of litigation against 
auditors who fail to detect fraud as well as damage to the accounting profession's 
credibility. 
The prevention and detection of fraud is expected to continue to be an important issue. 
Criminologists such as Grabosky and Smith (1996) have argued that Australia is in the 
midst of profound social, economic and technological change, and that this brings with 
it increasing opportunities for fraud. The same authors have also argued that new 
fonns of fraud may be expected in many areas of industry, commerce and public 
administration as a result of the g!obalisation of fmancial markets and improved 
technology. A recent survey by the Audit Faculty of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) has found that most accountants expect 
fraud to increase substantially dwing the next five years. This is attributed to a lower 
standard of personal ethics, increased pressure on individuals to perfonn, the impact of 
down-sizing and increased reliance on computers and their sophistication ("Fraud 
Fears", 1997: 13). 
General {1994:3), has quoted the figure of$611,000 per prutner per nonum for the [then] Big Six finns. 
,, 
A study of rmud commission ;unlthc auditor's ability to c.Jetcct Jraud is wummtcd I(Jr 
several rcustms. First, there c;«ist.~ an expectation gup as far as the role of auditors in 
fmud detection is concerned. The courts have statctlthat auditors can be held negligent 
if they have breached their duty of care to their client by not applying "reasonable care 
and skill" in carrying out the audit. However, the auditing profession with iL~ 
mandatory auditing standards indicates that the auditor is not responsible for detecting 
material irregularities and ''has distanced itself from these responsibilities" (Monroe 
and WoodlitY, 1994;49). A better understanding of how and why fraud is committed 
and who is likely to commit fnud should improve the fraud detection abilities of 
auditors, thus enabling them to better meet their Jegai and professional responsibilities 
and the expectations of financial report users. 
Second, by its very nature, fraud is a complex subject and difficult to detect. A~1ditors 
are not very good at detecting fraud as they rarely encounter fruud and they arc not 
usually experts at fraud detection 11 • 'Ibis is partly because there is a void in the 
auditing literature as there appears to be no comprehensive model of the aetiology of 
commercial fraud and its detection by auditors. Although Cressey (1986), Loebbeckc, 
Einning and Willingham (1989) and Albrecht, Wemz and Williams (1995) have 
presented models of why people commit fraud, their models can be criticised for not 
doing so within a psychological, sociological or criminological framework, and for not 
11 Auditing Standard SAS 82, AICPA (!997, para. 7) ncknowlcdgc tbnt fraud, particularly when conccn!cd 
through falsified documentation, is difficult for auditors tn dclect since auditors arc not trained nor arc they 
"experts in such authentication". lt can also he argued thul if nuditors rely on experience alone to become 
experts at identifying irreguhrri!lc:s, then they me unlikely to become experts in due course owing to the fact 
tbnt lm:guhuities are infrequent (Ashton, 1991; Locbbe<.:kc, ct at., 1989). Support for the argumcnltllnt 
auditors arc not experts at fraud detection is found in Ashton's {1991) literature review which shows 
convincingly thot audit cxp•ri•nce alone eannot make nuditors fr:111d-dctection cxpcru. However, KI'MG has 
developed a dntn base of error frequencies for a population of intemntionnl audits (Ashton, 1991 ). 
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dealing adcquntcly with th~ notion of traits tlml render someone to he crime-prone. In 
other words, the existing models mah: nn al\cmptto account lOr individual difkrcnccs 
as far as the aetiology of li"aud is concerned by considering the individual offcntkr's 
personality tmits which predispose him/her to commit fraud under particular 
circumstances. In addition, the three models have also failed to conceptualize the 
opportunity to commit !Taud so as to include the broader socioeconomic context in 
which fraud takes place and to locate it within a theoretical fmmework such as 
Clarke's (1980) situational approach to criminal behaviour. Clarke's approach stresses 
the importance of opportunity, both in understanding the aetiology of crime and crime 
prevention. 
This thesis argues that because management and employee fraud is by its very nature 
complex and difficult to detect, auditors' fraud-detection abilities need to be enhanced 
to enable them to apply "reasonable care and skill" in carrying out an audit. Such 
enhancement can come about by utilising knowledge about the aetiology of fraud in 
such disciplines as psychology, sociology and criminology, and by synthesising 
different approaches to fraud detection. A close examination of a broad range of 
explanations put forward by psychologists, sociologists, and criminologists as to why 
people commit fraud allows the identification of a numbl!r of correlates of fraud and 
enables the construction of a descriptive model of the aetiology of fraud. A better 
understanding of why fraud occurs and the type of individual likely to commit fraud 
should enable auditors to be better at detecting fraud, 
Finally, research into ti"aud is S\:arcc. Very li1tlc is known about the typl.:S or crimes 
commiucd, the chamctcristics of those who commit such crimes and uuditors' 
experiences with detecting fraud. Auditors' thmd detection abilities can also he 
enhanced by carrying out empirical research into fi'aud detection so that auditors letllll 
through tl1e experiences of others. 
The research undertaken in this thesis is intended to encapsulate in a model available 
knowledge about the aetiology of fraud and fraud-detection by auditors. Research has 
been noticeably deficient in both of these areas. At a theoretical level, the critical 
evaluation of available perspectives and empirical findings relevant to both the issues 
mentioned is used to construct a descriptive aetiological model of fraud (ROP model) 
and an eclectic fraud detection model. The model of fraud developed in this thesis 
incorporates and expands on idr:as in the models presented by Cressey (1986), 
Loebbecke et al. (1989) and Albrecht et al. (1995) by incorporating research findings 
from the auditing, psychology, sociology and criminology literatures. The probability 
of fraud oCGurring is modeled as a function of the opportunity (0) to commit the 
crime, one or more motivated crime-prone persons {P) being in a position to .::ommit 
the crime, and the use of rationalisations {R) or justifications to enable the 
individual(s) concerned to commit the crime by overcoming any inhibitions imposed 
by one's conscience or perceptions of the risks involved. Thus, the ROP model 
includes the notions of rationalisations, crime-prone persons and situational factors 
which are found in the psychology, sociology and criminology literatures. The fraud 
detection model developed in this thesis incorporates the ROP model into its design. 
'I 
'l11c applic!lhility nf each nmdclwa:> c.~mnincd cmpiricully in two separate studies. In 
the lirst study, pn:dictinns pcr:incnt to the aetiology of l:~ud generally, and li-~ud 
otli:ndcrs' chnmctt.Tistic:-~ ~·pcdlk11lly, were examined in a"'study of 50 serious fi"aUtl 
cases prosecuted by the Major Fmud Group (MFG) of the Victoria Police. This study 
provides a parlin! test of the ROP model, incbding demographic, modus operandi and 
criminal jll'lticc characteristics of the offenders surveyed. The study furnishes a two-
component profile of the major fraud offender. 
The second study which involved a survey of auditors who had experience in detecting 
irregularities, including fraud, yielded findings about fraud detection and tested the 
applicability of the fraud detection model. Findings pertaining to the notion of crime-
prone individuals, company fraud-victimisation proneness and fraud-detection by 
auditors are reported and discussed. 
Both studies as well as the two models developed are original and enable comparisons 
to be made between Australian and U.S. auditors as far as fraud detection is concerned. 
By providing knowledge that can be used in practice to improve auditors' fraud-
detection ability, this thesis reduces to some extent the fraud-detection component of 
the expectation gap. :.~ 
Ill 
2,U OUTLINE OF TilE TIII~SIS 
In view of the noticcnblc lack of knowledge by auditors as li1r as the aetiology of Jj-alJ(l 
is conccmcd, the next chapter draws on a num~r of perspectives within psychology, 
sociology, and criminology in order to identify correlates of fraud. A number of 
different theoretical perspectives in psychology, sociology and criminology arc 
discussed and critically evaluated. Chapter 3 examines the usefulness of auditing 
guidelines as far as frnud detection is conc~:med and a number of approaches to fraud 
detection an: also critiqued, including the Loebbecke et al. ( 1989) fraud assessment 
model. 
On the basis of the theoretical discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, two models are 
developed in Chapter 4, one addressing the reasons why people commit fraud and one 
of fraud detection by auditors. Chapter 5 reports lindings from a study of 50 major 
fraud offenders and provides case summaries of 24 illustrative cases. Chapter 6 
describes a survey of 108 Australian auditors' experience of detecting irregularities, 
including management and employee fraud. 
The final chapter discusses both the findings obtained and !he conclusions that can be 
drawn from them, as well as policy implications. The two models discussed in Chapter 
4 are revised in the light of the empirical findings in Chapters 5 and 6. Finally, Chapter 
7 coruiders in what sense this thcsi~: can be said to be making an original contribution 
to the knowledge about the aetiology of fraud and fri~t!d detection by auditors. 
CIIAI'TER 2 
AN INTERDISCII'LINAUY API'ROACH.;ro ·1.'111~ AETIOLOGY OF FRAUD 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The first part of this chapter considers Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) ge11eraltheory 
of crime and empirical studies of white-collar offenders. It then examines a number of 
well-known explanations for criminal behaviour within psychology (in tenns of self-
concept/self-esteem; Eysenck's theory of personality and crime; psychopathy; 
psychodynamic themy), sociology (differential association; control theory; theory of 
drift), and the situational approach in criminology. Offender personality and 
situational correlates of fraud arc also identified. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION: THE AETIOLOGY OF FRAUD 
Deception offences such as fraud arc examples of criminal behaviour. Therefore, 
accountants and auditors should look to the criminological literature for insights into 
the correlates of such behaviour. In the last century, psychiatrists, psychologists and 
sociologists have put f01ward general theories of criminal behaviour1• In most eases, 
the aim has been to provide a single theory that accounts for crime in general. 
However, given the variety of behaviours that can be assumed under "crime", the 
search has been largely unsuccessful. As Walker (1987) put it, the search for a single 
theory of crime can be compared to searching for one theory of disease. Disappointed 
I Sec Blockbum. 1993; Feldman, 1993; and Williums, 1991, rorn:vicws. 
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with the search for a single theory, some criminologists have shiflctl their allcntion 
away from individual offenders ami have, instead, concentrated on dmractcrlstics of 
sitm.1tions which make it easier to commit an o!Tcncc (Clarke, ]l)gf)). 
This chapter discusses a number of theories of crime. To put this discussion in context, 
du: following questions arc considered: 
i. Arc white-collar offenders in some significant way different from conventional 
offenders? 
H. Can existing theories of criminal behaviour provide an adequate explanation 
for white-collar crime in general and fraud in particular? 
iii. If a specific explanation for white-collar offences like fraud is needed, should 
we look for causes within the individual offender, the situation in which the 
offence is committed or both? 
iv. Can one legitimately talk about causes or correlates regarding the question of 
who, how, and why fraud is commil!cd? 
Following the discussion of the various theories of crime from a criminological 
perspective, auditing theories of fraud detection arc considered in the next chapter. 
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2.11 J•:XI'LANATIONS FOR WIIITJ•:-COLLAR OI•'FENDJmS 
2.1 Can gtntr,ll thcori!;!s of criminal hchaviuur ,,rovitlc an adciJUlltc 
cxphm:1tion for whitc-coll:1r crime in gcncral:1ml fraud in particular'! 
Theories of criminal behaviour in tl1c twentieth century have been dominated by 
positivism. Positivism in criminology is based on the belief that human behaviour is 
detennined, i.e., that there are causes of human behaviour which can be explained by 
natural laws. Another characteristic of positivism is that one should be concerned with 
"facts" rather than metaphysical issues. Finally, positivistic criminologists believe that 
the best way to discover the natural laws governing a particular behaviour is by means 
of the "scientific method" as used in the natura! sciences (Blackburn, 1993;18). 
Deterministic explanations of criminal behaviour are found in psychiatry, psychology 
and sociology. 
Positivist theories in criminology explaining crime in deterministic terms, have focused 
on the offender in their search for causes of criminal behavioul. This practice is in 
contrast to the Classical School's emphasis on an offender's deeds lli: the result of the 
choices of rJ.tional agents who arc therefore responsible for the behaviour in question. 
Positivistic criminologists have b~en criticised by critical criminologists such as 
Ta:,'\Or, Walton, and Young (1973) for: (I) not questioning the concept of ''causes"; (2) 
ignoring the fact that hwnan behaviour is rational and people internet with their 
environment (including the criminal justice system) in a dynamic way; (3) not 
questioning the medical model; und (4) for lrcaling people ns passive rather than active 
2 Positiv!SIIc criminologists olso emphasise tho need to rchnbilitntc, rnlhcr Oum punish, the offender, 
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decision makers. Positivism characterises most theories of cr!'lnc in this century, 
including theories of white-collar crilm:. 
In contrast, the Classical School of thought in criminology (sec Beccaria, I 963) builds 
on the premise that offenders are agents with free will. Consequently, because criminal 
behaviour is conceived of as the result of rational decision making, i.e., is free willed, 
the Classical School focuses on the type of crime that has been committed anc! 
considers bow serious it is in order to decide the degree of retribution the offender 
should be sentenced to. Unlike those interested in the rehabilitation of offenders, the 
Classical School is not interested in the individual offender and his/her personality, 
position in life, or needs, and thus conceives of retribution as commensurate to the 
severity ofthe crime alone. 
It should be noted that theories of criminal behaviour have been mainly concerned with 
juvenile delinquents (rather than adult offenders) as well as with offenders known to 
authorities. With these limitations of general theories of criminal behaviour in mind, let 
us consider four well-known psychological and three sociological theories of criminal 
behaviour as well as the situational approach to crime. 
" 
2.2 Arc whitc~collnr offcmlcrs in ~omc signilic:mt way different frum 
convcntiomd offenders'! 
Gott!i"edson and Hirschi (1990)1 put forwanl a w.meraltheory of crime which :tllcmpts 
to synthesise both offender-based cxplan<llions (i.e., both psychological and 
sociological explanations that focus on attributes of the individual) as well as offence-
based explanations within criminology (i.e., those that highlight the importance of 
opportunities for crimes to be committed). Drawing on Bottoms' (1993) critique of the 
theory, the following can be said about their general theory of crime: a number of 
explanatory elements are utilised to explain how crimes are possible, namely 
opportunity, a suitable target, a free-thinking but basically self-interested hedonistic 
individual lacking in self-control and making a free choice, and the absence of effective 
crime-prevention situational factors. Noting that committing crimes even in the case of 
persistent, career offenders takes up but a part of their time, the theory attempts to 
account for individu:d differences in how different people are likely to commit 
different offences or the same offences to a greater degree. 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) make use of the concept of self-control. According to 
these criminologists, low self-control is an enduring criminal predisposition which is 
the result of defective socialisation. For them, socialisation, whether effective or 
ineffective, takes shape primarily within the family and the school. They conceive of 
low self-control as a single, unidimensional, enduring trait which is made up of: (I) 
impulsivity, a preference for simple mU1er than complex tasks; (2) risk-seeking, a 
3 Their theory Is a.n extension orHirschi's (1969) ~:onlro] theory discussed in scction4.2 below. 
preference for physical rather than intellectual activities; (3) being self~ccnlrccl; ami (4) 
having an c.~plosive temper (pp.89-91). Low scJt:control is also said to prcdi>rxJse 
people to engage in certain other kinds of irresponsible behaviour which arc not 
necessarily criminal offences (pp.9l-94). Gottfredson and Hirschi maintain that self-
control is Jacking in persons whose socialisation within the family wa~ characterised by 
the absence of nurturance, discipline and training. More spccilically, they argue that 
low self-contrOl is established when parents: (I) do not monitor closely their children's 
behaviour; (2) do not recognise deviant behaviour when it takes place; and (3) fail to 
punish such behaviour (p.97). Furthermore, it is also argued that people with low self-
control are not only more likely to commit o/Tences but arc also more likely to be 
unsuccessful at school, as employees, and in their marriages. 
For Gottfredson and Hirschi, a primary cause of criminal behaviour is the combination 
or interaction of low self-control and opportunity to commit a crime. By itself, 
however, neither factor is a major cause of crime. The general theory of crime posits 
that the incidence of crime in society decreases as a person's self-control increases with 
age. Thus, the conunission of crime is explained in terms of a situation providing an 
opportunity for an offence to be committed and without effective "capable guardians"' 
and the presence or not of a person with weak enough self-control (in tum, a function 
of his/her socialisation and age). 
4 As termed in Cohen and Felson's {1979) routine activilics/opponunity theory, n "c~pablc guOfdian" in this 
context refers to the presence of one or more persons (e.g .• police presence, neighbours looking on) or 
technology (e.g., S«:urity cameros) that discourages offending b~usc it significantly incrcrucs the risk of 
apprehension. In d1c context off mud, the exi~.cncc of middle mMagcmcnt nndfor competent intcnwl audlor 
external auditors who watch out for frnud constitute 11!1 exnmpleofn 'capable guardian". 
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Finally, Gottfrcdson and Hirschi mnin111in that specialisation umong ol1Cndcrs is a 
myth lllld that criminals arc "l'el:mti/e", i.e., they perpetrate "a wide variety of criminal 
acts, with no strong inclinution to pursue a sp~cific criminal act or a pattern of criminal 
&"ts to the exclusion of others" (p.9l). However, as Bottoms (1993:70) states "<he 
empirical world is more complex than Gottfrcdson and Hirschi allow for". Before 
discusf.:ng this and other serious criticisms levelled against the general theory of crime, 
let us first consider some empirical support for Gottfredson and Hirschi's basic premise 
that a combination of low self-control and opportunity is a (perhaps the) primary cause 
of crime. 
Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and Ameklev (1993) reported a self-report study of offending 
that used a 24-item questionnaire measuring self-control and crime opportunity in face-
to-face opportunities with a random sample of 389 adults in Oklahoma City. The 
questionnaire items developed by Grasmick et al. tap six components of the personality 
trait of self-control derived from Gottfredson and Hirschi's conceptualisation of the 
trait Their results support the general theory of crime, namely that it is the 
combination of low self-control and crime opportunity which predicts both "fraud" 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi's term for property offences) and "force" (Gottfrcdson and 
Hirschi's term for violent personal crimes) that the respondents reported committing. 
However, contrary to what the general theory would have predicted, crime opportunity 
was a significant predictor of both fraud and force independent of its interaction with 
low self-control. Grasmick et 31. also found that crime opportunity was a better 
predictor of whether those surveyed had committed fraud than low self-control. 
Grasmick et al. concluded that their findings provide promising support for certain 
" 
aspects of the general theory and that the theory has identified one mechanism th<JI 
afli:cts crime. 'l11cir datu, however, "seem to weaken the theory's structural challenge" 
and falls short of the expectations generated by the appearance of the theory (p.24). 
Piqucro and Rosay (1998), however, have expressed concerns about the reliability and 
validity of Grnsmick ct a!.'s self-control scale). 
Regarding major criticisms levelled against Gonfredson and Hirschi's general theory of 
crime, Bottoms (1993:72) points out that two different schools of thought within 
criminology, positivism and classicism, are treated as potentially complementary. In 
fact, classicism and positivism are inherently contradictory. Other criticisms of the 
theory discussed by Bottoms (see pp.68-73) revolve around: (1) the absence of 
empirical support for their premise that the age-distribution of crime does not vary 
across social and cultural conditions; (2) a failure to show convincingly that their 
theory covers all crime as they claim; (3) available empirical literature contradicts their 
assertion that crimes basically "require little foresight, plruming or effort" (p.69); (4) 
their treatment of the relationship between gender and victimisation is inadequate; and, 
finally (5) they completely ignore "the socialisation and social control potential of 
communities" (p.71). 
Grasmick et al. (1993) criticise the theory for placing too little emphru;is on criminal 
.,opportunity which most likely is linked to social structure. 'l1:te same authors also point 
out that: Gottfrcdson and Hirschi's definition of low self-control includes risk seeking 
whereru; (in an apparently logically inconsistent way) their definition of criminal 
5 See Longshore, Stein nnd Turner (1998) for a response to Piquero Md Rosay (1998) and a defence of 
,,, 
opportunity includes little risk of tlctcction. The validity of Uottfi"cdson and Hirschi's 
assumption that everybody is equally motivated to commit of!Cm.:cs and that individual 
dillCrcnccs in olTcnding arc attributable primarily to low self-control and/or crime 
opportunity is questioned by Grasmick ct al. Finally, Grasmick et al. criticise 
Gottfredson and Hirschi's failure to elaborate on the situational circumstances and 
individual characteristics which might mute or countcmct the effect of low self-control 
(p.25). Consequently, they conclude that the theory "needs expansion, refinement, and 
elabomtion before it can explain crime to the degree Gottfredson and Hirschi imply" 
(p.26). 
Benson and Moore (1992:252) argued that Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory "is 
inadequate in explaining white-collar crime; its rejection of motives as important 
causal forces is misguided". Evidence against Gottfredson and Hirschi comes from 
studies showing that white-collar offenders are different from common criminals in 
tenns of a number of demographic and criminal justice characteristics (Benson and 
Moore, 1992; Marshall, Albrecht and Cherrington, 1980; Thomas, 1992, and Wheeler, 
Weisburd, Waring and Bode, 1988). It should be noted in this respect that a limitation 
of such studies is that they have been concerned with white-col!ar criminals reported to 
the·police and processed by the courts. In view of the large volume of crimes and 
offenders that remain unknown to the authorities (Williams, 1991:51-60), findings 
reported by such studies cannot be readily generalised to white-collar criminals at 
large. Their findings are nevertheless useful in increasing our knowledge about white-
collar offenders processed by the police, courts, and prisons. Another limitation of the 
Grao;mick ct ol.'s scale. 
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empirical studi~s discussed below is that the data upon which their lindin!;S arc huscd 
\\ 
' is dated. There(qrc, it is by no mctms clear whether one should expect, /(Jr cxwnplc, 
today's fmud oftCnders to have the same demographic and criminal ju~tice 
characteristics il!i two decades ago. The last 20 years have seen an increasingly more 
diverse population of people in western countries having tertiary education and 
entering the professions. Changes in the structure and management of corporations 
have affected the job mobility and career paths for many professionals in positions of 
financial trust, factors that affect the composition ofwhite-col!ar offenders. 
Marshall ct al. (1980-cited by Albrecht et al., 1995:7-8) compared incarcerated white-
collar criminals with prisoners serving sentences for property offences6 and with a 
sample of non-criminal college/university students. Compared to property offenders, 
white-collar criminals were more likely to be reported to the police, caught, arrested, 
convicted and imprisoned and less likely to serve long sentences. Given that it takes a 
nwnber of years for people to get into managerial positions or other positions of 
financial trust, it came as no surprise to find that white-collar criminals were likely to 
be older and better educated; they were also more religious and more likely to enjoy 
better psychological health, to be generally more optimistic, hz.v<: higher self-esteem, 
be self-sufficient, motivated, and to enjoy a sense of achievement and family harmony 
and, finally, were more likely to express more social conformity, self-control, and 
empathy. However, they were less likely to have criminal records or to be characterised 
by alcohol and illicit drug abuse than the other property offenders. Compared to the 
6 The tenn "property offence" refers to the following: theft, bu~gtruy, robbery, and fmud (i.e., obtaining 
property or finnnciol advantage belonging to another by deception with the intention ofpcnmmentty depriving 
lheothcrofil). 
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col!~g~/univcrsity student control group, white-collar criminals wtrc li:JUnd to be "more 
dishonest, more indcp~ndcnt, more scxuully mature, more socially c.lcvianl unr.l more 
empathic. However, white-collar criminals were much more similar to ~tudents thilll to 
other property offenders" (p.S). 
Further empirical evidence against Gottfrcdson and Hirschi's theory was reported by 
Wheeler et a!. (1988). They used data from 1976-1978 pre-sentence reports in I ,329 
white-collar crime cases (antitrust offences, securities and exchange fraud, ptJstal and 
wire fraud, false claims and statement~. credit and lending institution fraud, bank 
embezzlement, IRS fraud, and bribery) and a control sample (Noo2Q9) of non-violent 
crimes. They examined characteristics of white-collar crime that distinguish it from 
non-violent offences in a total of seven districts (see also Wheeler, Weisburd and Bode 
(1982)). They found that convicted white-co!lar crime offenders were of a higher 
educational standard and were more likely to have been in employment for longer 
periods and to be white and older in age than those convicted of common crimes. For 
example, the typical white-collar convicted offender in the Wheeler eta!. (1988) study 
was a forty-year old white male, while the typical convicted common offender was a 
black male thirty years of age. More specifically, 45.5% of non-violent common 
criminals were high school graduates compared to 79.3% of white-collar criminals and 
3.9% of the former but 27.1% of the latter were college/university graduates. Wheeler 
et al.'s findings support the common sense view that for someone to be in a position to 
commit major fraud, he/she must have had the necessary education and so forth to rise 
to a respected position over a number of years. Individuals without tertiary 
qualifications, with a serious drug-addiction problem, or with a criminal record, would 
??_ 
be significantly less likely to occupy responsible positions. 
In a di!lCrcnt report that used the &'ll11C sample as Wheeler ct al. (1981!), Wcisburd, 
Chayet ruJd Waring (1990), examined the criminal careers of white-collar offenders 
and found that they started their criminal career at a later age than common criminals. 
However, Weisburd et a!. also found that a proportion of white-collar offenders were 
recidivists who did not specialise in white-collar crime. 'lltis last finding knds support 
to Gottfredson and Hirschi's basic premise that white-collar offenders are no different 
from common offenders and do not specialise in their criminal activities. Further 
support for Gottfredson and Hirschi was reported by lbomas' (1992) five-year follow-
up study "of 588 persons convicted in one week in 1980" (p.l25) in New Zealand 
which included 44 fraud offenders. Thomas (p.l25) tbund that, "many fraud offenders 
re-offended: J 5 (34.1 %) were later re-convicted of the same offence, and 30 {68.2%) 
were re-convicted of fraud or any other offence". Benson and Moore {1 992:255) point 
out that the sample of offenders used by Weisburd et al. "may not represent convicted 
white-collar offenders generally". The sample used by Thomas can be similarly 
criticised. The sample of offenders used in the Weisburd et a!. study was drawn from 
seven judicial districts in the U.S. during the years 1976, 1977 and 1978. They 
examined a number of offence categories of white-collar crime and a random sample 
of 30 cases was selected from each offence category in each of the seven districts. As 
Wheeler et a!. (1988:336-337) themselves point out, the list of ofTence categories did 
not include a number of important federal white-collar crimes, including bankruptcy 
fraud, conspiracy, and the study relied on data from convicted white-collar defendants 
.. who cannot be considered representative of such ofTcndcrs generally, most of who 
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would remain umlctcctcd. Consequently, the findings of Wcisburd ct ul. cannot be 
extmpolatcd to white-collar crime of1Cndcrs generally. 
Benson and Moore ( 1992) examined the question of whether white-collar offenders arc 
different li"om common offenders by analysing data on 2,462 persons sentenced in 
eight federal district courts between 1973 and 1978 for bank embezzlement, bribery, 
income tax violations, false claims and mail fraud, and I ,986 individuals sentenced for 
three common crimes that included drug offences, postal forgery, and bank robbery. 
Pre-sentence reports were the main source of data. Like Wcisburd et al. (1990), Benson 
and Moore (1992) used an offence-based definition of white-collar crime, i.e., they 
designated offenders as white-collar by the offences they committed rather than their 
social or occupational status. Their findings contrndict Gottfredson ant. Hirschi's view 
that white-collar offenders are no different from common offenders. Benson and 
Moore found that offenders classified as white-collar were less likely to have prior 
arrests, alcohol and drug abuse, and poor performance in high school than those 
classified as conunon offenders (p.265). 
The studies discussed thus far have involved surveying official w:ords on white-collar 
offenders. Langdale (1990) reported an Australian study that used a case study 
approach. Langdale was concerned with two cases only. She attended the court 
proceedings, read the briefs of the case and followed un ru1structured intetview 
approach with the offenders and the victims. No concrete reasons or benefits are 
outlined for tlte methodology used and it is very unclear what the research was testing. 
Qualitative case studies of two cases can provide some useful insight into corporate 
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crimii'tal activity. Langdale found that the offenders did not sec themselves :ts 
criminals; in li1ct they denied having deceived any of the victims. Such case studies, 
however, need to be tOllowcd up with quantitative research. It is doubtful whether thr: 
approach followed by Langdale provides the claimed "deeper understanding of 
corporate criminal activity" (p.16). 
Zietz (1981) also reported using a case-study approach with 100 women inmates at the 
California Institution for Women serving sentences for embezzlement or fraud. She 
first interviewed the women and surveyed their prison records in order to examine 
whether the same conditions (antecedents) advocated by Cressey (1953) in A Study in 
the Social Psychology of Embezzlement: Other People's Money as necessary for male 
offenders to_ commit offences violating financial trust also apply to female felons. 
Cressey's antecedents for financial tr..tst violators who had accepted a position of trust 
in good faith are: (I) conceiving of themselves as having a non-shareable financial 
problem; (2) being "aware that this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the 
position of financial trust"; and (3) being able to apply their "own situation 
verbalisations which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted 
persons with conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property" 
(p.30). 
Cres:>ey found that the most important of the three antecedents was whether someone 
was able to fbrmulate, in advance, a rationalisation that would permit them to justify to 
themselves violating their position of financial trust. Regarding the nature of the 
unshareable fimmcial problem, Zietz (1981:52-61) reported that tl1e following financial 
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problems, also idcntilicd by Cressey, underpinned the tnJsl violation of tlw women in 
her study: problems resulting from personal Jililurc, from business reversals, and 
problems involving pressure or pcrsua~ion by u signilicant person. 1-lowcvcr, Zict1. also 
found that, unlike Cressey'~ male trust violators, none of the women in her study had 
been allCcted by:(\) physical isolation (though many had been adversely affected by 
emotional isolation); (2) problems resulting frOm employer-employee relations; or (3) 
a desire to gain status. Zietz concluded that the behaviour of the women in her study, 
unlike that of the male offenders described by Cressey, "seemed tc have a Joan of Aic 
quality. They showed a willingness to be burned at the stake, if necessary, to obtain for 
a loved one the medical care he needed, or to buy, if possible, the love of a husband 
attracted to a younger woman" (p.58). 
Having found that the female inmates studied did not share the srur· 'haracteristics as 
those reported by Cressey {1953) for his heterogeneous group of 133 melc financial 
trust violators (embezzlement and fraud offenders), Zietz attempted to develop a 
typology of female property offenders in general and embezzlement and fraud 
offenders in particular. She focused on the "problems" the female incarcerated felons 
tried to solve with their embezzlement or fraud and identified two typologies of such 
offenders. The first group consisted of a number of subtypes. First, there were "honest" 
women who breached financial trust in the context of: {I) shouldering their 
responsibilities as mothers and wives; (2) because they were romantic dreamers, e.g., 
obsessed with keeping a husband or a lover they loved too much to risk losing; (3) 
being greedy opportunists who defrauded in order to meet a financial need, and as a 
result came to enjoy a new lifestyle they got used to and, consequently, persisted in 
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defrauding in order to go on enjoying the same lifestyle; :md (4) women who came to 
violate financial tmst as a result of having been pressured into or been persuudcd to do 
so by another person. 
The second group of women identified by Zietz also consisted of subtypes. 'Jbere was 
the vindictive type who committed offences in order to benefit herself on the basis that 
this was justified by what she perceived to be childhood deprivations or hardships she 
experienced as an adult; there was the social cntrepreneu1 who perpetrated a variety of 
fraud offences with or without an accomplice, who planned her crimes and justified 
them by pointing to similar practices by legitimate entrepreneurs in the business world 
or by referring to the criminal avarice of her victims. Another identified subtype was 
the reluctant offender who perpetrated a variety of propert'f offences, but did not feel 
particularly responsible for planning them and blamed a husband or a lover as having 
pressured or talked her into committing the crimes concerned. Zietz reported that the 
two groups of women differed significantly in how they viewed themselves, in their 
motives, in what they valued in life and whether they engaged in a criminal lifestyle. A 
basic limitation of this type of research is how to ascertain the reliability of what one is 
told in interviews in general, especially by incarcerated felons. Inmates may well have 
their ideas about what are _desirable answen; to the questions and numerous factors 
influence how people attribute rt\'lponsibility for their behaviour. Zietz failed to ensure 
adequately the reliability of her data. One way of doing so would be to interview the 
spousesllovers of the women, where applicable. A final limitation of Zietz's study is 
that it is not cleir whether the justifications offered by the inmates were the cause or 
., the effec.t of their fraudulent activity. Despite its limitations, that study does provide 
" 
some insight into the thinking of women imprisoned fbr deception otlCnccs. 
Recasting the typology of ICmalc li-aud ollCnder.s developed by Zietz ( 193 I) in terms 
of components of a model of why people commit ffaud (sec Figure [,Chapter 4), we 
have: (I) motives (e.g., domestic responsibilities, greed, financial pressure, or other 
pressure such as emotional or even revenge on the company by a disgruntled 
employee seeking personal justice); and (2) justifications/rationalisations {so as not 
to lose a husband/lover, the company deserved it). Of course, given a person with a 
motive for committing fraud and being able to justifY it to him/herself, an opf.KJriUnity 
is needed for fraud to occur. What is lacking in Zietz's typology is some explanation of 
the reasons why, under the same circumstances, other women do not commit fraud. In 
other words, what personality attributes of the women rendered them crime-prone in 
combination with particular opportunities/conditions. 
It can be seen that findings from five of the six studies discussed (the exception being 
Weisburd et al., 1990) contradict Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime. In 
other words, white-collar offenders differ from conunon convicted offenders in tenns 
of a number of important demographic and criminal justice characteristics, namely 
being older, better educated, likely to be first offenden;, to have steady employment 
histories and, finally, to be less likely to have an alcohol or illicit drug abuse problem. 
In considering these studies, it is important to bear in mind that different findings may 
reflect differences in the research method used, such as the definition of white-collar 
crime, the types of offences examined and whether the criteria of prior criminality or 
recidivism was used. Furthermore, the term cmbc7zlcmcnt, as used in the U.S., may 
cover a bnr.1dcr mnge of offences than in Australia and New Zealand. It is also 
important to remember that the studies involve convicted white-collar offenders. It is 
unknown whether such oftCnders arc representative of white-collar offenders in general 
since only a proportion of such offenders comes to the auention of the authorities and, 
of those, a number beat the charges against them or, if convicted, arc not sent to prison. 
Consequently, a study that focuses on incarcerated fraud offenders, as Benson and 
Moore (1992); Marshall et al. (1980); Thomas {1992); Weisburd et al. (1990); Wheeler 
et al. (1988) and Zietz (1981) have done, can not justifiably extrapolate its findings to 
the general population of such offenders. The comment made (and whici; would apply 
less to research involving white-collar offenders investigated and prosecuted by the 
police, but not necessarily incarcerated, see Chapter 5) should not be taken to mean 
that such research should be dismissed; rather, that it should be treated with caution. 
Finally, there is still a lot we do not know about what factors motivate fraud offenders. 
Before considering a number of general theories of crime, it should be pointed out that: 
fraud occurs in many forms. A great deal of the published literature on fraud 
uses the term very loosely, often as a synonym for, or in the context of 
discussion of, white-collar crime, i.e., crimes against business. However, not all 
frauds would be classified as white-collar crimes (especially if they occur 
outside an occupational context) and there are white-collar crimes other than 
fraud. Fraud can also occur in the context of corporate crimes or crimes by 
business (Edelhertz, 1983; Levi,1987; Geis, 1991). (Thomas, 1992: 123) 
On the basis of the preceding discussion it can be concluded that Gottfredson and 
Hirschi's general theory of crime is inadequate in explaining fraud. Therefore, auditors 
wishing to improve their knowledge about why fraud occurs should consider other 
theories of criminal behaviour which have been proposed from different perspectives. 
,,, 
A discussion of such theories follows hut it needs to be pointed out that the theories 
concerned have not been tested on white-collar criminals. In the context of the present 
thesis, the justilication of discussing these theories is that they provide useful pieces of 
the jigsaw puzzle of fmml aetiology. 
3.0 PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF CRJMINAL BEHAVIOUR 
Psychologists' interest in crime goes back to the end of the nineteenth century. As 
Thomas ( 1992) points out, psychologists "do not appear to have considered fraud in the 
context of white collar crime in much detail" (p.l23}. In fact, as Blackburn ( 1993:2) 
reminds us, "crime has always been a minority interest among psychologists". 
Psychological research into criminal behaviour has concentrated on who becomes a 
criminal and why. Generally, psychologists have put forward positivistic explanations 
of criminal behaviour. Thus, they are subject to the same criticisms mentioned earlier 
with reference to positivism. It should be noted that critics of psychological theories 
tend to lump them together. H{';Wevcr, as sbo·.vn below, this can not be justified 
because such theories differ significantly. 
In considering the psychological theories discussed below, one should remember that 
there is disagreement among criminologists as to whether researchers should be 
focusing on offenders, offences or both. The usefulness of psychologists' concern with 
individual offenders is appreciated more when one remembers that "acts and 
tendencies ... call for different kinds of explanation" (p.22). It should be emphasised 
that psychologists are interested in explaining individual differences. In this way, they 
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supplement the sociologists' I(Jcus on social am! cultural lhctors us dctcrmimmts of 
crimina! behaviour. After all, individuals who arc brought up in the same environment 
do not necessarily exhibit the smnc behaviour. 
3.1 Self conccpt/cstccm/im:IAC ami criminal bchaviour7 
Behnviouristic psychologists, who like to explain behaviour in terms of conditioning, 
frown upon the notion of the self as a separate "]" or "me" which people experience 
subjectively. Social cognitive theorists (see Bandura, 1989) conceive of the self as a 
structure that proces:;cs infonnation actively. Jn other words, it is viewed as a cognitive 
schema. According to Blackburn (1993), the concept "refers to knowledge and beliefs 
about oneself including attitudes of affective regard or self-esteem. Since the self is 
generally believed to derive from and mediate social interaction, a deviant self-concept 
may also mediate antisocial behaviour" (Wells, !978:197). Psychologists have 
constructed instruments that measure self-esteem (sec Eyo's, 1981, "Tc!lllesse Self 
Concept Scale"). Self~esteem is part of a person's social identity and is said to be 
inversely correlated with a person's degree of neuroticism (Watson and Clark, 1984). 
As mentioned below, neuroticism is a personality trait considered by Eyscnck (1977) 
to be associated with criminal behaviour. 
There are conflicting views about the exact nature of the relationship between self 
concept and criminal behaviour. One such theory is that a positive self concept 
insulates against deviant influences (Reckless and Dinitz, 1967). Another view is that 
people will commit offences if they believe that in doing so their sclf~imagc will not 
7 This section draws on Blnckbum {1993:197~200). 
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suffer. When one's scll:cstccm is low, one is more likely to commit deviant 11c\s such 
us cheating when an opportunity presents itself (Eisen, 1972}. Other uuthors (sec 
Howells, 1978) argue that people arc motivated to maintain their self-esteem or to 
augment it, even if it means committing deviant acts such as crimes. Finally, 
researchers have reported a significant correlation between low self-esteem/negative 
image and non-confonnity in young ofTenders (Richman, Brown and Clark, 1984) and 
between low self-esteem and cheating (Aronson and Mellee, 1968- cited in Feldman, 
1993:287-288). One explanation as to why there are such conflicting views (and no 
identifiable prevailing or current view) between self image/esteem and deviant 
behaviour/offending i5 that there is "a lack of an adequate theory of self concept" 
(Blackburn, 1993:199). 
Social identity theory {Tajfel and Turner, 1986) provides an explanation for the 
relationship between one's self-categorisation and behaviour. This theory maintains 
\hat much of people's social behaviour is motivated by the desire to understand and 
evaluate one's self, and that this desire is satisfied through social categorisation and 
social comparison. Social categorisation refers to how people simplify a complex 
social world by placing themselves and others into categories such as gender or 
successful business-person. Thus, one's social identity is defined by the social 
categorisation process. According to Vivian and Brown {1995), together with the need 
for self-evaluation and understanding, there may be a need for "self-enhancement". In 
other wc·rds, people are motivated by the desire to know and evaluate themselves 
favourably in relation to others, to have a positive social identity and behave 
accordingly (see below). 
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Drawing on the psychology of sciJ:conccpt and social identity, one could hyrMhcsist.: 
that someone in manugcmcnt who regards themselves as competent and a high-
achiever and is accepted as such by their colleagues enjoys high sell: esteem. If such a 
person comes to perceive him/herself as having failed as a professional because the 
company is facing imminent bankruptcy his/her self-esteem will be low, he will 
accordingly be under pressure, and may well commit fraud to re-establish his/her self 
image/esteem/social identity (Kaplan, 1980). 
3.2 Personality and criminal behaviour }! 
3.2.1 Eyscnck's Theory 
Madc!i (1980) defines personality as a set of characteristics, tendencies and 
temperament that have been fanned by inheritance and by social, cultural, and 
t.O.vironmental factors. On the basis of his assessment of available empirical findings 
from a number of criminological studies of offenders under the age of 21 8, Feldman 
(1993:160) states that "there seems, then, some basis for expecting personality 
measures to correlate with criminal behavior and to discriminate between offenders 
and controls", One view is that certain ~rsonality characteristics (e.g., beiug a neurotic 
extrovert, high on psychopathy, having a weak ego or inadequate superego, or being 
characterised by criminal thinking pattems9) facilitate the commission of antisocial 
acts. In other words crime-prone individuals possess certain identifiable 
characteristics/traits. 
8 Sec, for example, McCord (1979). 
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Caspi ct ul. (1994) examined the relationship between personality traits ami crime in 
two studies. In New Zealand, they studied 18-ycar old males and JCmalcs from un 
entire birth cohort. In the U.S., they studied an ethnically diverse group of 12 and 13 
year old boys. In botl1 studies they used personality tests (Multidimensional Personality 
Questionnaire (MPQ)) and a nwnber of independent measures of delinquent behaviour: 
police records of contact, court records of convictions, self-reports, and reports from 
independent infonnants, parents and teachers (pp.J66-7). Caspi et al. found that, 
irrespective of country, age cohort, gender and race, those high on Negative 
Emotionality (the tendency to experience negative emotional states10) and weak on 
constraint (i.e., having a strong tendency to behave impulsively) were more delinquent. 
Crime prognoses in tenns of distinct personality traits, however, has not been 
examined with adult white-collar offenders. 
A well-known theory of personality and crime was put forward by Eysenck (1977) and 
it is known as the Eysenck theory of crime and delinquency. This theory (unlike 
psychodynamic theories such as that of Sigmund Freud - see below) is stated in a way 
that makes it possible to falsify it. Eysenck's starting position is that human beings are 
by nature antisocial, i.e., hedonistic, egocentric and destructive. Therefore, he asks: 
why doesn't everybody commit certain criminal acts? In other words, what is it that 
stops people from committing criminal offences? His answer is that it is people's 
conscience, which he takes to be a conditioned reflex. According to Eyscnek, an 
9 Sec Blackburn (1993) fora discussion of the relevant literature. 
10 Persons high co "negative emotionality" nre said by Caspi ct al. (1994:169) to haven ''low Scncml 
threshold for tile eKperience of negative emotions such ns fear, anxiety, and anger nnd tend to break down 
under stress". 
14 
individual's personality can be measured on three dimensions: extroversion (E), 
JJI!IIroficism (N) and p.\Yr:hotidsm (P). Each of these personality traits is said to have a 
biological basis and the three personality traits can be measured using the Ey.renck 
Personality Inventory (EPI/ 1• 
1bis section draws on Feldman's (1993) and Blackburn's (1993) discussion of 
Eysenck's theory. The three determinant variables are: 
l. Extroverts (E) are said to be low on cortical arousal (i.e., brain stimulation) and 
a high score onE points to a perr.::m who (in contrast to an introvert) is sociable, 
active, optimistic, outgoing and impu!si.ve. Individuals who arc high on E are 
said to be difficult to condition, will not have a strong conscience and, 
consequently, will show higher levels of criminal behaviour. 
ii. The individual who is high on neuroticism (N) has a labile autonomic nervous 
system (i.e., jumpy), which overreacts to painful stimuli (e.g., when being 
punished for behaving in a particular way) and thus interferes with 
conditioning. They are prone to mood fluctuations, are sensitive to criticism, 
are anxious, restless, and rigid. A high N score is said to be associated with 
higher levels of criminal activity. 
iii, As far as psychalicism (P) is concerned, people high on this characteristic tend 
to be loners who search for pleasure, are social misfits and do not feel remorse 
II See Black bum {1993), F~1dmnn (1993) 1111d Williams (1991) for delllilcd descriptions Md appraisals oflhe 
theory. 
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lOr the trouble they cuusc others ami, finally, urc incapable of empathy. A high 
I' score is also said to correlate with higher levels of olfcm.ling. 
Eyscnck's theory predicts that offenders will have higher E, N and P scores. Studies 
which have tested this hypothesis, comparing, for example, prisoners and, non-
offenders as well as studies of self-report offending, have reported conflicting 
findings 12 • 
Farrington, Biron and LeBlanc (1982) reviewed 16 snxlies (including Allsopp and 
Feldman, 1974; Bartol and Holanchock, 1979; Buikhuisen and Hemmel, 1972; 
Eysenck and Eysenck, 1970; Farrington, 1979) which compared offenders with police 
records and control groups. They concluded that while in most of the studies the 
officially-known offenders scored higher on P and N, seven studies which used a self-
report measure of offending reported a significant positive correlation withE, a smaller 
munbcr of studies reported a ~ignificant positive correlation with P and, finally, there 
was no unequivocal relationship reported for N and offending. On the basis of their 
own test of Eysenck's theory in London and Montreal, Farrington et aL concluded that 
it lacked empirical support. 
Eysenck's theory has been criticised by Blackburn (1993) on a number of grounds. The 
following are some of the major criticisms made by Blackburn: (I) it only considers 
punishment and ignores the importance of praise, positive reinforcement, in shaping 
one's behaviour; (2) the EPI can be faked; (3) the P dimension as described by Eyscnck 
12 See Bl~ckbum, 1993, for discussion of such studii!S. 
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contains u lot of iUnbiguitics; and (4) it ignores the importuncc of social li~etors in 
explaining criminal behaviour. 
Blackburn (1993: 127) concludes his comprehensive evaluation of Eysenck's theory by 
stating that: 
It must be concluded that Eysenck's theory of criminality is not well supported 
... the crucial prediction that the ranks of criminals are swelled by extroverts has 
not been upheld with sufficient consistency to justifY confidence in the theory. 
Eysenck's theory has not been tested with white-co!!ar criminals. On the basis of this 
theory one would argue that: 
i. not forgetting individual differences regarding one's E, N and P score and crime 
proneness, people would not feel guilly about perpetrating white-collar crimes 
such as fr,lUd because they have not been conditioned through punishment to 
feel enough anxiety about it so as not to commit such act~; am't 
ii. white-collar crime is very widespread because most people do not disapprove 
of it. 
While fraud victlmisation studies support (ii)13 whether white-collar offenders in 
general and fraud perpetrators in particular feel remorse about their offending remains 
13 Set: Cressey (1986), Dirkisand Nichol (1996). 
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:m empirical question. Chapter 5 reports iindings rclcvWll to 1his ISSUe. Eyscnck's 
theory suggcsl~ some ways that link personality traits and criminal behaviour. Limited 
support for Eysenck's theory is !Ound in the research finding that psychopuths arc very 
similar to the extremely extroverted individuals described by Eyscnck (Bartol and 
Bartol, 1994:323). Psychopathy is a controversial per~onality trait much discussed by 
psychologists and criminologists alike. 
3.2.2 The psychopath and crime 
Psychopath is a clinical tenn which has some validity as a behavioural pattern that is 
both identifiable and distinct. Psychopathy is often measured with the Peychopathy 
Checklist (Hare, 1991). According \f) Bartol and Bartol, psychopaths are generally of 
average or above-average intelligence, sociable, appt!ar fril!ndly, likeablti, well 
educated with broad knowledge and interests (p.323). Additional features of the 
psychopath include an ability to remain calm a.nd collected under :;!Xtremely stressful 
conditions, they do not feel anxious, do not have a genuine sen8e of humour, and they 
appear emotionally flat (p.323). Behavioural pattems typical of psychopaths inelud;!: 
an inability to love and be affectionate towards others and to be extremely selfish; they 
are unable to learn from their mistakes and, when drunk, they "become vulgar, 
domineering, loud and boisterous" (p.323). Psychopaths are constantly under-a.roused 
neuro-physiologically so they have an insatiable need for stimulation, cxdtement and, 
in this sense, they are very similar to the extrt!mely extroverted individuals described 
by Eysenck. In psychoanalytic terms, a p~yd1opath bus a weak superego [see belowl 
(Glover, 1960). 
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l'sychopnths should not, he confused with .wciopa/hl' or people with un anli-social 
personality disorder (APD). As Bartol ami Bartol (1994:323) point out, the terms 
sociopath and APD arc commonly used to refer to recidivist offenders who exhibit a 
distinct inability to learn f<Dm experience. The psychopath, despite also sharing an 
apparent inability to team from experience, may or may not commit criminal offences. 
Most people would find psychopaths difficult to live or work with because they arc 
irresponsible, unpredictable and thus unreliable. Their behaviour follows a cyclical 
pattern in that for a period of time a psychopath will appear responsible and be 
successful at whatever he/she is doing. However, quite unexpectedly, he/she will do 
something which endangers his/her status irrespective of the importance of the 
occasion and however serious the consequences of his/her impulsive behaviour. 
"Because of this cyclical pattern, psychopaths rarely pursue consistent, successful 
criminal careers. Rather, they are more likely to participate in capers or hastily planned 
crimes that offer immediate satisfaction" (Bartol and Bartol, 1994:323). In the light of 
the attributes of the psychopath (e.g., intelligence, charm, selfishne~s, lack of anxiety or 
remorse, sensitivity to monetary gains and a weak superego), one could hypothesise a 
significant positive relationship between psychopathy and a tendency to commit fraud. 
3.2.3 Psychodynamic theory and criminal behaviour 
Freud's ideas have influenced thinking in various disciplines. Blackburn (1993:11) 
points out that while Freud himself "had litlle to say about crime", other 
psychoanalysts have shown strong interest in criminal behaviour because of their 
1'1 
gcncmli(Jcu~ on imlividuul pathologies which arc expressed in crime. Consequently, a 
number of psyclwana!yticnlly·oricntctl authors have expressed views on causes of 
crime, however, there i:; no single p;;ychounalytic theory of crime (p. I I). 
Like Eysenck, Freud regarded people as antisocial by nature. 'l11is is because humans, 
whose behaviour is largely determined by how unconscious conflicts arc resolved, arc 
born with instincts {e.g., aggressive, sexual, death) that demand satisfaction. Freud 
advocated three personality structures and maintained that a child goes through a 
munber of stage:; of psychosexual development (oral, anal, phallic), each of which is 
characterised by an erotogenic zone (i.e., a part of the body which can be the source of 
sexual pleasure). The first component of the personality structUJe is the id. TI1is stands 
for our instincts. Inevitably, the id conflicts with demands imposed by our social 
natures. The need to control the demands of the id gives rise to the ego which mediates 
between the id and external reality. /be ego can thus delay satisfying the demands of 
the id using fantasy and planning. In addition, the ego has at its disposal a nwnber of 
defence mechanisms to help deal wiU1 conflicts experienced by an individual. The 
defence mechanisms include: denial, repression, regression, projection, displacement, 
sublimation and reaction formation. 
An individual's superego represents the norms of his/her parents and social groups. The 
superego consists of two parts: a set of moral principles, a conscience, violation of 
which gives rise to guilt, and an ego-ideal, i.e., stwtdards to which the self aspires, 
which provide the ego with values and goals (Blackburn, 1993:112). If the ids 
demands are incompatible with a person's conscience, then the ego must ciU1cr 
•Hl 
neutmlise them or prevent them from reaching consciousness through the ego's clcfi.:nce 
mechanisms. For example, ifU1e ids demand is for someone to be aggressive towards a 
person they consider momlly wrong to attack, then if this wish breaks thruugh into 
consciousness or is acted upon, the person will experience guilt. The ego, therefore, 
needs to neutmlisc the energy generated by the ids wish or redirect it by, for example, 
denying the unconscious wish or repressing it or displacing it. In cha,melling id drives, 
the ego is guided by the superego. "Superego formation depends on psychosexual and 
ego development through the child's relations with its parents, and is associated with 
the resolution of the Oedipal conflict around the age of five" {p.l12). 
Psychoanalysts explain criminal behaviour in t~rms of inadequate superego fonnation 
and functioning. More specifically, criminal behaviour may result from a harsh, weak 
or deviant superego. According to Blackburn, a person with a harsh superego may 
commit a crime in order to be punished (p.ll4), while a weak superego (i.e., a weak 
conscience) correlates with a person having a psychopathic personality, i.e., one which 
is egocentric, hedonistic, feels no guilt wtd cannot empathise. Finally, a deviant 
superego is one where a boy has a good relationship with his father, but the father is a 
criminal and the boy comes to adopt the father's nonns and behaviour. People with a 
weak superego, j,e,, those who have an underdeveloped conscience, are less able to 
channel their energies into socially approved pursuits and thus feel no guilt when 
committing antisocial acts (Albrecht, Romney, Cherrington, Payne and Roe, 1982:32). 
Blackburn (1993) points out one major weakness of Freudian theory, namely that it 
does not provide a comprehensive theory of crime because it not only fails to account 
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for scvcml JCaturcs of (lrfcndcrs such as their uge hut, also, not all examples of criminal 
behaviour can he auributcd to unconscious conllicts - the Jilct is that muny nimcs 
involve rational decision making (pp.l15,116). In other words, Freudian theory 
overemph:>siscs unconscious processes. Other major weaknesses of orthodox Freudian 
theory are: (I) it ignores the importance of influences on a person's behaviour during 
adolescence and later on; (2) it is not clear whether criminal behaviour is a 
consequence or a cause of neurotic conflicts experienced by individuals; (3) it 
overemphasiscs the importance of unconscious processes; and (4) it is not possible to 
ascertain the effectiveness of psychoanalysis as a method of helping a person resolve 
their unconscious conflicts. 
Despite such weaknesses, Blackburn (1993) concludes that: 
the psychodynamic hypotheses cannot be rejected out of hand. Psychoanalysis 
is the only theory which attempts to deal systematically with the phenomenon 
of affective experience, and contrary to the somewhat overdone positivist 
critiques, the theory has proved to be falsifiable, and has withstood the tr.st in 
severn! respects ... The resistance of psychologists to the r.otion of unconscious 
processes has also begun to dissipate ... and with the ·cognitive' revolution, 
psychology has moved closer to psychoanalysis ... (p.116) 
To !he best of the author's knowledge, none of the psychological theories considered 
above have been tested in the context of white-collar crime. Each provides a useful 
insight into personality attributes of crime-prone individuals and thus goes some way 
towards explaining why people commit crimes. Such knowledge enables us to expand 
on existing models of the aetiology of fraud which, for example, talk about "attitudes" 
and "motivations" (Loebbecke ct a!., 1989) as a necessary prerequisite for fraud to take 
place, but fail to locate their explanation within a conceptual frruucwork, treating the 
individual fraud offender in a vacuum. 
In summary, it can be argued that the personality of the individual o!Tenr.lcr may be a 
significant component of a psychological explanation as to why people commit fraud. 
The psychological perspectives discussed provide some useful pieces to construct the 
personality mosaic of fraud-prone individuals. These include: 
weak superego/low self-control; 
low self-esteem; 
not being attached to other people; 
egocentricity; 
lying; 
lack of anxiety and empathy; 
over-sensitivity to monetary gain; 
need for excitement; 
being indifferent to the consequences of one's behaviour; and 
impulsivity. 
Th.ls Hst does not suggest that an individual must posseSs all the attributes for fraud to 
occur. Possessing some of them can be enough under the right circumstances of 
environmental opportunity and conditions. 
4.0 SOCIOLOGICAL TIIEOIUES OF CIUMINAI.JII.:UAVIOIJR 
Sociologists hnve been con~crned with which social groups become delinquent. Most 
sociological theories of crime hnve been concerned with explaining juvenile 
delinquency by lower-class male offenders. Such theories can be grouped into 
"learning", "strain", "control", "labelling", "conflict" anci "radical" theories. 
Sociologists researching crime have traditiona!ly been interested in identifying causes 
of delinquency in social structure and cultural factors (Blackburn, 1993:87). In other 
words, ''they have emphasised the causal pro~esses in the social environment" (p.88). 
Th.is section considers three well-known sociological theories of crime: (I) differential 
association; (2) control theory; and, finally, (3) theory of drift (see Blackburn, 1993; 
Feldman, !993, and Williams, 1991, for reviews of sociological theories of crime). 
4.1 Differential association 
In an attempt to explain white-collar crime (i.e., criminal offences by persons of high 
socioeconomic status), Edwin Sutherland (1939), put iiJrward the theory of differential 
association (Sutherland and Cressey, 1970). This is a learning theory which explains 
criminality by asserting that crime is learned primarily by association with others. Such 
learning is said to take place in small groups and involves botl1 lhe tcclmiques for 
committing a particular crime as well as the values, attitudes, rationalisations and 
motives necessary for its commission. Williams, (1991: 195) indicates that, "whether a 
person takes part in criminal activities depends on the amount of contact they have 
with criminal activities or with those who Sllpport or arc sympathetic towards criminal 
activities". 
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The notion of dillCrcnlial association is useful in understanding the professional career 
conman who intentionally sets out to victimise a company. Such an of!Cndcr would 
often get him/herself into a position of trust within the company (sometimes by forging 
qualifications and work references or would set up a company to prey on other 
company by exploiting the trust he/she manages to establish) or vis·il·vis the company. 
In their association with other criminals, such offenders can acquire skills and 
techniques useful in committing fraud, such as how to produce forgeries of various 
documents and how to otherwise deceive financial institutions. Another example of 
how the notion of differential association can be applied to the aetiology of 
management fraud is by focusing attention on the importance of the corporate culture 
that often condones unethical and illegal means of acquiring wealth, whether for 
oneself or the company. Adopting such a perspective, for example, might lead a 
researcher to ask about the processes by which a manager becomes aware of and 
adopts the norm that "it is okay to use insider information to trade in shares". A final 
example of how the type of people one associates with can facilitate the conunission of 
fraud is the case where someone in a position of trust in a company that is vulnerable 
to fraud victimisation (e.g., due t0 weak internal controls) is befriended by a non-
employee of the company (e.g., a real estate agent) and together they embark on a scam 
to defraud the company. 
Williams (1991) discusses a number of criticisms of differential association theory 
(pp.197-198)' 
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i. It cannot account for the lirst time a crime is committed bccuusc if the 
behaviour docs not exist, it cannot be learned. 
ii. It does not cater for individual diflCrcnccs when it comes to being influenced 
by one's a'lSociates. As Blackburn (1993:90) points out, differential a~sociation 
·'•, 
is "an incomplete theory, since it rests on vague psychological a~s'~mptions 
about human learning". 
iii. It cannot account for crimes committed by individuals who have not associated 
with criminals or people who hold similar attitudes. Of course, as Williams 
points out, behaviour may be learned through observing others, watching 
television, from books, etc. 
iv. "A further criticism is that this approach carmot explain irrational, impulsive, 
opportunist or passionate criminals, who would then. be acting due to one of 
those factors rather than as a result of anything they have learnt" (p.l97). 
v. It is impossible to measure the effect of differential association as an 
explanation of why an individual has conunittcd a particular crime. 
vi. One cannot, on the basis of this theory, decide whether differential association 
is the cause or the effect of a person's criminal activities. 
vii. Finally, differential association, as formulated by Sutherland (1939) and 
Sutherland and Cressey (1970), is not ··concerned with the process of acquiring 
criminal attitudes and behaviors" or "with their perfomtance and long-term 
maintenance" (Feldman, 1993:234). 
Despite the above criticisms, according to Williams (1991: 198) and Blackburn 
(1993:90), there is evidence for a link between differential association and criminal 
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behaviour. The theory appears to be more useful in explaining white-collar or corporutc 
crime. One could hypothesise, for example, that new business executives arc 
"inducted" into the "executive subculture" and this includes allitudcs and norms which 
are conducive for the commission of certain white-collar offences. Furthermore, 
placing one's self into the category of successful company director, bank manager, 
solicitor, or accountant, defines one's social identity favourably relative to what others 
in a similar occupational position enjoy in life. 
4.2 Control theory 
Control theorists in sociological criminology (e.g., Hirschi, 1969), like their 
counterparts within criminological psychology, start with the assumption that people 
are born free to break the law and that criminal activity is natural since the uncontrolled 
human tendency is to look for pleasure and avoid pain. The search for an account of 
why people commit offences is a search for constraints and/or controls on behaviour. 
Hirschi (1969) argued that four elements are nect:ssary for someone to be a law-abiding 
citizen: 
i. Attachment to other people. Evidence for this is to be found in one's conscience 
and the nonns one has come to adopt, as well as whether one cares about what 
others think. 
ii. To develop a commitment to conventional goals and the responsibilities that go 
with them. 
iii. To be involved in conventional activities which arc incompatible with law-
breaking. 
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iv. To have a belief "in the moral validity of conventional values" (Blackburn, 
1993:92). 
According to Hirschi ( 1969), these four clements arc important because they arc 
associat.~d with the bond between a person and society. If this bond is weak an 
individual will exhibit criminal behaviour. 
Hirschi (1969) does not provide details about how bonds develop or break down or 
how weak bonds produce criminal behaviour or why an individual selects one kind of 
criminal activity rather than another {Williams, 1991 :250). Blackburn (1993:92) states 
that empirical studies have reported conflicting findings regarding the negative relation 
between bonding elements and delinquency that control theory would predict. Finally, 
criminologists disagree on whether control theory can account for crimes such as 
Watergate and oil sanction busting in Rhodesia that are committed by the powerful 
(Box, 1981-cited by Williams, 1991 :262). 
4,3 Theory of drift 
The American sociologist Matza (1969) reintroduced the notion of free will into 
criminological theorising with the idea of "drift". Matza's theory maintains that 
individuals choose to drift in and out of criminal behaviour or, to put it differently, to 
drift between law-abiding and criminal behaviour. In other words, offenders arc not 
committed to criminal behaviour. Matza, too, has been concerned with explaining 
juvenile delinquency. His theory, however, has applications to adult offenders 
(Williams, 1991:239). According to Matza, there are constraints on atTending and the 
stall! of drifi is reached by means of a number of techniqm.!~' rJfneutrali.ralion. These 
are justifications which explain or neutralise the oflCndcrs' criminal behaviour. More 
specifically, they enable individuals to: 
i. Deny responsibility for their offending by blaming factors beyond their control 
(such as poverty, their family background, influence of friends and so forth) for 
their behaviour. 
iL Claim that no one has been harmed by the crimc(s} concerned because, for 
example, the victim can afford the financial loss ancllor the insurance company 
will pay. 
iii. Claim the victim deserved !he harm caused because, for example, the victim 
also commits offences and/or because he/or she or the company provoked the 
offence. 
iv. Condemn the condemners by claiming that they too commit crimes so they are 
in no moral position to condemn the offender and, finally, 
v. Claim greater loyalty to a particular group. This justification may be used by 
delinquents to refer to their loyalty to a street gang, but a white-collar criminal 
could use loyalty to his/her oompany or family in order to justify a particular 
crime. This does not mean, however, that either the street gang or a company 
actually demands that a member or an employee commit a crime. Rather, the 
choice is up to the individual, 
Matza's techniques of neutralisation are no different from the notion of rationalisations, 
justifications put forward by Albrecht, et. al, (1995) or Cressey (1953, 1986) to explain 
I 
why people commit Ji"aud. The theory expluins how it is possible J(Jr someone to lead a 
double life, commit fmud and sec themselves us respectable members of the 
community. There is cmpiricui5Upport for his view !hill individuals are not necessarily 
committed to either criminal or luw-abiding behaviour (Williams, 1991 :242) and the 
theory is not dctenninistic in its predictions. As Williams (1991) puts it, most 
delinquents "have some area of choice as to whether they will perfonn criminal acts 
when both the opportunity and the temptation ari5c" (p.243). 
It is possible for someone to initially get into trouble financially and, as a result, drift 
into criminal behaviour. For example, a bank manager may decide to lend someone 
more money than is justified by the type of security provided, in the hope that the 
excess funds will soon be paid back and/or because, due to a very beary workload 
and/or incompetence as a manager, he/she had no time to do the necessary paperwork 
that would render the Joan objectionable. Subsequently, however, the loan is not repaid 
and the manager ends up stealing from the bank to cover up the bank loan decision. Jn 
i.i' 
thi~ sense, a person may be said to "drift in" to fraud rather than to commit the crime(s) ,, 
' ~tJ. the basis of a rational, free-willed decision. 
\\. 
In concluding this brief discussion of these three well-known sociological the~ries of 
crime, it can be said that theories which attempt to explain juvenile delinquency can 
not readily be used to account for white-collar offenders and why they offend. 
However, particular concepts from these theories (e.g., differential association, weak 
self-control, a person's rationalisations that render criminal behaviour possible) can be 
used to explain causes of white-collar crime. 
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5.0 A SITllATIONAL TlllmRY OF FRAUD 
Unlike the psychological ~md sociological theories of crime, which treat compliance 
with the law a.<> a consequence of internalised norms or moral prohibitions, the 
situational approach to criminal behaviour is concerned with crime prevention (see 
Clarke, \980; Clarke and Mayhew, \980). More specifically, it "sees crime as the 
outcome of immediate choices and decisions, and[ ... ] focuses on the proximal rather 
than the distal influences on crimes as specific events" (Blackburn, \993: 104). Without 
ignoring the importance of individual differr:nces, advocates of the situational approach 
do not assume environmental determini~m. The situational approach to understanding 
why people commit crime developed out of a disillusionment with theories that assume 
crime is the result of some disposition of the individual (p.\04). 
Seen from this perspective, the career, professional fraud offender is motivated to 
exploit and, if need be, to create opportunities. Most frauds, like most crimes generally, 
are best understood as "rational action perfonned by fairly ordinary people acting 
under particular pressures and exposed to specific opportunities and situational 
improvements" (Hough, Clarke and Mayhew, 1980 -cited by Blackburn, 1993:104). 
Conceptuillising fraud offenders as rational decision milters focuses on the aetiology of 
fraud as the result of benefii:J outweighing the costs and could well lead one to 
advocate the use of deterrents to reduce fraud victimisation. Fraud reduction could b.! 
achieved by increasing one's subjective perception of risk of apprehension and severity 
of likely penalty upon conviction, so that the calculated costs of punishment arc 
significantly greater than the individual's subjective benefits or profits of the fraud (See 
!I 
13mithwnitc, 1989). 
6.0-- THE AETIOLOGY OF FRAUI>: WHAT EXI'I.ANATION'! 
Historically, it appears that fraud is more prominent when there is a recession, or an 
avalanche of corporate collapses (Clolcry 1993). KPMG's (1995b) report of Canada's 
1,000 largest companies indicates the following reasons for alleged increases in fraud 
(multiple responses): 
i, economic pressures- 88%; 
ii. weakening of society's values- 70%; 
iii. more sophisticated criminals- 56%; 
iv.,.-; lack of emphasis on prevention- 51%; 
v. staff downsizing- 50%; and 
vi. lack of government intervention- II%. 
There may be cultural factors affecting the detenninants of fraud. An international 
survey conducted by KPMG (1996:8) attributed the major reason for the increase in 
fraud to be "society's weakening values. This wns the nwnber one reason given by the 
regions of Hong Kong, Middle East/Asia, Europe and Australasia. Consistent with the 
Canadian survey, North America and Afuca liSted economic pressures as the major 
reason for the expected increase". 
'{he preceding di~cussion has shown that li"uud offenders arc different lfom common 
ollCnders in terms of a number of demographic <md criminal activity characteristics 
Despite a number of criticisms that can be lcvclicd against the psychological and 
sociological theories of crime, each theory has something to contribute to our 
understanding of the reasons people commit crimes. This knowledge can be 
supplemented through the situational approach, which highlights situational factors and 
conditions providing opportunities for crime. 
Prior research in criminology indicates that a single theory can not account for a broad 
range of criminal behaviours. Given that the tcnn "fraud" covers a list of diverse 
situations and individuals, and because serious fraud offenders do not appear to be 
versatile, the best we can do is to provide a multi-disciplinary explanation for specific 
types of fraud offences. E!liott and Willingham (1980) also recommend that an 
interdisciplinary approach b~>: taken when studying management fraud so as to better 
understand how such acts are committed, by whom, and in what type of organisations. 
Reference was made earlier in this chapter to Blackburn's {1993) argument that 
"whether behaviour is a function of a person or a situation depends on what is meant 
by behaviour" (p.21, emphasis in the original). This point is very importilllt to the 
present thesis and, therefore, Blackburn's argument is quoted at length: 
The claim that behaviour is a function of the situation usually refers to specific 
ao:ts. However, a specific act or occurrence must be (at least) a function of the 
situation, because it depends on environmental opportunities and conditions: A 
could not have hit B without B's presence in that particular context. It is 
therefore tautologous to say that behaviour is "situation specific", because what 
identifies a specific act is the situational context in which it occurs. On the 
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other hrmd, if "behaviour" means a tendency, it is clearly a property of the 
purpose: it is something he or she carries around with them, which is the 
product of their prior history. Terms such a~ "sociable" and "aggressive" ... 
describe tendencies or cnpacitics residing in the person, which arc manifl!st 
only under relevant conditions ... Acts and tendencies thcrcli:Jte call for 
ditTcrcnt kinds of explanations. A specific act is a function of the situation and 
the person. The situation is necessary to provide the conditions and 
opportunities for action, but only !he person has the power to produce that 
action ... traits arc weak predictors of specific acts ... traits summarise average 
and likely behaviour, and cannot reasonably be expected to predict single nets, 
unless other conditions are known ... Theories of criminal behaviour vary in 
whether they focus on crime, as the aggregate of criminal activities, crimes, as 
specific criminal acts or events, or criminality as a disposition to engage in such 
acts (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1988) ... to contrast "situations" and 
"dispositions", or proximal and distal factors, as causes of "crime" is a false 
dichotomy. Clearly, early family experience cannot itself explain why an adult 
commits a specific criminal act. Equally clearly, some people have strong 
criminal dispositions, which can only be explained by prior history, not the 
immediate situation. (pp.21 ~23) 
The studies cited above report correlates of white-collar crime, and characteristics of 
both the person and situational factors. On the basis of such data, one cannot predict 
with accuracy who will tum out to be a major fraud offender. What is needed for such 
a predictive statement is detailed and reliable data on both characteristics of offenders 
and specific situations. If enough such information were available to generate a 
predictive model, then one could attempt to provide a probability explanalion, i.e., how 
was it inevitable that such an act should have taken place? In the absence of such 
detailed infomtation on recurring behaviours or because the behaviour in question is a 
~'ne-off event, the best one can hope for is a possibilily explanalion (Walker, 1977), 
i.e., how was it possible for someone to commit fraud? By virtue of being narrative, 
such an explanation is of an historical kind. The existing empirical literature on li"aud 
offenders only allows for possibility explrumtions. In other words, in attempting to 
~- provide an answer to the question "Why is fraud committed?", the available empirical 
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literature cnnblcs us ~~ point to correlates of fraud that make it possibk Jbr the crime to 
take place. Such factors, whether operating alone or in combination, can be said to 
titcilitatc the commission of the crime. We cannot talk about direct single causes of 
fraud on the basis of relevant Utcorics in criminology, psychology or sociology because 
no single feature of a person or a situation makes it inevitable that fraud will be 
committed. Rather, fraud is more likely to be the result of multiple factors operating 
contemporaneously. 
7.0 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that a number of criminal behaviOur correlates relevant to the 
offender's personality and situational factors have been identified by psychologists, 
criminologists and sociologists. The characteristics of offenders that are likely to be 
related to their criminal behaviour include the following: (a) psychological (weak 
superego/low self-control, low self-esteem, not being attached to other people, 
egocentricity, lying, lack of anxiety and empathy, over-sensitivity to monetary gain, 
need for excitement, being indifferent to the consequences of one's behaviour; and 
impul,sivity) ; and (b) sociological (one's associates, being part of a criminogenic 
corpomte culture, possessing techniques of ncutralising one's guilt, and finally being 
prepared to exploit opportunities). Without ignoring the fact that the theories of 
criminal behaviour discussed have not been tested on white-collar offenders the present 
thesis argues that such correlates of criminal behaviour are nlso to be found runong 
.fraud offenders. TI1c personality correlates of li"aud identilied together with the various 
motives discussed in the next chapter enable us to talk about fraud-prone individuals. 
I 
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The notion of fraud-proneness is used to rc!Cr mainly to a person with low scl/~cuntrol 
who is motivated to commit fmud. One's level of self-control (which renders a pcn;on 
crime-prone) in combination with crime opportunity appears to be worth invcstiguting 
further as one mechanism that affects crime. The existence of an opportunity and 
pressure on someone to commit fraud are not enough to account for individual 
differences in who does or does not commit fraud. 
Given the importance of an individual's personality and motives in any attempt to 
explain individual differences in why people commit fraud, as we!! as situational 
factors (e.g., opportunity), aetiological factors of fraud identified in this chapter are 
incorporated in the model proposed in Chapter 4 and tested in Ute research reported in 
Chapter 5. 
CIIAI'TI·:n] 
AUDITOHS ANI> FJ{AIJJ) IH~TECTION 
CIIAPTim. SUMMARY 
The first part of this ch:~pter discusses why frnud is not detected by auditors as 
frequently as financial statement users would like them to. The focus is then shifted to 
a critical ev:~luation of a number of approaches to fraud detection, including Loebbcckc 
ct a i.'s (1989) fraud assessment model, and the cognitive approach. 
1.0 WHY FRAUD IS DIFFICULT TO DETECT 
Due to the nature of auditing and its inherr;nt limitations, fraud is very difficult to 
detect. Interestingly, a survey of British accountants by the Audit Faculty of the 
ICAEW found that the two areas considered as the most difficult to detect were 
transactions with related parties and manipulation of computer programs ("Fraud 
Fears", 1997:13). One reason fraud is difficult to detect is because it may be committed 
by people who arc familiar with accounting procedures and can cover it up. In addition, 
auditors do not have the: 
requisite education and background to recognise its characteristics ... [and] 
because of the limited amount of time an auditor spends looking at the records 
of a business, he or she typically docs not have the time or inclination to review 
the personal characteristics and lifestyle of possible white-collar criminals. 
(Wells, 1993:93-94) 
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Wells also mentions that there is a built-in conflict since auditors arc asked to 
investigate upper management who indirectly arc the same group that hired them. 
More import;mlly, why should they spend a lot of time detecting fraud when if they do 
there is the "spectre of protracted litigation, grand juries, and trials, and one 
immediately sees why the auditor may hope the issue of fraud never sees the light of 
day" (p.94). 
Another reason fraud is difficult to detect is because auditors do not possess the 
necessary skills. In fact, the U.K.'s APB discussion paper (APB, 1992) identified the 
auditors' lack of skills as a key issue giving a cause for concern. 
Knox, Deputy Director of the serious fraud office (1994), believes that auditors fail to 
detect fraud for the following reasons: 
i. the scope of audit testing and inquiries were inadequate; 
ii. the scope of the auditors' work has been restricted by management; 
iii. the auditors have failed to understand the company's business; 
iv, failure to identify related party transactions; 
v. reliance on uncorroborated representations from management; and 
vi. deteptions practised on auditors. (p.128) 
A further difficulty is time pressure. The AICPA (1978:114-121) recognised that the 
time pressure auditors face leads to increased reliance on management's 
representations. Furthennore, due to tight reporting deadlines, senior personnel are 
spread too thin, hence having an impact on the effectiveness of the amlit. To illustrate, 
Elliott aml Willingham {1980:31) believe tlial "large transactions ncar the end of a 
reporting period have been a feature of a number of fraud cases". Time pressure, 
however, may well prevent the auditor from following up large, unusual and infrequent 
transactions. Such transactions need to be followed up and measures should also be 
considered by the auditor to ensure that light year end deadlines will nol be 
experienced. 
Despite the above-mentioned difficulties, there are some auditors who are able to 
detect fraud even though it might be well hidden (Bell, Szykowney, and Willingham, 
1991; Jamal, 1991; and Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal and Zualkennan, 1992). 
2.0 APPROACHES TO ENHANCING FRAUD DETECTION BY 
AUDITORS 
A number of models have been developed to assist auditors to obtain expertise in fraud 
detection, even though it is a rather infrequent experience for them (Loebbecke et al., 
1989). 
Different authors on the subject of fraud detection have taken different approaches and 
put forward a range of different suggestions aimed at enabling auditors to be more 
effective in detecting fraud, These ran be differentiated into general approaches and 
specific models. 
2.1 General approaches 
There is a growing supply of published texts on how to detect and/or investigate fraud 
(see Albrecht eta!., 1995; Bologna, Lindquist, and Wells, 1993; Huntington lmd Davis, 
!995; and Thornhill, 1995). Similarly, some of the Big Five finns have recognised the 
need to survey fraud victimisation (sec Ernst and Young, 1996 and KPMG, 1996; 
1995a and b; \993a and b), and offer fraud awareness training to thdr clients. 
Arthur (1995) maintains that for external auditors to be proficient at detecting fraud, 
they should be able to use some of the techniques already developed by pre-emptive 
fraud investigators. According to Arthur, Pre-emptive Fraud Investigation "is a review 
intended to assess the vulnerability of an organization to fraud" (p.23). On the basis of 
his survey of suppliers (security !inns) and users (accounting firms) of pre-emptive 
fraud investigation services, Arthur lists the following requirements for auditors 
wishing to be proficient at fraud-detection, they: 
i. need to develop more effective inter-personal skills; 
ii. should acquire investigative work experience; 
iii. should use non-financial information and information external to the 
organisation under review; 
iv. should use subterfuge (e.g., undercover methods, and surveillance); and 
v. should adopt a more susp!cious and proactive attitude towards fraud. 
(j() 
Finally, he recommends that more experienced and senior auditors should be used "at 
the coal !hcc" to review crucial documents and to carry out basic tests to detect fraud. 
One weakness of Arthur's survey is th~t the security firms whose opinion was sought 
about external auditors' fraud detection ability had a vested interest in criticising 
auditors to justify the pre-emptive fraud investigations services their companies 
provided. Also, it is highly unlikely subterfuge will ever become an ar.ccptablc 
external audit tool because it raises important ethical and professional issues. Finally, 
the use of pre-emptive fraud investigation methods will add si!,'llificant!y to the cost of 
an audit, a major obstacle to introducing such methods into the audit process. 
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners Manual (1994:1.601), to 
examine company books and records for fraud, one must know and understand the 
environment where the entity operates (i.e., the business, the industry, major 
customers, the methods of receipts, the procurement methods) and the accounting 
system (i.e., the system of internal controls, past, present and future, internal fraud, the 
audit trail). 
2.2 Triangle approach in detecting fraud 
Sorensen and Sorensen (1980: 196-225) discuss a number of auditing approaches that 
can be used to detect management fraud, nan1ely the Triangle Model, which comprises 
three parts: (I) a strong, involved, investigative board of directors; (2) a sound, 
comprehensive system of internal controls; and (3) alert, capable independent auditors. 
If any of the points in the triangle do not function properly, the entire triangle wi11 
collapse, and the opportunity for management fraud is increased. 
,,, 
In order to avoid the triangle collapsing and the opportunity for fraud increasing 
auditors need to audit the board where the board members do not take an active role in 
the company's opcrutions. Auditors need to ascertain the knowledge and understanding 
of its individual board members, and assess the board's composition and operation 
(e.g., how many non-exe\:Utivc directors are on the board, and whether board members 
attend meetings). In addition, companies should fonn audit committees to assure the 
adequacy and effectiveness of accounting and other controls m well as the objectivity 
of the financial statements. 
Sorensen and Sorensen also advocated management involvement in material 
transactions. A specific "review should be made [by the auditors] to detennine 
management's direct or indirect involvement in material transactions which are 
included in financial statements" (Touche Ross, 1976:10). Red flags arc tied to 
conducive economic factors (e.g., pressure to finance expansion via current earnings 
rather than through equity or debt) and business structures (management tendency to 
exert extreme pressure on executives to meet budgets), hence a procedure like a 
specific review of management involved in material transactions should be integrated 
into the appropriate sections of the basic audit program to avoid over auditing. 
They also recommend using the risk-based audit approach, which requires the auditor 
to have an understanding of the overa!! economy, industry, and environment in which 
the client operates and a general knowledge of the operations of the client's business 
AUS 304 (AARF, 1995c). 
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Elliott and Willingham (1980;38) recommend Umt the audit team's detection 
effectiveness can be cnhancctl by: 
1. Improving the "preparation ofindividuals entering the profession" (p.24). 
ii. Audit finns ensuring that they have "measures of individual's sensitivity to 
evidence of potential fraud, the measures to be used to recruit and promote 
auditors with greater regard for their acuity in detecting fraud" (p.25). 
iii. Varying the "audit procedures from year to year" (p.25) so that perpetrators of 
management fraud do not become familiar with the audit procedures. 
iv. Learning auditing procedures that should have been perfonned in an audit 
where fraud is known to have been committed. To illustrate, following the 
McCusker (1990) report on Rothwells, once again the significance of debtors' 
confirmations became apparent. 
v. The creation of a database of fraud cases to assist auditors in maintaining 
sensitivity to management fraud indicators. 
vi. Appointing members to the audit team with a sociology or a psychology 
background to question employees on their role in the internal controls, or 
interviewing outgoing employees who would least fear reprisals. 
Pincus (1994) recommends an individual approach. She claims that auditing finns need 
to recruit and select auditors who are sensitive to red flags. II is doubtful, however, that 
auditing finns can assess this sensitivity of auditors. She recommends combining this 
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approach with Sullivan's (1993- us cited by Pincus, 1994) frontal 1 and sirJcl approach 
in order for auditors to be effective in fraud detection. 
A practical suggestion about how to enhance auditors' fraud-detection capacity has 
been made by Davidson (1994) who argues that auditors ought to spend time in 
forensic accounting departments to gain knowledge about fraud detection. 
There is undoubtedly a need for the effectiveness of these fraud-detection enhancement 
techniques/approaches to be ascertained empirically. 
2.3 Manipulating trade--offs for the auditor 
In an attempt to obtain more infonnation on the relationship between the occurrence 
and detection of fraud and substantive testing versus complianre testing and audit fees, 
an experimental simulation was used by Matsumara and Tucker (1992) to gain some 
tmderstanding about factors that impact on fraud detection by auditors. They developed 
a theoretical frrunework drawing on game-theoretic analysis and economic 
experimentation. The manager moves first by committing fraud. Unaware of the 
manager's move, the auditor plans his/her compliance and substantive procedures. 
Substantive testing allows the auditor to detect fraud with a probability that increases 
with the level of testing (p.753). They examined the importance of four independent 
I This approach uses increased "manpower nnd heavy artillery· such as larger samples nnd more detail tests" 
(PinC'tS, 1994:91). With this approach, while ouditors will detect frnud, the cost of auditing will increase and, os 
Pincus claims, will have economic rnmiflcntions for the companies 1111d the survivnl of auditing !inns. 
2 This approach involves getting the auditors "smartc~· about frnud (Pincus, 1994:92). Auditors nee<:! to know 
more about the nature of the client's business 1111d the industry ond auditing finns wo11IJ need to invest m their 
auditors' tmining and improve<:! docision mnking. 
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variables oil the auditor's tests of transactions and balances, fraud detection and 
incidence of fraud, namely: {I) the auditor's penally (JinruJcial penalty or loss of 
reputation); (2) auditing standard requirements; (3) the quality of the intcmal control 
structure; and (4) the audit fcc. They reported the following findings using 39 students 
(undergraduate business and MBA) as subjects wha were asked to play the role of 
check<;!r (auditor) and marker (manager): 
i. Increasing the auditor's penalty decreased fraud occurrence, decreased tests of 
transactions, increased detailed tests ofbalances, and increased fraud detection. 
ii. Increasing audit procedures increased audit costs, decreased discretionruy 
testing, increased fraud detection and decreased fraud commission. 
iii. With strong internal controls, auditors increased tests of transactions and 
detected fraud more frequently and managers committed fraud less frequently. 
iv. Increasing the audit fee resulted in less fraud due to increased testing being 
done. 
v. A direct relationship exists between the extent of tests and likelihood of fraud 
detection and, consequently, fraud prevention. 
It should be noted that Matsumara and Tu~kcr (1992) focused on irregularities in 
general, i.e., fraud (misrepresentation of fact) and defalcations (misappropriation of 
assets). Therefore, as they themselves admit, their findings cannot be generalised to 
management fraud (p. 754). A methodologi~al weakness of the Matsumara and Tucker 
(1992) experimental simulation study is its apparent low external validity because they 
used university ~rodents as subjects. In fact, they concealed the purpose of the study by 
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rcfcrrin~;: to managers as "markers" and auditors as "checkers". 
2.4 Tile Red-Flags' Approach 
Under this approach, fraud indicators are cues ("red nags") meant to alert an auditor to 
the possibility of fraudulent activity, which could have a material impact on the 
financial statement in a given circumstance. The use of red flags is evident in textbooks 
on fraud detection (Albrecht et al., 1995, 1982; and Bologna and Lindquist, 1987) and 
in auditing standards AUS 210 (AARF, 1995a). Recognising til~ auditor's difficulty in 
detecting irregularities including fraud, AUS210 (AARF, 1995a) provides a checklist 
of fraud indicators that might alert the auditor to detect an irregularity. 
The notion of "red flags" has been conceptualised by the accounting profession in a 
very narrow way. Price Waterhouse (1985:31) defined "red flags" as "potential 
symptoms existing within the company's business environment that would induce a 
higher risk of intentional misstatement of the financial statement" [own emphasis 
added]. Such a definition ignores attributes of an individual holding a position of trust 
that point to his/her being crime prone, as will be shown later in this thesis (see 
Chapters 5 and 6). It also ignores various external pressures which have an impact on 
an individual and increase the likelihood of fraud being commi!tcd. 
According to Sorensen and Sorensen (1980), the red flags approach began in the mid-
1970's with Touche Ross designing a set of warning signs for fraud. Following ru1 
3 Red nDgs nrc cuc,o; lhut muy be picked up by c~lemnl nuditors or internal nuditor.; which moy put them on 
nolic~ lhnt someone in the company moyb~ engaged in some form offmudulcnl or irnpropcroonducl. 
increase in the expectation that auditors ought to he responsible for fraud detection, 
some of the U.S. Big Six [then] audit firms developed the red flags approach within 
their practices (rincus, \989). 
Uretsky (1980:90-91) emphasised that auditors must be alert for signals that 
management lacks integrity\ conditions that may provide a motive for management 
fraud, and to signs that fraud has occurred. Red flags are situational indicators, which 
indicate thnt the auditor should be more watchful and suspicious than usual. 
According to Elliott and Willingham (1980:28) red flags do not indicate the presence 
of frauct. Instead, they represent conditions commonly present in events of fraud and 
they therefore suggest that auditors should be more concerned with fraud when such 
indicators are present. 
Views similar to Elliott and Willingham have been expressed by Johnson, Grazioli and 
Jamal (1993:485), who argued that neither the use of red flags nor the development of 
specialised individuals have "been particularly successful" in fraud detection. Johnson 
et al. arrived at this conclusion on the basis that the problem of fraud detection is better 
solved "through reasoning rather than through recognition and experience" (p.486). 
4 A questionnaire survey cf t56 nuditors from a [then] Big(, !1rm by Sh~ub and Lawrenoe (19%) found that 
siluational factors that increase professional scepticism include: the c~istcncc of a related party transaotion, client 
financial stress, prior client inaccuracies, ond prior clicnt-audi!or communcation. It was also fou11d thot the 
professional s.:cpticism of tho auditors wns counteracted when the dicntwas important to the practioc of tho 
•udit finn as n source of 1tfcrrals (p.155). 
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KPMG's (1993b) fraud survey of the largest companies in the U.S. found that the most 
frequent reason why frauds remained umlctcctcd was insensitivity to red flags. More 
specifically, it was found that approximately half of the reported fraud "could have 
been detected more quickly had red flags not been ignored" (p.2). 
The effectiveness of the red flags approach depends on the auditor's interpretation of 
the fraud cues, and its correlation with other evidence found during the audit. 
Therefore, conununication among audit team members is imperative to enable them to 
compare, analyse and correlate various signals. For a small audit team this might be 
easy, however, for a large audit team involving up to 100 audit staff, tax consultants 
and infonnation technology advisers, in Hrious offices or even states, it will be very 
difficult to achieve. As Pincus {1989:155) states, studies {e.g., Sorensen, Grove and 
Selton, 1983; Wallace, 1983; also see Jones and Maher, 1987 *cited by Pincus, 1989) 
"have not yet established impressive predictive ability" of the red flags questionnaire. 
Pincus (1989) investigated the usefulness of the red flags approach with an 
experimental study. One hundred and thirty seven auditors, with an average of 18 
months' experience at a large CPA finn, were asked to evaluate the possibility of fraud 
during the planning stage of an audit. An actual case was used. Subjects were asked to 
review a set of detailed background information for an audit client and to assess the 
likelihood that material fraud existed. In order to assist their assessment, about half of 
the subjects were provided with a red flags questionnaire comprising 73 questions 
(while the other half were not) and were given either a case where the current year 
financial statements were materially misstated due to fraud or were given a no-fraud 
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case. Pincus found that: (I) the "subjects wl10 used a red flags questionnaire to aid 
them in fruud risk assessment considered a more comprehensive and uniform ~cl of 
potential fraud indicators than those subjects who did not usc a questionnaire" (p.l6l ); 
and (2) "there was no significant difference in the assessed fraud risk by questionnaire 
users and non-users for a no-fraud case, and the non-questionnaire users outperformed 
the questionnaire users for a fraud case" (p.l60). In other words, the use of a red !lags 
questionnaire did not impact significantly on the auditors' fraud risk assessment for the 
fraud case {p.160). One can argue, however, that the Pincus study did not prove the 
case against the usefulness of red flags for the following reasons: (1) the auditors used 
were relatively inexperienced;1 (2) as Pincus herself admits, several fraud indicators 
listed by non-questionnaire users were not included in the red flags questionnaire; and, 
finally, (3) there is the possibility that "the red flags questionnaire used in this study 
may have underemphasised negative indicators" (p.l62). 
There is general agreement among authors on the limitations of the use of red flags. 
According to Pincus (1989:155), the predictive ability for red flags is limited by the 
nature of the approach. While red flags are associated with fraud, the association is not 
perfect. 
In addition, Pincus (1989) ru1d Purvis (1987) pointed out that one major disadvantage 
of red flags is that they focus attention on specific cues and could prohibit the auditor 
from identifying or observing other reasons. 
5 According to Bonner und Pennington (1990), in ~rdcr 10 make rcu.<onc<.l "sscssments of !he likelihood of 
fmudulent financinl reporting, nudilors should have al lc"st cisllt and onc·hntf years' c.p<ricnce, 
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Rcgrmling the advmttagcs of red flags, Pincus (I 989: ]55) is of the view that they: (I) 
arc functional to the extent that they appropriately raise the auditor's sensitivity to the 
possibility of fraud; (2) add structure to the consideration of fraud; (3) provide 
consistency among auditors; and (4) could increase the possibility of detecting fraud. 
In testing ti.( predictive ability of red flags, Albrecht and Romney (1986) state that 
"this validation is important because most of the red flags were identified from single 
fraud c~,es rather than a statistically valid study" (]).324). As a result, they prepared 
"two qU·estiOimaires, each containing 87 red flags, {categorised into situational 
pressures, opportunity to commit fraud and personality factors). One questionnaire was 
written in the present tense and served as the control group instrument" (1986:324). It 
was sent to partners on engagements where fraud had not been found and was not 
suspected. The partners had to indicate whether the red flags were present. The major 
limitation which detracts from tile survey is that the questionnaire was sent to 20 finns 
and data on 27 past frauds and 36 non-fraud cases were identified. The respondents 
were asked to rank the red flags, and as the authors themselves state, there "was an 
insufficient number of responses to statistically test the red !lags" (p.33l ). It was found, 
however, that only one-third of the 87 red flags were significant predictors of fraud. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that the board of directors plays a crucial role in 
monitoring the actions of top managers and, furthcnnore, it constitutes the highest 
internal control mechanism that performs that task. They also argued that the presence 
on the board of outside directors {who are more motivated to discharge their 
monitoring responsibility and not to conspire with top managers to victimise 
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shu;choldcrs) reduces the risk of limmciul stalcmcnl fraud. In a recent study Beasley 
(1996) examined the relationship between financial statement fraud (i.e., management 
fraud) and the composition of the board of directors. He utilised data on 75 fraud and 
75 non-fraud firms matched for "size, industry, national exchange where common 
stocks traded, and time period". He also controlled for "differences in motivations for 
management to commit financial statement fraud and for conditions that enable 
management to override board monitoring to carry out the fraud" (p.445). It was found 
that the inclusion of a larger proportion of outside members on the board of directors 
(but not the presence of an audit comrnittee) significantly reduces the risk of financial 
statement fraud. 
2.5 Fraud Assessment Model 
Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) and Loebbecke et al. (1989) developed a 
descriptive model based on empirical work conducted. in two studies. A pioneering 
research project, it tried to identify as ml!eh information as possible on both 
management fraud and employee fraud. 
One basic premise of the Loebbecke et al. (1989) fraud assessment model is that 
material management fraud (MI) occurs when the following three components are 
present: (1) conditions that provide an incentive (C); (2) person(s) in position of 
authority and responsibility have a reason or a motivation (M) to commit a fraud; and 
(3) pcrson(s) in position of authority and responsibility have an attitude or set of ethical 
values that allow them to commit that irregularity (A). 
P(Ml)"'J{C,M,A) 
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In developing their model, Locbbcckc and Willingham ( 1988) considered the content 
of the then relevant U.S. Auditing Guideline SAS 53 (AI CPA, 1988) which identified 
£1ctors to consider when assessing the likelihood of management fraud being prcscllt. 
They proposed a reorganisation of those red flags and developed a model which tested 
management fraud cases reported by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
as well as by Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. They recognised that 
their model was biased towards those cases investigated by the SEC. As a result, they 
extended their model in an attempt to gain more information on: "how oficn can an 
auditor expect to encounter fraud? Where is it encountered and how is it likely to be 
detected? What are the common types of fraud? What industries seem to be more 
fraud-prone than others?" (p.3). They contacted the audit partners from one U.S. (then] 
Big Six finn and asked them to participate in a questionnaire sutvey. From the 277 
audit partners who agreed to participate, the researchers selected 165 and administered 
their instrument. The sutvey consisted of two Parts. Part I obtained summary 
infonnation of two types: (I) demographic data about the participant and his/her audit 
experience, and (2) summary information about each of the irregularities with which 
the participant had experience. Part II of the suJVey obtained detailed information about 
one material irregularity which was selected by the participant. The purpose of the 
survey was to obtain a better understanding of auditors' experience wiU1 detecting 
irregularities and to obtain a better understanding regarding material irregularities and 
the presence of red flags. They had a response rate of 73% and the respondents had an 
average of 19.5 years of audit experience. 
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Management fraud' was found to be more prevalent in public than in private 
companies as well as in technology rnlll communications, transportation and 
manufacturing companies, but was less frequently encountered in the educational 
sector. It was mainly committed by top management and occurred in revenue, 
inventory, related parties transactions, other assets, and accounts receivable. Regarding 
defalcations', they were more likely to be committed by a variety of personnel at all 
levels in an organisation and tended to occur in payroll and cash receipts. Finally, like 
defalcations, management fraud came to light as a result of substantive tests. They also 
found that about 25% of instances of defalcation or management fraud occurred with 
new clients and with clients who had been audited for up to ten years rather than for 
those who had been audited for more than ten years (p.J2). The authors concluded that 
since detecting a material irregularity is such a rare event, auditors need to maintain 
their vigilance and not fhil to detect them due to a sense of complacency. 
On the basis of their findings, they recommend the use of their assessment model on 
every audit as opposed to a check-list approach. Their model intemalises the reasoning 
process. The work of Loebbecke and his associates has been important in highlighting 
fraud-vulnerability differences between different types of industries as well as between 
different financial areas within the same company. They also reported useful correlates 
of fraud, which can be used by auditors to help detect fraud. 
6 Man•gemcnt fwud is irregularities including fmudulcnt finantio\ reponing undertaken H> render financial 
stotemcnts misleading SAS SJ(AICP/1, 1988~ 
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Their model, however, contains a number of important limitations which detract li-om 
its usefulness. First, aU(Ji\ors need to make a subjective assessment on each of the three 
components, and if any one requirement is absent, the overall assessed likelihood is 
zero. Since it is a subjective assessment, there is the risk that an auditor might not be 
able to identify a condilion(s) that would allow a material management fraud to occur. 
Furthennore, in practice, fraud can occur with only two clements being present (sec 
Chapter4). 
Second, it has been maintained by Hackenbrack (1993) that how auditors assess the 
risk of fraudulent financial reporting using red flags is related to whether they are 
:JSsigned to the audit of small or large companies. Those (like the ones in the 
Loebbecke and Willingham, 1988, study) who arc assigned to audit large companies 
are more likely to focus on opportunities-for-fraud red flags. In other words, one's 
experience influences one's audit judgement. Consequently, since their model is based 
on a biased sample, it may not be useful to auditors who are routinely assigned to audit 
small companies. 
Third, Locbbecke et al. assumed that the decision concerning whether an irregularity 
does or does not exist is a dichotomous one. However, this view ignores U1e fact that 
irregularities can be located at different points along a continuum and there is 
discretion in deciding whether there is enough evidence to constitute a material 
irregularity. 
7 Dcfalc•tions arc misappropriation of""s~ts by cmployccsSAS 53 (AlCPA, 1988). 
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Fourth, their model conccptualiscs the pcrpctmtor as a pathological individual with 
devi;ml attitudes and ethics. Criminologists, however, question such a simplistic 
perspective of deviance, especially one in tcnns of pathology (sec Taylor, Waltnn and 
Young, 1973). The view that there arc two types of people, honest and dishonest, can 
not be sustained given the amount of evidence from studies of criminal behaviour 
stowing that committing offences (with the exception of a few very serious violent 
II . f I I . . I . . f cnmes) and breakmg all sorts o rues and regu allons ts a c mractcnstJc o most 
people. 
Finally, it is not possible to generalise the findings from Locbbecke et al. (1989) to 
auditors at large because it was based on the responses of audit partners who frequently 
do not perfonn the bulk of the audit work and make assessments on fraud indicators 
but simply review and approve the work of other auditors. Furthermore, their findings 
were from only one firm and the training and audit experience of those audit partners 
would differ from those in smaller firms (see Hackenbrack, 1993). 
2,6 Type of audit experience and differential approach to fraud detection 
Recognising some of the weaknesses in L0ebbecke et al. (1989), Hackenbrack (1993) 
conducted two studies to determine the effect of experience with different sized clients 
on auditor evaluations of fraudulent financial reporting indicators. In a simulation 
study, the author administered a one-tJage description of a hypothetical company to 
establish a baseline from which to evaluate 16 fraud-related situations. Each situation 
was based on a fraud-risk factor listed in the AICPA (1987) Treadway Commission's 
Good Practice Guidelines for Assessing the Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
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Each auditor hml to rate how much each imlcpcmlcnt situation would increase the 
company's exposure to fraudulent financial reporting. After completing the rating task, 
the auditors categorised each of the fraud-related situations as either an incentive or an 
opportlmity. The 21 participants who had three years' audit experience were selected 
from 87 auditors who participated in a national public accounting finn's fourth year 
continuing education course (attendance was not based on industry specialisation). He 
found significant disagreement about the amount of fraud-risk associated with the 
fraud related situations presented. None of the fraud indicators examined was found to 
be significant. 
In a second study Hackenbrack (1993:1 03), examined possible systematic differences 
in auditors' opinions about the relative importance of incentives versus opportunities 
when making fraud-risk assessments as a function of whether an auditor's experience 
had been with small or large clients. The hypothesis tested by Hackenbrack was that 
the stronger a company's control structure, the lower the control risk assessment made 
by the auditor, hence greater emphasis will be placed on compliance procedures. Large 
client auditors are more accustomed than small client auditors to situations where 
control risk is assessed as low, and spend "considerably more time evaluating and 
testing control strnetures ... [and] are more likely to suffer a loss, in tenns of expected 
audit efficiency, if key controls arc found not to be in place and effective" {p.104). 
Large client auditors were therefore expected and were found by Haekenbrack to place 
more emphasis on opportunities than the small eli en! auditors. Hackenbrack (p.l 09) 
goes on to say that if "opportunities do pose a greater threat in large companies than in 
small companies, one implication is that audit efficiency could suiTer if an auditor 
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typicnlly assigned to large engagements were to be assigned to a small engagement." 
He believes that being an expert in large companies rather than small ones, the auditor 
would perceive that there exists an abumlancc of opportunities in the small company, 
and would assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting as "high" and perhaps be 
Jmnccessarily sceptical. 
In Hackenbrac!:'s second study, three audit partners, one at each of the offices of two 
national accounting finns, coordinated the distribution of experimental materials to 
auditors with about three years' audit experience. The materials were given to equal 
numbers of subjects from two groups: one with experience mainly on small companies 
and another with experience on large companies. In order to establish a baseline from 
which to evaluate eight fraud-related situations, the auditors first read a one-page 
description of the same fictitious company used in study one. Four of the situations 
were incentives to commit fraudulent financial reporting and four were opportunities 
that rendered such fraud possible. 
The subjects were asked to categorise each of the eight fraud-related situations as either 
an incentive or an opportunity. More specifically, the subjects carried out two tasks. 
Initially, they carried out a paired-comparison which required them to judge the 
relative fraud risk created by each incentive V1S-d-v1:S each opportunity. For each pair of 
situations they indicated which situation created the greater risk of fraudulent reporting, 
and rated it by how much on a seven-point scale. The subjects were then given ennis 
011 which were reproduced the eight fraud-related situations. They had to sort them so 
as to have the situation that created the greatest fraud risk on top nnd the least fraud-
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risk situation at the bollom of the pack. A pair of fraud-related situations WllS rated 
positive if the opportunity was placed on top of the pack and negative if the incentive 
was placed on top of the pack. The total of the 16 signed ratings yielded an index of the 
relative emphasis placed on the opportunities by an auditor. In other words, the larger 
the index, the !,'Teater the emphasis placed on opportunities. Another index was 
computed showing the relative emphasis placed on opportunities by auditors in the 
card-sorting task. 
Analysis of the paired-comparison data showed a positive relationship between the 
average-size company to which the subjects were assigned to during the most recent 
calendar year in millions of dollars, and the relative emphasis they placed on the 
opportunities vis-ii-vis the incentives used in the study. A similar finding was obtained 
with the card-sorting ta~k. The findings were obtained taking into account the subjects' 
months of audit experience, industry experience, prior experience with fraudulent 
reporting, and firm affiliation or office affilHion. Hackenbrack concluded that "audit 
seniors presented with the same facts and instances had different opinions about the 
risk of fraudulent financial reporting. The auditors, assigned predominantly to the audit 
of large companies, placed more emphasis on the opportunities than the auditors 
ru;signed to the audit of small companies" (p.l08). The policy implication of this 
finding is that (!) "such differences of opiillon may lead to differences in planning 
decisions about the extent of supervision, the extent and selection of audit procedures, 
and the degree of professional scepticism to be applied on tha engagement"; and (2) the 
need to develop fraud risk engagement tools with high utility cannot be 
overemphasised (p.108). 
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The findings of Hackcnbrack's two studies, however, need to be treated with caution 
because: (I) what auditors say they do or influences them may be diffen:nt from what 
they actually do and what factors influence them in real audit work; (2) the auditors 
who participated had on average 37 months' experience in auditing and only 33% of 
them had experienced fraud detection, i.e., the respondents were relatively 
inexperienced in fraud detcction1; and (3) Hackenbrack did not instruct his subjects to 
make any assumptions about materiality levels, despite the fact that they were 
'\·reminded that the definition of fraudulent financial reporting is intentional material 
misstatement. Hackenbrack's studies point to the importance of auditors' experience 
with different size clients (it could be argued that partners in the then Big Six firms 
would have bigger size clients than smaller tier firms, which indicates a possible 
weakness in the Loebbecke eta\. ( 1989) study). 
2.7 Tbe cognitive approach to fraud detection 
Briefly stated, the cognitive approach aims to understand people's decision making by 
focusing on how they process and utilize information available to them and explaining 
differential usc of the same information. In other words, this approach concerns itself 
with the thinking and reasoning that underlies one's decisions. As will he shown below, 
the cognitive approach has been used to detect fraud by utilising infomtation about an 
auditor's expectations regarding the likelihood that fraud has occurred, and his/her 
degree of perceptual field-dependence (sec below Bernardi, 1994a). From this 
8 Sec Donn or and Pennington {1990). 
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perspective, fraud detection by auditors is largely a function of the extent to which 
auditors selectively perceive, interpret and utilise infbnnation about fmud so as to 
justify to themselves carrying out additional tests. Another way the cognitive approach 
can be used to detect fraud is by enabling the auditor to think like the person who has 
perpetrated the fraud. The auditor is thus able to avoid being fooled by the fraud 
offender's deception tactics (see Jamal, Johnson and Berryman, 1995; Johnson ct al. 
1993). 
2.7.1 Fraud detection: Psychological attributes of auditors 
There is evidence that an auditor's perception of a client's integrity and competence are 
important factors in fraud detection (Anderson and Marchant, \989; Kaplan and 
Reekers, 1984). Using a modified version of the case study used by Pincus (\990), 
Bernardi {1994a) tested the following hypotheses: 
i. fraud will be detected by auditors at a higher rate when they are provided with 
!ow-integrity and competence infonnation about their client; 
ii. fraud will be detected by auditors at a higher rate when their prior expectations 
regarding the existence of fraud increase; 
,, 
iii. fraud will be detected by auditors at a l1igher rate when they are more field 
independent (i.e., are able to recognise embedded figures within larger and 
more complex figures, as measured by the "Group Embedded Figures Test"), 
of high moral development (as measured by the short fonn of the ''Defining 
Issues Test") and are of intcmallocus of control (as measured by the "Internal-
HO 
External Locus of Control Test")''. 
The subjects in Bcrnanli's experimental study were randomly assigned to the 
experimental conditions (i) and (ii) described above, and comprised· 152 managers and 
342 seniors from five Big Six [then] auditing firms in the U.S. it was found that the 
auditors' fraud detection ability was significantly affected by perceptions of client 
integrity and competence only for high-moral development managers. Managers 
outperformed seniors but this difference was moderated by the latter's moral 
development, and finally, a positive relationship was found between an auditor's prior 
beliefs concerning the existence of fraud and fraud detection. Bernardi (1994a) 
concluded that "auditors should be more suspicious about the probability of fraud 
existing" (p.78) and that "accounting fim1s should develop specialized training aimed 
at increasing auditors' awareness of the probability of fraud" (pp.78-79). 
In her discussion of the Bernardi (1994a) study, Pincus (1994) argued that the reason 
why no differences were found between field-dependent and field-independent 10 
auditors may well reflect a shift towards a more field-independent population 
distribution for auditors. Fm1herrnore, that shift may reflect more field-independent 
people being attracted to auditing as a career and/or remaining in the field and not so 
much the increase in computer technology in auditing. Pincus also questioned 
Bernardi's hypothesised relationship between an auditor's locus of control and fraud 
9 Soc Bernardi (1994;1 nnd 1994b) for dct•ils rcgnrding these different tom, 
I 0 A fiold-indcpcndcnt person (the opposite of a field-dependent p<rson) is someone wlw is good •t rccognit.iog 
figures whkh nrc embedded within larger and more complc~ figures (Bernardi, 199~o:71). Ficld·indcpendcnt 
individu•\s hnvc been found to be more effioicnt nt conotructing inferences, to be better "t solvmg pmblcms ond, 
finntly, to detect fraud •t a higher rate (p.71). 
" 
' detection, on the basis that an auditor can influence outcomes and events in the cxtcnml 
audit despite hisfhcr locus-of-control rating as far as everyday life is concerned (p.92). 
Another criticism levelled against Bernardi (1994a) by Pincus (1994) concerned the 
finding that auditvrs who failed to detect fraud were insensitive tu ethical attitudes of 
their client's management. Pincus argued that this finding was attributable to 
weaknesses in the rese[!fCh design used by Bcrnan:ii, namely the extreme manipulation 
of the client integrity/competence or that some ofthe subjects misinterpreted the moral 
development scales used or, fina!ly, that adding the competcncelintegrity scale 
experimental manipulation was unrealistic. Pincus concluded that "further research on 
auditors' sensitivity to management integrity is the only means to detennine whether 
Bernardi's results are disturbingly real or spurious" (p.94). 11 
2.7.2 Using general strategies 
Managers are in a position, if they wish, to wordl"frame" their annual report in such a 
way as to conceal fraud or to otherwise mislead financial statement users (Kalmcman 
and Tversky, 1986- cited by Jamal, Johnson and Berryman, 1995). According to Jamal 
et al. (1995:86), "a framing effect occurs when alternative descriptions (frames) of a 
problem activate different representations in the mind of a problem-solving agent". 
Thus, a ''framing effecl" would refer, for example, to t}!~ impact of changes in 
management's descriptions in the annual report on the auditor's decision making. In the 
ll Su Bernardi (l994b) for his reply to Pincus 11994). 
context of an audit, a representation is a mental image of such task-relevant constmcts 
as materiality 1md audit risk and their interrelationship. Kahncrnan and Tvcrsky ( 19ll6) 
proposed that there are two ways a framing effect can be detected: 
i. Using multiple representations, i.e., considering alternative representations of 
the particular problem (e.g., gains vs. losses). By being in a position to know 
the different solutions for different representations of the same problem, the 
auditor can identify which particular representation is likely to be invalid; and 
ii. using a procedure that will transform all problems into a standard 
represetttation. An example of such a procedure is the convcrston of different 
streams of cash flows into net present value (Jamal et al., 1995:87). 
Jamal et a\. reported that financial statement fraud can be better detected by converting 
alternative versions of a problem into a standard representation, instead of a multiple 
representation. Twenty-four audit partners were asked in a simulation study to think 
aloud while canying out a concurring partner review in four cases in which client 
management had constructed a misleading frame (description of the company) and a 
financial statement fraud. All the (seven) auditors who used a standard representation 
were successful in detecting both management's frame and the financial statement 
fraud in all the four cases used. Auditors using a single representation dete<:ted neither 
the frame nor the fraud. Four auditors who used multiple representations were only 
successful in detecting the company's overall company frame and not the fraud in the 
four cases. Jamal ct al. concluded that their results suggest that a strategy that uses 
multiple representations may not be effective in complex tMk domains such as auditing 
(p.l 02). 
" 
Finally, Jamal ct al.'s findings lend support to the idea that management has the power 
to deceive auditors by using framing ciT eels. Over half (13) of the audit partners who 
took part in their study were deceived by management despite their training, experience 
and motivation not to be deceived (p.\02). 
2.7.3 Using specific strategies to counter management's deception tactics 
Johnson ct a!. (1993) developed a cognitive model using an interdisciplinary approach. 
Their model transforms the problem of fraud detection by auditors into an adversarial 
information processing problem in the context of one auditor examining the financial 
statements of a company, the management of which is assumed to attempt to deceive 
the auditor. Their model proposes that while management attempts to deceive the 
auditor by utilising their knowledge of the business and accounting practices as well as 
deep cognitive strategies and tactics for constructing a deception, auditors can use 
strategies and tactics for detecting such deceptions. Furthermore, they claim that fraud 
detection requires lmowledge which is not based on direct experience of fraud 
detection and consider fraud to be an instance of a deception created in order to cheat 
on a social contract. For an auditor to detect such a deception, they must first 
understand the strategies for constructing a deception. A deceiver can use 
"dissimu!ative deceptions [hiding the real]" or "simulative deceptions [showing the 
false]". For an auditor to detect such deceptions, they need to identify the 
misrepresentation created by the deceiver. Johnson et a\. consider this an easy task 
since there are constraints created by the deceiver, for example, information which is 
not readily available to the auditor. Johnson ct al. identified a numhcr of "strategies 
and tactics that have been developed as a means of constructing a deception, and usc 
them to specify constmints that must be processed by any agent that attempts to detect 
this deception" (p.469). 
A basic goal of management is to create a favoumble impression among financial 
statement users such as creditors and investors. Additiomtl goals of management that 
can lead to the creation of a deception were suggested by Turner {1980: I 01 -104 -cited 
by Jolmson et a!., 1993:472) and include the following: 
i. overstatement of earnings {e.g., in order to maximize compensation); 
ii. obtaining financing (credit, capital) despite condition of financial distress (e.g., 
by fulfilling contractual obligations such as bond covenants); 
iii. evading legal tax liability; 
iv. manipulating the company's stock price; 
v, consolidating management's reputation despite unsatisfactory perfonnance 
(e.g., by increasing R&D investments); 
vi. concealing the sale or assignment of fictitious or misrepresented assets; 
vii. fulfilling regulatory constraints (e.g., portfolio restrictions); 
viii. concealing illegal activities (e.g., bribes); and 
ix. embezzling, 
,, 
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Table I (reproduced from Johnson ct !!I., 1993:472) showS seven deception tactics that 
,, 
can be used.tc cover up an overstat~~cnt of earnings. 
Table 1: Examples of Deception Based on the Goal of Overstating Earnings 
Strategies for 
Deception 
Examples of Tactics for Creating Deception 
Masking . Failing to record or disclose an expense or a liability . 
. Eliminating differences with the target representation 
by deleting non-complying items. 
Double play . Improperly ahplying Generally Accepted Accountinf. 
Principles, w ere an item is not individually materia . 
Mimicking . Add in~ a misleading narrative ::bout the company. 
. Sprca mg the extent of the fraud into small 
manipulations, individually not material. 
Dazzling . De-emEhasizing issues by reporting them in the notes 
to the mancial statements rather than reporting them 
in the financial statement. 
Inventing . Creating fictitious transactions or transactions without 
substance. 
. Creating external factors justifying attributes that 
deviate from the mislcadmg representation. 
Repackaging . Changing the labels that characterize attributes in the 
financial statements. 
. Reframing issues to maliciously justifY attributes that 
deviate from the target representation. 
Decoying . Creating "blind alleys"; anomalies which after a close 
examination tum out to be inconsistent with the 
"•-""'"'-' 
misleading representation. 
., 
It would be useful if auditors had some way of identifying intentional misleading 
assertions made by management that constitute fraud. As a starting point, it would be 
helpful to know the tactics management use to conceal fraud in the financial 
statements. Johnson, Jamal and Benyman (1991) reported three such tactics, namely: 
i. by describing a company as expwtding rather than on the verge of colhtpsc, for 
exiUllple, management deceives an auditor into having IUlse expectations about 
the company; as u consequence, the auditor fitils to notice inconsistencies; 
ii. by presenting infonnation about the company in such a way (creating a 
"frame") as to induce the auditor to test non-irTegularity hypotheses in order to 
evaluate inconsistencies that arc created; and 
iii. breaking up an impropriety and presenting and rationalising a series of small 
manipulations to particular accounts in the financial statements (each one on its 
own immaterial) in order to minimise the likelihood of the auditor detecting the 
material misstatement. 
According to Johnson et al. (1993), the strategies the· auditor can use to detect 
deception fall into two categories: 
i. Strategies for finding evidence suggestive of the process used to perpetrate the 
deception. The auditor can first look for "situational" red flags as signs that 
management's personal financial situation is in distress or that a manager's 
compensation scheme relics on the company's income, which would motivate 
management to deceive the auditor. Second, the auditor can look for signs 
showing manipulation activity such as a manager who insists personally on 
approving all payments of a particular kind. 
ii. Strategies that utilise infonnation contained in the manipulation environment. 
The auditor: (1) recognises cues that reveal a manipulation; (2) is cautious 
about what inferences he/she draws in order to avoid committing him/herself to 
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accepting management's representations early on in the audit; (3) reduces the 
scope for numagcmcnt to deceive by making the audit both exhaustive and 
accurate (thus preempting management's attempt to deceive); and finally (4) 
focuses on the goals and limited actions management can take in order to 
concentrate on what and how a manipulation can be cffccted. The last strategy 
is known as the "intentional-based" strategy and is "one of the most likely to be 
uncovered in the concurring partner review task" (Johnson ct aL, 1993:475). 
Johnson et a\. go on to outline four deception tactics (sec Table 2) and the line 
of reasoning actually used by their model to solve the case used in their study. 
Table 2: Correspondent~ Between Detection Tactics and Lines of Reasoning in 
an Auditor Model (Reproduced from Johnson ct al (1993"479)) 
De~eption Tactics Line of Reasoning (partial) actually usc!l by 
the model to solve the Surgical Product Case. 
Anti-repackaging Inventory line of reasoning 
RULE44 
lF an attribute of the environment: IF an expectation for inventory is needed 
. is such that the Deceiver has control Til EN compute it as: last year value of inventory 
over it and • (J+pereent of change in sales). 
. is inconsistent with expectations 
'"' 
RULE45 
• the attribute contributes to the IF the expectation for inventory is available, and 
attainment of one of the ascribed inventory is greater than its c~~:pcctation • 
Deceiver's goals, (l+allowable variation) 
THEN assume that inventory is inconsistent and 
TIIEN hypothesize that repackaging has call the difference between the value of inventory 
occurred and provisionally assume the and its e~~:pecL.1tion *(!+allowable variation) the 
worst case interpretation of that inventory discrepnncy. 
inconsistency. 
RULE84 
IF inventory is inconsistent, 
THEN generate a "valuation of assets" hypothesis 
about manipulation of the accounting process, and 
assign the value of the inventory discrepancy to it. 
-· --- ---- ------- -- --
Anti-double play 
IF an attribute oft he environment: 
is revealing of a manipulation and 
it is not sufficient to conclude that a 
manipulation has taken place 
TIIEN hypothesize that a double play has 
occurred and provi~ionally do not explain 11 
away. 
Anti-mimicking 
IF an attribute in th.! environment 
over which the Deceiver has 
control 
is consistent with the expectations, 
and this attribute is inconsistent 
with another attribute in the 
environment, 
and the fact that the fonncr 
attribute satisfies the expectation 
contributes to the attainment of 
one of the ascribed Deceiver's 
goals, 
TIIEN hypothesize that mimicking has 
occurred and provisionally ignore the 
fonner attribute. 
Anti·dccoying 
IF an attributc in the environment 
a)is inconsistent with expectations and 
b)does not contribute to the attainment of 
one of the Deceiver's goals, 
TIIEN, hypothesize that decoying has 
occurred and discard that attribute 
Changes In Accounting Estimat~: line Iff 
rea.~oning 
RULE2 
IF accounting estimates changes arc grc3tcr than 
zero, 
THEN assume that the change in ~ccounting 
estimate is inconsistent, and assign its full value 
to the homonymous discrepancy. 
RULE II 
IF a change in accounting estimate is 
inconsistent, generate a "changes in policies" 
hypothesis about manipulation of the accounting 
process and a;sign the value of th~ accountmg 
estimate change discrepancy to it. 
----··----···--1 
Successful Research Division line of rcawuiug 
The model has no rule that applies to the 
qualitative infonnation contained in the narrative 
part of the financial statements. 
Functionally, this is equivalent to the 
prescription of the tactics, i.e., to ignore the cue. 
Litigation line of reasoning 
The model has no rule that applies to the 
litigation cue. 
Functionally, this is equivalent to the 
prescription of the tactics, i.e. to ignore the cue. 
Johnson et a\.'s (1993) model of fraud detection makes usc of the "risk hierarchy" 
from Johnson et al. (1992). Their model is a means of solving the problem of frnud 
detection through reasoning rather than through experience and recognition. Its main 
I 
weakness is that it is time-consuming and imposes a high demand on human 
resources, as it requires that every inconsistency, however small, be evaluated as a 
potential fraud. Consequently, its wide adoption by auditors generally (as opposed to 
fraud auditors) is questionable. The moclcl satisfies four independent basic 
information processing requirements, namely: (l) activation; (2) detection; (3) 
editing; and (4) rcvaluation 12 • Johnson et al. (1993) validated the model on four 
known cases and two clean cases. The model was also compared with the judgement 
of 24 experienced concuning partners. Their model was successful in detecting fraud 
in all five cases to which it was applied and it was found that the tactics used in the 
model to detect fraud are very similar with such tactics used by auditors who have 
been successful at detecting fraud. Johnson eta!. (1993:485) concluded that neither 
the use of red flags nor the use of auditors who have specialised knowledge about 
particular industries to examine financial statements has been particularly successful 
in detecting fraud. 
12 Described in more detnil, ~ccording to Johnson ~tal. (1993:476-478) tho four rcquiremonlsl~tages are ns 
follows: (l) in activation the nuditor looks for cues in the nnanci~l statement, calculates expectations, identifies 
inconsislcncics between cues and cxpcclationl, lhus generating potential symptoms of mnnipulations; (2) in 
detection the auditor uses one or more deecption-dctcction tnctics lo genomic hypotheses about the 
mMipulations of tho environment, some ofwhkh concern possible goals of management; (J) editing, in the light 
of the manipulations hypothesized in (2) in using doccp1ion-dctcction tactics, the nuditor edits the initial 
representation in (I) and for ench inconsistency identified in (2) th~ auditor identifies n dollar value which 
expresses its likely impnct on the operating income of the hypothesized manipulation. Finally, (4) in rcvnlua1ion, 
the audilor makes a decision concerning the appropriate action 1o be taken, i.e., Qetcnnines the mntcriatitY of the 
hypothesized manipulations und the conclusion reached is expressed in the nudit opmion. The ~ucccss of the 
method described is based on two principles: (i) coverage· this stales that "success in the task of fraud detection 
is based on the use of dte go:tls of a fmudulcnt management for intcrprcl"tng detected incon~istcncics'", nnd (ii) 
composition • litis >IDles tltot "success in the task oF frnud detection is b35cd on the ~bility of combining cues thnt 
arc function•l to tltc nclticvcment of man•gcmrnt gonls ""clements of a tnrgcr mnnipulntinn" {Johnson cl nt., 
1993;478). 
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3.0 CONCLUSION 
The usefulness of the various fraud detection approaches (i.e., general, triangle, 
manipulating tradc-offs, red nags, fraud ui:scSsmcnt, differential approach, and 
cognitive) described in this chapter will be enhanced if the various approaches arc 
used to supplement one another. To illustrate, the counter-deception strategies 
advocated by Johnson ct al. (1993, 1992) can be supplemented with knowledge 
derived using Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) fraud assessment model. To assist auditors, 
a fraud detection model is developed in the next chapter which integrates and expand 
on the merits of models discussed in this chapter. The next chapter describes and 
argues the case for (I) a descriptive model of the aetiology of fraud; and (2) an 
eclectic fi"aud detection model. Empirical findings about the usefulness to auditors of 
both models are reported and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
CIIAI'TJ<:R4 
MODELS OF WUY PEOPLE COMMIT FRAUO AND FRAUD DF.TI~CTION 
CHAI'TER SUMMARY 
After noting that the literature in psychology, sociolOb'Y, and criminology docs not 
offer one generally-accepted explanation of why people commit frnud, the first part of 
this chapter identifies a number of factors which should be accounted for in a model of 
why fraud is committed. It then proceeds to describe and critique three models/theories 
that have been put forward and their components regarding the aetiology of fraud. On 
the basis of this evaluation and the conclusions reached in the previous chapter, a 
model (ROP) of why fraud is committed is developed and its three components 
(Rationalisations, Opportunity, and Person) are elaborated on. The model's 
assumptions (tested in the empirical research reported in Chapter 5) are also described. 
Also drawing on the discussion in the previous chapter of models of fraud detection, a 
new model is proposed, and its assumptions and aims are described, as are potential 
fraud indicators. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The modeVtheory of why people commit fraud put forward in this chapter incorporates 
and expands on ideas from existing models, It is argued that we can identify factors 
which make the commission of fraud possible, but not inevitable. The factors arc 
presented as "correlates of fraud" since a correlation indicates an association between 
two factors but not a causal relationship. The model depicts the three component~ 
necessary for fmud to occur. Systematic knowledge concerning the aetiology of ffaud 
is then incorporated in a fraud-detection model to enhance auditors' fhmd-d\!tcction 
ability. 
20 THREE MODF.LS OF FRAUD: Albrecht ct al. (1995); Cressey (1986); 
and Locbbcckc ct al. (1989) 
As far as the concepts used by the three models arc concerned, even though they all 
tbcus on workplace fraud they do not use the same terms for it. Cressey is concerned 
with embezzlement while Loebbecke et a]. talk about management fraud and 
defalcations, whereas Albrecht el al. use fraud in such a way as to encompass both. 
For Albrecht et al. (1995) the essential components are presented in the "fraud triangle" 
and consist of: (1) perceived opportunity to commit fraud; (2) financial and/or non-
financial pressure; and (3) rationalisation. These arc explained below: 
i. Perceived opportunity to commit fraud, convert the fraud and conceal the 
offence. Albrecht ct al. provide the following examples of opportunities: lack 
or circumvention of controls that prevent and/or detect fraudulent behaviour; 
inability to judge quality of work; lack of disciplinary action; asymmetrical 
information; ignorance and apathy, and no audit trail (p.27). 
ii. Financial and/or non-financial pressure. Financial pressure includes factors 
such as greed, living beyond one's means, high personal debt, high medical 
bills, poor credit, personal financial loss, unexpected financial needs, (p.20). 
Vk·e pressure includes !Uc!ors such as gambling, dmgs, alcohol and expensive 
sexual rclatiunships. /York-related pre.l'.Wre such as !o get even with one's 
employer or somebody else, getting lillie recognition li1r joh performance, 
experiencing joh dissatisfhetion, fearing losing one's joh, hcing bypassed fbr 
promotion and feeling underpaid, (p.24). Other pressures such as having a 
spouse who insists (either directly or indirectly) on an improved lifestyle or a 
challenge to beat the system. 
iii. Rationalisation. Albrecht ct al. list the following examples: the organisation 
owes it to me; I am only borrowing the money and will pay it back; nobody 
will get hurt; I deserve more; it's for a good purpose, and finally, something has 
to be sacrificed (p.46). 
On the basis of his studies of embezzlers, Cressey (1986) identified the following three 
components necessary for fraud to take place: 
i. Someone with an unshareable financial problem. According to Cressey. people 
have problems of this nature "if it seems to them that they cannot tum to 
ordinary, legitimate sources for sorely needed funds" (p.l99). 
ii. Someone who knows how to solve rhe problem in secret by violating his/her 
position of financial trust. Cressey points out that, "everyone in a position of 
financial trust has hundreds of opportunities to violate that trust. That's part and 
parcel of being trusted - if there is no opportunity for people to steal, it is 
meaningless to say that they are trusted" (p.200). Furthermore, it is oHen the 
ca£e with professionals in positions of financial trust that knowledge and 
,, 
'l4 
techniqLLC5 cunccming fr:.utl arc taught :L~ part of profcssinnal training courses. 
iii. Someom: wlw fmS.I'!'SSt'S neutmlisiiiK verhali.\'1/liom· that render committing 
fraud "right", ttL~!, lOr example, in tcnns of "necessity", "just borrowing the 
money", "don't can:" or "business is husincss''. 
Finally, Locbbccke et al. (1989;5-7) suggested that the following three components 
must all be present if management fraud in particular is to take place: 
i. Condilions (i.e., the "degree to which conditions arc such that a material 
management fraud could be committcd" 1). Examples of conditions listed by 
Loebbecke et al. {1989:6-7) include: management operating and financial 
decisions are dominated by a single person; management (particularly senior 
accounting personnel) turnover is high; organisation is dccentralised without 
adequate monitoring; the existence offrequent and significant difficult-to-audit 
transactions or balances; a weak control environment; failure to establish 
policies and procedures that provide reasonable assurance of reliable 
accounting estimates; conditions that indicate lack of control of activities (e.g., 
constant crisis conditions, disorganised work areas, frequent or excessive back 
orders, shortage or delays); a lack of control over computer processing; 
inadequate policies and procedures for security of data or assets; and complex 
calculations affecting the balance or class of transactions. 
ii. Motives (i.e., the degree to which the pcrson(s) in "positions of authority and 
responsibility in Lie entity have a reason or motivation to commit nmnagcment 
I These= wcak~os:;es in internal cmlln>l.<. 
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fmud"). Examples of motives tlmt may result in management fraud inclttde: 
management places undue emphasis un meeting cHrnings projections; 
profitability of entity relative to iL~ industry is inadc(jualc or incon.~istcnt; 
sensitivity of operating result:; to economic factors (inllation, intt:rcst rates, 
WJCtnp!oyment, etc.) is high; rate of change in entity's indtL~Iry is rapid; 
direction of change in entity's industry is declining with many business failures; 
solvency problems or other internal or external matters that bring into question 
the entity's ability to continue in existence arc present; excessive emphasis on 
meeting quantified targets that must be achieved to receive a substantial portion 
of management compensation. 
iii. Altitudes (i.e., "the degree to which the person or person(s) in positions of 
authority and responsibility in the entity have an attitude or such set of ethical 
values that they would allow themselves - or even seek - to commit 
management fraud"). Loebbecke eta!. list the following: management's attitude 
towards financial reporting is tmduly aggressive; management places tmduc 
emphasis on meeting earnings projections; management's reputation in the 
business community is poor; frequent disputes about aggressive application of 
accotmting principles that increase earnings; and evasive response to audit 
inquiries (pp.6·7). It should be noted at this point, however, that there is an 
inconsistency between Loebbeckc ct al. 's definition of attitudes and the 
examples provided. As argued below, in effect Loebbecke ct a!. 's attitudes can 
not be taken to mean rationalisations. 
All three models postulate three components as essential for an explanation of why 
people commit fraud. As argued he[ ow, howcv•~r, I ,oehhcckc ct al.\ examples l(!r their 
allitmle.\' component arc synonymous with and should he included with their conditions 
component. '!11is is why Table I show~ two components for the Loebbcckc ct al. 
model. While the tenns used by the different authors for cnch component arc cliiTcrcnt 
(see Table 1), all three refer to the need to have a person with a motive who 
rationalises/justifies committing fraud by exploiting a perceived opportunity. 
Table 1: Necessary Components for Fraud to Take Place 
Albrecht Perceived Financial and/or Rationalisations 
opportunity to non fimmcia! 
commit fraud pressure 
Cressey Knowhow Unsharcable Possesses 
Financial neutralising 
Problems verbalisations 
Loebbecke Conditions/ Motive 
Attitude 
Loebbeckc et al.'s "conditions" is synonymous with Albrecht et nl.'s "opportunity". 
Cressey's "the knowledge of how to solve the problem in secret, by violating a position 
of financial trust" (p.l99) appears at first glance to be different from "conditions" and 
"opportunity". However, the notion of opportunity is contained in Cressey's emphasis 
on someone with the knowhow to commit fraud. This is because, as Cressey points 
out, someone can only be said to hold a position of financial trust if he/she has 
opportunities to violate that trust. 
The way Locbbeeke et al. define "attitudes" is synonymous with Albrecht ct nl. 's 
"rationalisations" and Cressey's "ncutralising verbalisations". However the examples 
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of "attitudes" they lbt (sec almvc) arc a set uf company characteristics which arc 
conducive Jlx Jhmd to occur. Thus, unlike 1\lbrcchl ct al. and Cressey, they litil to lfokc 
into account the importance of rationalisations that make fraud possible for an 
individual ollCndcr. This omission is perhaps explained by the filet that they only 
surveyed audit partners, had no data on individual o!Tendcrs and did not draw on 
relevant psychological, sociological, and criminological literature on the aetiology of 
fraud. Recasting Locbbeckc et al.'s model in terms of the ROP model components 
(see below) we have only a crime-prone person with a motive (P) and opportunity (0). 
Loebbecke eta!. (1989) and Cressey (1986) both indicate that all three elements (as 
they state them) must be present if fraud is to take place, Albrecht et al. (1995) nrc the 
only authors who draw attention to their three clements as inreractive. By interactive 
they mean that " ... the greater the perceived opportunity or the more intense the 
pressure, the less rationalisation it takes to motivate someone to commit fraud. 
Likewise, the more dishonest a perpetrator is, Ute less opportunity and/or pressure it 
takes to motivate fraud" (p. I 9). 
In their use of "attitudes" Albrecht ct a!. 's and Cressey's models utilise knowledge 
from such other disciplines as psychology, sociology and criminology pertaining to the 
type of person who is likely to be a fraud offender. However, they all can be criticised 
for: (I) not doing so within a psychological, sociological or criminological theorcticnl 
framework; and (2) not dealing adequately with the notion of traits that render 
someone to be crime-prone. In other words, no attempt is made to nccmmt !Or 
individual differences as far as the aetiology of fraud is concerned by considering the 
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individual otlCndcr's pcroonulity traits whi'.:.h predispose.~ h'mllhcr to commit rmud 
under particular circumstances. '!his is a serious deficiency in their models. Their 
explanations of why people commit lfaud arc inco1nplctc and, consequently, their 
practical usefulness for auditors who want to enhance their fraud-detection ability is 
limited. In addition, all three authors have also failed to conccptualise "opportunity" so 
as to include the broader socio-economic context in which fraud takes place and to 
locate it within a theoretical framework such as Clarke's (1980) snuational approach to 
criminal behaviour, 
The model of fraud developed in this chapter incorpcrates and expands on ideas in the 
three models discussed, including the notion of rationalisations, as well as 
incorporating the notions of a crime-prone person and situational factors that facilitate 
the crime. 
3.0 A MODEL OF WHY PEOPLE COMMIT FRAUD 
The model of fraud put forward incorpomtes the ideas of the three models discussed 
earlier but expands on them by making good their common drawback of ignoring 
individual differences in crime-proneness. The model also: (!) incorporates the 
emphasis on the three fraud elements being interactive; (2) emphasises the importance 
of a motivated crime-prone individual; (3) stresses the importance of offenders' 
rationalisations/ justifications of their fraudulent activity; and (4) acknowledges that 
the process by which employee or management fraud comes to be committed is not 
necessarily a straightforwwd one. 
,,, 
The model also acknowlcr.lgcs !hut fi"aml ollCndcrs arc not homogeneous; some h:wc 
no second thoughlq about embarking on a spree of fraud of/Cnccs; for others, however, 
it can be an agonising decision and then end up being serial fraud offcmlcrs when they 
only intended to commit a single offence. Finally, others continue to commit other 
fraud offences not out of a need to cover up those already committed, but because they 
come to enjoy U1e proceeds of their first offence and believe they can go on 
perpetrating fraud without getting caught. For this type of individual, greed ha~ 
replaced the original need for money to pay a debt. In other words, offenders become 
overconfident, greedy and compulsive, thus continuing offending until they get caught. 
3.1 Assumptions of the model 
The following assumptions underp[n the model: 
i. Generally, fraud is made possible by the presence of three preconditions, 
namely, an opportunity to commit the crime (0); one or more motivated 
crime-prone persons (P) who is/are likely to be in a position of financial 
trust and who has/have the knowledge of how to commit the fraud, convert 
the money, and conceal the offence; and, the use of rationalisations 
(R)/justifieations (i.e., the thinking processes) that enable the individual(s) 
concerned to carry out fraudulent activity by overcoming any inhibitions 
imposed by one's conscience or by one's perception of the risks involved 
(Albrecht eta!., 1995; Cressey, 1986). 
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ii. Ench of the conditions arc correlated with fi"aud occurrence. /Jowcvcr, if un 
opportunity for fraud docs not exist, this docs not ncccss~rily stop a crime-
prone person with a motive and the necessary rationalisations li"om crcuting 
such an opportunity. To illustrate, a professional career fraudster sel~ out to 
infiltrate a company, or even establishes one in order to perpetrate his crime 
irrespective of the state of the national economy, the financial pressures on the 
company or the system of internal controls. 
iii. Fraud offences and offenders are characterised by a significant degree of 
heterogeneity (Cressey, 1953) and no single explanation can account for all 
frauds. 
iv. Employee and management frauds are committed for a variety of motives such 
as having an unshareable financial problem, acting out of love for the company 
and the employees, financial pressure, acting out of greed, wanting personal 
justice, wanting a challenge and, finally, being a professional/career corunan 
(Albrecht eta!,, 1995; Zietz, 1981). 
v. The majority of potential fraud offenders have a perceived urgent need for 
money while a minority seeks some other non-financial reward. 
vi. Correlates of fraud exist at different levels of analysis: society, the individual 
company, the individual perpetrator(s) and, finally, situational factors. 
vii. There are individual differences in how a person in a management position will 
resolve a particular company financial problem and/or a particular personal 
problem that calls for the raising of money urgently (Cressey, 1986). People 
predisposed to dishonest behaviour are more likely to commit fraud ru; a 
solution to a financial problem they face, if they perceive an opportunity to do 
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so mul believe they will not be lbuml ou!. 
viii. There arc individual dilfercnccs in how a r~rson in a non-manugcmcnt position 
will choose to resolve a particular individual/family problem that calls /Or the 
mising of money. Such differences arc largely explained by the crime-
proneness of an individual (Albrecht ct a!., 1995). 
The model of employee and management fraud must account for established facts 
about the offence and the offenders as well as the processes by which the offenders 
come to conunit the offence. It is known, for example, that demographic, criminal 
justice, and personality attributes of such offenders include the following: 
getting first convicted when of a mature age (Benson and Moore, 1992); 
being a specialist offender, i.e., only committing fraud (Thomas, 1992); 
• being predominantly male of high educational status (Wheeler et al., I 982); 
having weak self-control (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990); 
having a weak superego (Blackburn, 1993); 
because of their socialisation into some aspects of co1p0rate culture 
(Sutherland, 1949) there is often an absence of constraints on their behaviour 
because they are not committed, are not involved and do not believe in 
conventional values and goals (Hirschi, 1969); 
• egocentricity (Eysenck, 1977); 
• feeling no anxiet:-; or remorse (Eysenck, 1977); 
insensitivity to the consequences of their behaviour (Eysenck, 1977); 
• over-sensitivity tc. monetary gain (Bartol and Bartol, 1994); and 
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un ability to mtionalise their misbehuviour, neutralise guilt and ~o justify it to 
themselves (Albrecht ct a!., 1995; Cressey, 1986; Mat ... .a, 1969). 
Some of the apparent inter-relationships between the demographic offender attributes 
listed above arc explained by the following·. the upper echelon of the executive world is 
male-dominated, as arc the accounting and legal professions; tertiary qualification.:> arc 
almQst essential for someone to acquire a senior position of trust within a company; it 
takes a number of years before one can lay claim to such a management position and, 
finally, having a prior criminal record as an adult correlates with leaving school early 
and not with completing a tertiary degree (Farrington, 1993). 
A representation of the model is as follows: 
Pr(Fraud)=f(R,O,P) 
The probability of fraud is a function of the three components. The model will now be 
referred to by the acronym ROP (see Figure 1). The three components of ROP are 
elaborated on below. 
Two basic features of ROP are that it attempts to account for: (a) the interactive 
relationship between the different components; and (b) individual differences, i.e., not 
everyone who is motivated to acquire extra money and is presented with ru1 
opportunity to do so actually goes ahead and commits fraud. Another important feature 
ofROP is that it concedes that there is an overlap between the different components. 
·., 
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To illustmtr.:, thr.: far.:t that somr.:onc has the knowJr.:dgr.: to r.:ommit thr.: lb!Ud and r.:onr.:cal 
the oflCn~c ctm be considered either as a characteristic of a motivated crime-prone 
person or as part of the notion ofoppurtunity. Also, as alrr.:ady mentioned, "motive", 
"opportunity" and "rationalisations" cannot be considered indr.:pcndr.:nt of the 
individual offender's personality. 
To use an analogy, a law-abiding member of the public walking along a residential 
street sees houses, whereas a recidivist burglar assesses opportunities for breaking into 
houses and identifies lucrative targets. Similarly, a weak internal control remains just 
that to a manager or an employee with strong moral scruples, but it is perceived as a 
great opportunity to steal money by deception by someone with a weak conscience and 
thus predisposed to break the law ifhe/she believes he/she can get away with it. 
It should be noted that "crime-proneness" as an attribute of an individual is not used in 
the ROP model as a dichotomous variable but is conceptualised as being located along 
a continuum. The existence of any one of the ROP model's three components is not 
enough for fraud to occur. Many people may become aware that there is a weakness in 
the system of internal control of a company but only those who are crime-prone will 
perceive it as Wl opportunity to commit the offence. Furthennore, a crime·pronc 
individual will go ahead, exploit an opportunity and commit a fraud with or without 
accomplices if he/she can justify the deed to him/herself. A person who does not 
possess the neeessary rationalisations would not be in a position to justify committing 
the crime to him/herself. In this sense, the components of the ROP model are 
interactive 
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Drawing on Blackburn's (1993:21-23) distinction hctwccn acts and tendencies, it can 
be stated that: 
i. there exist one or more acts/occurrences of fraudulent activity which depend on 
environmental opportunities and conditions for their occurrence; 
ii. there are individuals who, for a nwnber of psychological, sociological, and 
other reasons (e.g., financial pressure) are fraud-prone, i.e., given an 
opportunity to commit fraud they are likely to exploit it and justify it to 
themselves; 
iii. only an individual, or two or more individuals conspiring together, haslbave the 
power to commit an act of fraud; 
iv. corrunitting fraud is a function of the situation (i.e., opportur.i.ty in terms of 
both company characteristics and situational factors that facilitate the 
corrunission of fraud) and the existence of a person with both the necessary 
predisposition and motive as well as rationalisations; 
v. personality attributes of individuals by themselves are weak predictors of 
specific acts of fraud, but arc useful red flags for auditors insofar as they 
summarise average and likely behaviour; and 
vi. one could expect to predict a single act of fraud if one knew enough about an 
individual's personality traits that point to his/her tendencies to break the law, 
and if one had enough information about a given situation in terms of 
opportunities for fraud and relevant conditions. 
Finally, the model needs to be viewed in the broader socio-economic context. The fact 
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is that !Tnud increases during economic recessions when high interest mtes exert 
financial pressure on both companies and ind!viduals. In addition, the existence of 
l·! multiple moralities within society and a largely utilitarian approach to ethics by the 
corporate culture {i.e., a state of "anything goes", of "!!thical neutralism") in the 
competition for profit which expects a lavish lifestyle from its members, are conducive 
for fraud (Cressey, 1986). Consequently, a crime-prone manager/ accountant! lawyer 
who cannot maintain mortgage payments on the family home because of drastic 
increa::es in interest rates may wdl exploit opportunities to commit fraud against 
clients. 
3.2 The three components of the proposed model 
3.2.1 Opportunity 
Fmud is facilitated by: the existence of opportunities for individuals who ,ry:lude to 
commit the crime; a lack C'·~ emphasis on fraud-prevention controls by a company; the 
absence of a code of conduct (KPMG, 1995a); and the presence of inadequately trained 
internal and/or external auditors. 
Two characteristics th11t affect the opportunity for fraud are organisational structure and 
management style. Changes in management style such as the shift from a hierarchical, 
authoritarian one to a more democratic one, coupled with the influence of economic 
rationalism and staff downsizing, have resulted in flatter organisations where middle 
management (which used to watch out for fraud signs) has disappeared. 
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Undoubtedly, a poor control system provides opportunities for someone to commit 
fraud. Such opportunities include, for example, sloppy paperwork, the isouing of 
cheques payable to cash and giving discounts to clients who pay cash. ntc fraud 
surveys by KPMG (1996, 1995a, 1995b, 1993a, 1993b) found that poor internal 
contra! was the one factor that underpinned most frauds both in Australia and in 17 
other countries. Albrecht et al. (1995) provide a comprehensive discussion of fraud 
opportunities within companies. Drawing on Albrecht et al., it can be said that such 
opportunities can take the form of: 
i. Inadequate internal controls (improper management modelling; bad 
communication or labelling; ineffective hiring procedures; unclear 
organisational structure and assigned responsibilities, and an ineffective 
internal audit department). 
ii. Lack of adequate control procedures that prevent fraud (e.g., inappropriate 
segregation of duties or dual custody; Jack of a system of authorizations, 
independent checks, physical safeguards, and docwnents and records). 
iii. Noncontrol factors that provide opportunities for fraud to be committed (e.g., 
inability to judge the quality of perfonnance; failure to discipline fraud 
perpetrators; lack of access to information; ignorance, apathy or incapacity, and 
lack of an audit trail). 
Cohen and Felson (1979) put forward the idea that crime can be understood in terms of 
people's daily routine activities. They also drew attention to the fact that criminal 
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ollCnccs olicn take place due to the absence of capable guardians (e.g., police prcscnc~: 
or other fom1s of surveillance) who increase the risk of of!Cndcrs being apprchcndcd, 
thll~ preventing the commission or of!Cnccs being committed. Both intcm<d and 
external auditors can be thought of as capable guardians. Auditors do not fullil the role 
of the capable guardian when, for example, they come to rely more on management's 
representations due to reporting deadlines; and/or senior audit partners arc spread too 
thin (i.e,, they are deployed ineffectively as far as overseeing the quality of audit work 
is concerned) due to excessive time pressure. Under such circmnstances fraud becomes 
more likely. 
A theory of why fraud is committed must also account for the fact that employee and 
management fraud often involves more than one offender. KPMG's (1995a) national 
fraud survey found that collusion was involved in one-third of the cases and comprised 
8% internal collusion and 24% collusion with third parties (p.ll ). Similarly, KPMG's 
(1996) international (18 countries) fraud survey reported that collusion between 
employees and third parties was the second most common element that allowed fraud 
to occur (p.12). Collusion in fraud cases against a company is often necessary for 
offenders to circwnvent separation of duties, an impediment made easier to overcome 
by weak internal controls. Therefore, collusion between someone within the company 
and a client of the company or some other outside party is essential for some t'jpes of 
fraud to take place. 
Situational factors such as a perceived low risk of being detected and a perception that 
upon conviction the likely penal sanction will be a relatively lenient one, contribute to 
I 
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I« frnud as they negate any notion of dclerrc lCC (Brnithwatc, ~~&~.!). A good reason why 
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an oftCndcr may remain undetected is tha there is a_1tcndency for such individuals to 
not only hold positions of trust, but also to be hard working, not to take holidays and to 
be able to cover up their offences effcctiv ly (Loisel, 1996). Prosecution difficulties in 
convicting major frnud offenders mell!1s at such defendants are in a strong plea-
bargaining position. The fact remains, ho ver, that even though many people hold 
positions of trust in a company and are a are of opportunities to commit fraud, not 
everybody does it. Let us, therefore, co ider what might explain such individual 
differences. 
3.2.2 Person with a motive and a crim prone personality 
The challenge for a theory of fraud is to a colUlt for individual differences. The fact is 
that not all crime-prone individuals who p rceive an opportunity I'J commit fraud nre 
motivated to do it. Also, not all motivate crime-prone individuals who perceive an 
opportunity eventually commit fraud bee II5C they may not possess the necessary 
rationalisations. As Albrecht et al. (1995:4 ) point out, some people commit fraud due 
to a lot of financial pressure while othe s do it "even though no real pressure or 
opportunity for fraud exists .... Most pe pic are somewhere in between these two 
eldremes". Excluding professional career conmen, it can be said that "When the 
combination of pressure, opportunity and tionaJisation becomes severe enough, they 
cross the line of honesty lllld commit frau " {p.49). lt should also be noted that while 
for.many fraud offenders the decision to ommit the offence is a rational one, for a 
minority it is the result of a slow process hereby they half-heartedly commit the first 
offence as a quick-fix solution to an unsh cable financial problem (Albrecht et al., 
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1995; Cressey, 1986). They experience a lot of guilt; they hope they will be abh: to pay 
the money back very soon nnd that will be the end of their misbehaviour, but they lind 
they have to go on committing frauds to cover up those already committed, i.e., they 
sink deeper and deeper into fraudulent activity as they "rob Peter to pay Paul". Such 
offenders may well stumL!e across an opportunity to conunit fraud (e.g., as when 
someone entrusts them with a large amount of cash), or they first commit fraud to 
misappropriate small amounts of money but the small thefts snowball and the 
offending gets completely out of controL 
Drawing on a large number of fraud cases described in the literature2 and on the basis 
of lengthy discussions the author had with MFG officers3 regarding fraud offences and 
offenders they had investigated for major fraud and the different circumstances under 
which fraud occurs, the following types of individuals who commit fraud(s) as well as 
the circumstances under which they do so can be identified: 
i. The offender is predominantly a highly educated male, of mature age when first 
convicted and is not versatile in his/her offending. 
ii. The offender has weak self-control. 
iii. The offender rationalises his/her crimina! behaviour, justifies it to him!herM:!f 
and feels no guilt for the crime, 
iv, The offender is a professional, career conman, who infiltrates a company (or 
even establishes one, even though a bankrupt) and gets him/herself into a 
2scc A\brcchlclal., 1995; Bolognu, 1993; Crcss~y, 1986; Ziclz., 1981. 
3 DctiSgl Wayne Monk, Oct/Chief Inspector Ro\>crt Cockerel, nnd Commnndcr Allen Bowles. 
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position of trust in order to commit the crime. In other words, fi'aud is the goal 
from tl1c moment this type of person enters a company. 
v. The offender commits a fraud because of a belief, sometimes unrealistic, that 
he/she can get away with it ami, also that hdshc will be able to return the 
money to its rightful owner(s). 
vi. The company faces fi~mncial problems and is in urgent need of money and 
someone in a management position rationally decides to commit one or more 
frauds to rescue the company, belicwing that he/she wil! be able to pay back the 
money to its rightful owner(s) and/or because of a belief that he/she can 
meanwhile conceal the offence(s) and not get punished. Here fraud is 
committed more out of love for the company than any animosity towards it or 
some egocentric motive. 
vii. A company's financial problems lead a particular member of management to 
experience socioeconomic status disequilibrium and self-concept incongruence 
as he/she and/or his/her family can no longer enjoy the same lifestyle: 
a. bu~ due to strong self-control adjusts his/her expenditure accordingly 
and does not need to connnit fraud; or 
. b. due to weak self-control does not adjust his/her expenditure 
accordingly, and commits fraud once or repeatedly. For some people, 
being seen to be successful is more important than being honest. 
viii. An individual in a position of trust persuades, or (by virtue of having weak self~ 
control) is persuaded by, an outsider to embark on a scam to deceive and to 
share the money stolen. 
ix. Fraud is conunitted by a crime-prone individual in response to a felt personal 
I 
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need, e.g., to buy a house because one is engaged to be married or in order to 
help loved ones. 
x. Duc~tll some vice pressure (e.g., gambling, drugs, alcohol, expensive scxuul 
relationship) or for sheer excitement, an individual lives b<;yond hisfhcr means. 
The financial pressure could also come from a spouse who insists (directly or 
indirectly) on a more expensive lifestyle than the individual can afford. Fraud is 
committed in response to such an unshareable financial problem by individuals 
who possess the necessary neutralising verbalisations to justify committing the 
offence. 
xi. According to Albrecht et al. (1995), someone in management or an employee 
of a company commits fraud because of some animosity towards the company 
in order to get even. An employee may be disgruntled because of feelir;g 
unrle~paid, overlooked for promotion, job dissatisfaction, fear of losing his/her 
job, or getting little recognition for his/her job performance. 
xii. Utilising an orthodox (i.e., Freudian) psychoanalytic perspective, the 
uncorucious wishes of a high socioecoilomic status individual, whose company 
is facing insolvency, may be sublimated and find expression by perpetrating a 
fraud which provides the needed recognition or status in the context of the 
corporate culture (Blackburn, 1993: 114). 
xiii. A person with an antisocial personality disorder (see Blackburn, 1993; 
Eysenck, 1997) is excessively egocentric, feeling no anxiety or remorse, and 
being insensitive to the consequences of committing one or more frauds on the 
victims. Such a person is predisposed to commit fraud under some financial or 
other pressure that call for the urgent mising of money if there exists an 
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opportunity for frnud. 
xiv. Finally, someone rnay commit fraud to prove they can beat the system, i.e., a~ a 
challenge (Albrecht ct a\., 1995). 
3.2.3 Rationalisations 
It needs to be emphasised that, as Cressey (1986) has argued, ultimately a trusted 
person with an unshareable financial problem who perceives an opportunity to commit 
fraud does so as a result of neutralising verbalisations that make possible frauds against 
or for the company. In other words, in order to corrunit fraud it is not enough for 
someone to be in a position of trust, with an unshareable financial problem and an 
opportunity to commit fraud in secret. By violating that trust, acting alone or with one 
or more accomplices, they need to talk themselves into a belief that, somehow, they 
have a "right" to perpetrate the crime. Therefore, it is the ability to rationalise and 
justify committing the offence(s) that ultimately makes fraud possible. In this context, 
hc,iit a manager feels towards d1e company (an example of motivation which muy 
reflect one or more company characteristics) is important in understanding his/her 
neurralisalion techniques (i.e., rationalisations) which make fraud possible4• 
Cressey's (1986) theory of why managers commit fraud involves a psychological 
process which includes among its three components "the ability to find a fonnula 
which describes the act of embezzling in words which does not conflict with the image 
4 The president of the Institute of Chartered Accountllllts in Australia (ICAA) otthotimc of writing, Rob Wylie, 
hus warned thnt economic rationalism 1111d staff downsizing hnYc indirectly crc~tcd the idcnl climate for frnud 
('A Climate for Fraud', 1996:9}. Tho possible impact of these changes nnd stuff downsizing includes flx~d-tcnn 
appointments, incrwcs In job Insecurity, a dwlinc in corporotc loynlty,low momlcnnd the adoption by stnffof 
n mercenary attitude to one's employers. These lli'C fattors that contribute to frnudulcnt activity. 
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of oneself as a trusted person" (p.l99). Cressey called this "nculralising vcrbalisations'', 
and argued that "they make up the most important element in the process which gets a 
trusted person in trouble, or keeps the person out of trouble" {p.200). Cressey stated 
that "every trust violator [he himself] interviewed used a neutralizing verbalization" 
(p.20 I). More specifically, Cressey found that imprisoned embezzlers made use of the 
notion that their case was one of "necessity", or that their loved ones were in a dire 
situation c that their employers "were cheating them". However, such justifications 
were cast in terms of "borrowing", "ownership" or "don't care" (p.201). He pointed out 
that rationalisations' used by fraud offenders are not made up by offenders on the spur 
of the moment but "they are learned, and are reflections of cultural ideologies 
pertaining to the propriety of committing crime under certain circumstances" (p.201 ). 
In this serue, the rationalisations one uses to justify conunitting fraud are related to 
both one's socialisation and personality (which encapsulates one's velues, attitudes and 
behavioural patterns) generally as well as to socialisation into the contemporary 
corporate culture. 
Cressey argued that neutralising verbalisations used by both management and 
employees who commit fraud are accounted for by Sutherland's (1949) differential 
association theory. According to this theory, people rationalise their behaviour in ways 
they have learned from associates, CreS£ey also argues that the source of 
rationalisations used by management who commit fraud for the company (e.g., to 
increase its profits) is a number of ideologies which penneate the business world. He 
lists four such ideologies: (1) honesty is the best policy but business is business; (2) it's 
~ Whnt he termed "vocabularies of motive". 
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all right to steal a loaf of bread when you arc starving; (3) government regulation of 
business is socialistic and counterproductive (p.201 ); and (4) it's necessary (p.204). 
Thus, rationalisations are made possible, on the one hand, by the existence of widely-
acce·~'ed ideologies that are part of the corporate culture and the socialising effect and, 
on the other, the socialising effect of differential association. 
Rationalisations is the third element in Albrecht et al.'s fraud triangle, the other two 
being perceived opportunity and pressure. On the basis that generally "there are very 
few, if any, people who do not rationalize" (p.46), these authors maintain that "nearly 
every fraud involves the element of rationalization. Most fraud perpetrators are first 
time offenders who would not commit other crimes. Someway, they must rationalise 
away the dishonesty of their acts" (p.46). Such rationalizations sometime mean lying to 
oneself and sometimes to others (p.47). Albrecht et al. (1995:46) provide the following 
list of common rationalisations used by fraud perpetrators: 
i. The organisation owes it to me. 
ii. I am only borrowing the money and will pay it back. 
iii. Nobody will get hurt, 
iv. I deserve more. 
v. It's for a good purpose. 
vi. Something has to be sacrificed ~ my integrity or my reputation, (If I don't 
embezzle to cover up my inability to pay, people will know I can't meet my 
obligations, which will be embarrassing because I am a professional), 
It needs to be emphasised at this stage that, as already argued above, that all three 
components of the model (opportunity, a crime-prone person with a motive, and 
rationalisations) are necessary for fraud to occur. 
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4.0 A MODEL OF FRAUDMDI~TECTION 
There has been an increasing amount of published literature on how auditors can 
become better at detecting material misstatements, including employee and 
management fraud. Fraud detection, of course, does not exist in a vacuum but needs to 
be considered in the broad context of audit work and against the backdrop of the 
knowledge of why people commit fraud. Having a definition of fraud detection helps 
to focus attention on the areas concerned. Albrecht et al. (1995) state that it "includes 
tho 
steps or actions taken to discover that a',,fraud has been committed"; that "one of the 
most difficult tasks is detennining whethevor not a fraud has actually occurred", and 
that the "detection of fraud begins by identifYing symptoms, indicators, or red flags 
that can be associated with fraud" (p.53). Recognising indicators of fraud is but the first 
step in detecting fraud, because the auditor then needs to pursue the indicators 
concerned until an unequivoc:il decision can be made as to whether fraud has in fact 
been perpetrated. Consequently, the availability of a checklist of red flags, however 
exhaustive, is not going to lead to more fraud being discovered than would otherwise 
be the case if the red flags are considered in isolation from other relevant infonnation 
about fraud risk, and if the auditor is not inquisitive enough to pursue fraud indicators 
he/she has recognised. 
Chapter 3 discussed different approaches that have been put forward to enable auditors 
to better detect fraud. While some of the approaches are very simplistic and do not 
warrant serious consideration, others have merits that point to the need of combining 
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different apprm1chcs. For example, the pmctical usefulness of a comprehensive list of 
red flags is significantly diminished if an auditor has no knowledge of various 
deception strategies management can usc as well as counter strategies he/she can usc, 
to detect such deceptions. Similarly, complaints by a company's employees, clients or 
competitors, can provide the auditor with useful informationltip-offs that can alert 
him/her to the possibility that fraud may have been perpetrated. 
The model developed in the next section is intended to: (1) bring together the essential 
components of a fraud detection strategy and guidance on the relevant tactics; (2) 
enhance auditors' ability to detect fraud by incorporating a component based on the 
ROP model; and (3) demonstrate how feedback from auditing experience in detecting 
fraud utilisine the model can be used to traln auditors in the task, as well as to set up 
and update fraud-detection data bases in order to keep up with the inventiveness of 
many fraud perpetrators. 
,, 
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4.1 The model's content 
People commit fraud, U•' :ref ore, lm auditor needs to be aware of existing knowledge 
about why people commit fraud if he/she is going to detect it. "Ibc pattern-
recognition/risk-assessment decision making process that precedes fraud-detection by 
an auditor would be incomplete without knowledge about the reasons people commit 
fraud. Hence, the ROP model is an essential part of the proposed eclectic fraud 
detection model as shown in Figure 2. 
The phrase "adequate knowledge of a company's envirorunent where the entity 
operates" means the auditor has an understanding of the overall economy and industry 
in which the client operates, and a general knowledge of the operations of the client's 
business as provided in AUS 304 (AARF, l995c). Information of this kind should be 
incorporated into the auditor's overall fraud-risk assessment regarding the business, 
industry, major customers, methods of receipts, and procurement methods. Such 
knowledge would, for example, draw the auditor's attention to whether it is a high risk 
industry or a high risk financial area within the company. The fraud surveys by KPMG 
(1996; 1995a; I993a) found that high risk industries are manufacturing and finance and 
high risk financial areas are cash, inventory, revenue and expense cycles (see also 
Deakin University, 19%, and Loebbecke et al., 1989). 
The accounting and internal control symptoms of employee fraud and operational ones 
listed by Albrecht et al. (1995:76-11'3) are categorised under: 
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1. Irregularities in source documents. Common fraud symptoms involving source 
documents, such as cheques, sales invoices, purchase orders, purchase 
requisitions, and rceeiving reports include items such as missing documents, 
alterations on documents, duplicate payments, photocopied documents, etc. 
ii. Faulty journal entries. The following arc common journal entry fraud 
symptoms: journal entries without documentary support; unexplained 
adjustments to receivables, payables, revenues, or expenses; journal entries that 
don't balance; journal entries made by individuals who would not nonnally 
make such entries; and journal entries made near the ends of accounting 
periods. 
iii. inaccuracies in ledgers. Two common fraud symptoms related to ledgers are: a 
ledger that doesn't balance and master (control) account balances that do not 
equal the sum of the individual customer or vendor balances. The first 
symptom is indicative of fraud in which cover-up in the accounting records is 
not complete. The second ledger symptom is indicative of manipulation of an 
individual customer or vendor's balance without altering the master receivable 
or payable account in the ledger. 
iv. Unexplained changes in financial statements such as a disproportionate 
increase in debtors when compared to sale.$ growth. 
v. Internal control weaknesses such as: lack of segregation of duties; lack of 
physical safeguards; lack of independent checks; lack of proper authorizations; 
lack of proper documents and records; overriding existing controls; and an 
inadequate accounting system. 
vi. Fraud symptoms involving relationships with other parties include items such 
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as significant litigntion, a frequent change in ~olicitors or auditors, a high 
turnover of key management positions or board members, etc. 
The part of the model dealing with fraud symptoms/indicators,1rcd nags drJ.':ts heavily 
' 
on the work of Albrecht eta\. (1995). Considering the various fraud-risk information 
sources from left to right, we note the importance of the auditor paying particular 
attention to information that someone in management, for example: has been/is under 
financial pressure; has a criminal record or his professional credentials are otherwise 
dubious, or leads an extravagant lifestyle beyond his means. Finally, the auditor ~lmuld 
need infJnnation that someone in management exhibits behavioural changes such as 
sudden mood swings; is a heavy drinker, a heavy smoker; is on drugs; is unable to 
relax; suffers from insomnia; is unable to look people in the eye; is defensive; and 
argumentative. Albrecht et al. (1995) describe the "psychological aftermath of crime" 
as comprising "guilt > fear > stress > behaviour changes" (p.126). It can be argued, 
however, that there are people who do not feel any remorse after committing a crime 
(Eysenck, 1977). Information about an individual's employment history and contact 
with the criminal justice system can be easily obtained by means of background 
checks. Similarly, the auditor's fraud-detection ability will be enhanced by the 
company's relationship with its lawyers, auditors, board members, regulators and the 
Taxation Department, management, banks and other lenders, related parties and other 
companies and, finally, with its vendors or custom<!rs (see Albrecht et al., 1995:104-
105). Useful intelligence inforrna:ion about a company's relationship with other parties 
and the life of its management or employees can sometimes come from tips and 
complaints by the company's employees, clients or competitors. 
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Albrecht ct al. (1995) discuss fmud symptoms indicative of the following spccilic 
types of potential fraud: 
i. Management fraud (operation performance anomalies, management 
characteristics that indicate possible motives, organisational structure 
anomalies, irregularities in relationships with outside partics)6• 
ii. Employee fraud {accounting anomalies, internal control wealmesses, analytical 
anomalies, extravagant lifestyle, unusual behaviour, tips and complaints). 
iii. Investment fraud (e.g., "unreasonable promised rates of return, investments that 
do not make snund business sense, pressure to get in early on the investment. .. " 
(Albrecht et al., 1995:66). 
iv. Kiting (e.g., signature and maker on kited cheques are often the same, area 
abnormalities, i.e., many out-of-area cheques; frequent deposits, cheques, and 
balance inquiries, escalating account balance, bank abnonnalities, average 
length oftime money is in the account is short)1 • 
Authors on fraud detection emphasise the importance of the auditor and other fraud 
examiners looking out for, recognising and pursuing further "anomalies" of one kind or 
another. One such bnsic "anomaly" is an overly complex organisational structure 
which, according to Albrecht et al. "seems to exist without real purpose", but is 
intended to "mask financial statement frauds by not allowing auditors and other 
6 Sec pp.60·64 in Albrecht cl al. for funllcr de toils. 
7 Sec AlbTcChl Cl al. (1995:70). 
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outsiders· to undcrst;md that tmnsactions were not at ann's-lcngth unll that suhstantial 
amounts of revenue and inwmc were not legitimate" (p.95). Finally, the possible 
existence of frnud may be indicated by what Albrtcht ct al. lcnn "analytical fraud 
symptoms, i.e., out-of-the-ordinary procedures and relationships that arc implausible" 
such as increased revenues with decreased cash flows, increased inventory with 
decreased payables, etc, 
If we take a look at the fraud detection model we also see that the auditor's endeavours 
to detect fraud are more likely to prove fruitful if: he/she has the support of his finn; 
the auditor possesses certain attributes and adopts a suitable approach to the task; 
addresses inherent risk before control risk which, in tum, should precede detection-risk 
assessment (Monroe, Ng, and Woodliff, 1993); and he/she is able to synthesise fraud-
risk infonnation from a variety of sources that point to "anomalies". If one or more of 
these ingredients are not present, fraud detection is likely to prove an el' , . <! goal for 
the auditor. While the proposed model addresses the broad range of infonnation-inputs 
into effective fraud detection, it does not claim to guarantee that, using it, an auditor 
will detect carefully-concealed frauds. It needs to be pointed out in this context that 
while, on the one hand, recognising even one fraud indicator can lead an auditor to 
discover fraud, on the other, recognising a number of red flags and pursuing them 
extensively may prove a false alarm. 
For the proposed fraud detection model to be applied successfully, the auditor i:; 
required to process, evaluate critically, and synthesise a significant amount of 
infonnation (including infonnation contained in the ROP model) about a client. It is 
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the ability to synthesise the infOnnation conccmcd that is essential for the model to 
work. 
,, 
,,, 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
The interactive model of the aetiology of fraud holds that fraud is generally committed 
as a result of a combination of factors, namely, rationalisations, opportunities and 
person(s). It is argued that a variety of peOJile commit fraud for a variety of motives 
and who the offenders are cannot be attnlmtcd to a random pror.ess. The model sets out 
the different ways in which fraud becomes possible when a crime-prone individual 
under fmancial pressure or with other motives, perceives at least one opportunity to 
commit fraud and the individual has both the knowledge to commit (alone or in 
collusion) and conceal the fraud and possesses the neutralising verbalisations that 
enable him/her to perceive committing the offence once or repeatedly seem "right". 
The need to locate the three sufficient components ofROP in a broader socioeconomic 
context is emphasised. Rationalisations constitute the most vital of the three 
components that make up the psychological process of infommtion processing and 
decision making that precedes an act offraud. By incorporating ideas from the existing 
models and expanding on them, and by introducing the concept of crime~pront.ness 
drawing on knowledge in ol:t.o:r disciplines, ROP can be said to be a new model with 
high usefuhtess potential for anditors. 
The need to enhance auditors' fraud detection ability cannot be overemphasised. Audit 
··experience alone, however, cannot make auditors fraud-detection experts. The ROP 
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model of the aetiology of fraud is an important part of the eclectic fmud detection 
model Jcvc!opcd in this chapter. The model of frautl detection highlights the 
importance of having a competent, clhica[]y-mindcd auditor, who is well versed in the 
aetiology of fraud, in management deception strategies and counter deception 
strategies, and who enjoys the full support of his/her finn as far as fraud detection is 
concerned. Moreover, an auditor should have a good overall view of the company's 
environment and internal control system, be alert to information about both individuals 
within the company who are high risks of potential fraud as well as about the 
company's relationship with outside parties and, finally, be aware of and guard against 
his/her own unintended biases in carrying out the audit. 
Two studies were conducted to test the models developed in this chapter. These 
studies are reported in Chapters 5 and 6. The firnt study was concerned with 
demographic, modus operandi and criminal justice characteristics of major fraud 
offenders prosecuted successfully by the MFG in Melbourne. The firnt study also 
aimed to construct a two-component profile of the major fraud offender and to test the 
ROP model as well as Loebbeckc ct al.'s (1989) fraud assessment model. The second 
study involved a survey of 108 Australian auditors' experience of detecting 
irregularities including management and employee fraud. The second study also tested 
a nwnber ofhwotheses based on tht: fraud detection model proposed and examined the 
applicability ofLocbbecke et al.'s fraud assessment model. The ROP model could not 
be tested in the second study as the auditors surveyed (sec Chapter 6) were in no 
position to provide adequate data on offenders' crime-proneness and rationalisations. 
CIIAI'Tli:.RS 
PROFILING MAJOR FRAUD, OFFENDERS PROSECUTED BY Tiff~ 
POLICE 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
After outlining the method of crimina! profiling, attention is focused on the empirical 
study of 50 major fraud offenders, the methodology used and the da!a co!!ected. A list 
of24 representative case swnmaries is provided before reporting the findings obtained. 
Relevant findings are then discussed with reference to the applicability of the ROP 
model developed in this thesis and Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) model of fraud 
assessment. Demographic, modus operandi, and criminal justice characteristics of the 
offenders are also reported as there are interrelationships between offence, offender, 
victim, and criminal justice factors. This chapter goes on to report a profile of major 
fraud offenders which comprises a general-level component and another component in 
tenns of particular typologies of fraud victimisation. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
An apparently untapped source or knowledge for auditors is to be fOund in official Iiles 
on serious fraud offenders prosecuted by specialist police squads like the MFG in 
Melbourne or the Serious Fraud Office in London and in New Zealand. Who are these 
offenders who commit fraud for or against companies? What motivates their criminal 
behaviour? How do they justify doing what they do? Do they stand out in any way? If 
so, how can auditors use such infonnation to assist them in detecting fraud? The 
criminological research reported in this chapter attempts to provide answers to these 
questions. 
The film "Silence of the Lambs" popularised one approach to investigating serious 
crime known as "criminal profiling". The well-known British expert on criminal 
profiling, Professor David Canter, argues, in his 1994 book Criminal Shadows: Inside 
the Mind of a Serial Killer, that a profile is like a silhouette, a shadow, that an offender 
leaves behinrl at the scene of the crime. The profiling process developed by the FBI's 
Behavioural Science Unit (see Douglas, Ressler, Burgess, and Hartman 1986), also 
known as "psychological profiling" as well as by its technical tenn "criminal 
investigative analysis'', is "an investigative technique by which to identify the major 
personality and behavioral characteristics of the offender based upon an analysis of the 
crime(s) he or she has committed" (Douglas and Burgess, 1990:1). llms, while 
profiling does not yield the specific identity of the offender, it points to the kind of 
person most likely to have committed the offence{s) (Douglas ct al., 1986). 
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The concept of ofli:ndcr profiling is based on the argument that "neither a crime nor an 
offender is completely unique" (Jackson and Bckcrian, 1997:2). In other words, there 
are limits to the number of motives and the methods of carrying out a crime -there arc 
always patterns to be identified and to be compared with those in other cases (p.2). In 
view of the fact that fraud often involves serial offenders, offender profiling can 
provide auditors with useful knowledge to improve their fraud-detection ability. 
Profiling "can be based on clinical experience, research and statistical analysis of 
offender databases" (Jackson and Bekerian, 1997:3). 
1.1 The profiling process 
According to two FBI special agents Douglas and Burgess {1990) who have 
contributed to the development of criminal profiling, the technique is a viable 
investigative tool against violent crime. Criminal profiles draw on demographic and 
police data on particular categories of offenders and interviews with known offenders. 
According to Douglas and Burgess (1990:1), the process by which a criminal profile of 
a violent offender is constructed, generally involves the following seven steps: 
;, 
.,,ii. 
'~Hi. 
~~>~~ 
vi. i 
vii. 
evaluation of the criminal act itself; 
comprehensive evaluation of the specifics of the crime scene(s); 
comprehensive analysis of the victim; 
evaluation of preliminary police reports; 
evaluation of the medical examiners' autopsy protocol; 
development of profile with critical offender characteristics; and 
investigative suggestions predicated on construction of the profile (p.l). 
I 
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In order to develop a psychologicul profile of a serious criminal it i.> csst."'ltialthatlhc 
crime scene be carefully studied. In the case of mujor fmud, the crime scene may he 
someonc's ollice, one or more computers used by the offender and the system of" 
internal controls. The weapon used by a fraud offender is his/her deception strategy 
, and tactics. Turco (1990) emphasises the importance of being able to utilise 
' ' 
\'hemogmphic material based on population studies of known perpetrators of particular 
crimes when it comes to constructing a profile. In the case of major fraud, such data 
could include the type and style of deception used, the relationship between the 
offender, the victim(s) and the method(s) used to conceal the offence(s). The offender's 
motive(s) is an integral piece in this crimlnal jigsaw puzzle. 
Criminal profiling (personality assessment) has been used to narrow the field and thus 
assist police in: managing hostage negotiations, identifying anonymous letter writers 
and individuals who have made oral or written threats of violence, investigating single 
and serial cases of arson, rape, and sexual homicide (Douglas and Burgess, 1990). 
Profiling has also been used with serious obsessive-compulsive offenders, including 
exhibitionists and kleptomaniacs (Reese, 1979- cited in Blau, 1994). Finally, in an 
unusual proactive aPPlication of profiling, Hagaman, Wells, Blau and Wells (1987) 
developed a family homicide profiie that could be used to predict such an event and 
possibly prevent the homicide. Proactive profiling has not been used with fraud. 
According to Copestake (1994:171 criminal pro filers like Canter maintain that in order 
to understand and predict crime one needs to look for clues in the lives of individual 
offenders, in the "shadows" they leave behind. In order to understand the individual 
nn 
o!Tcndcr and their crime, one needs \(l assess the "distorted story about lili: each 
o!Tcndcr tells him/hcrsclt". "Distorted stories about li/C" refer to ofli.:ndcrs' 
rationalisations that help them to: (I) justify their criminal behaviour to themselves and 
reduce, if not remove completely, any sense of guilt; and (2) resolve any discrepancy 
between, on the one hand, viewing themselves as successful and "respectable" 
citizens/professionals and, on the other, the knowledge that they are committing 
crimes. 
Turco (1990: 148) points out two limitations of profiles based on such data. First, an 
accurate prediction before the arrest of the subject is not possible since a large number 
of people fit the demographic characteristics of the profile but do not commit the crime 
in question. Second, there is no real theoretical basis for the profiles. Turcc does admit, 
however, that such profiles allow organisation of material collected by police 
investigators. A theoretical basis is provided for the profile of fraud offenders put 
forward below. 
According to investigative profilers at the FBI Behavioural Science Unit, profiling has 
been used by law enforcement in the U.S. "with success in many areas ... " (Douglas and 
Burgess, 1990:1). Tetem (1989 - cited in Blau 1994} reviewed 193 cases where 
profiling was done and found that 45% of the cases, had been resolved. Of more 
interest, perhaps, is Tetem's finding that in 17% the accuracy of the profile was such ~s 
to identifY the suspect. Tetem also reported that in 77% of the cases the profile had 
been of significant help to the investigation. B1au (1994) concluded his discussion of 
the usefulness of criminal profiling stating that it is a potentially useful tool. 
nt 
Of course. some of the dcmogruphic attributes of fmud offenders (e.g., age and 
educational status) are obvious. This is due to the time and qualifications nonnally 
required to ucquire a position of finEUJciul trust in a corpomtion where one cun effect 
major fmud. 
Utilising data from police prosecution files on major fraud offenders, the study 
reported in this chapter attempts to: 
i. collect and analyse demographic, modus operandi and criminal justice data; 
ii. identify clues to the fraud~ in the lives of the offenders and in the 
rationalisations they tell themselves and to the police investigators; 
iii. construct a two-component profile of offenders consisting of: (l) at a general 
level, demographic characteristics; and (2) a classification in terms of offender 
typologies; 
iv. compare fraud indicators in the ROP model and Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) fraud 
assessment model with those identified in the Major Fraud Group of the 
Victoria Police (MFG) eases; 
v. investigate Loebbecke et al.'s argument that all three of their model's 
components must b!! present for fraud to take place; 
vi. test Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) premises in their general theory of crime 
that: (a) white-collar offenders (like the major fraud offenders studied) do not 
specialise in one type of crime, but are versatile; and (b) that a person's self-
control in interaction with criminal opportunity, is the major cause of crime; 
ond 
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vii. examine the validity of the eight assumptions underlying the ROP mode! of 
fraud correlates. 
Drawing on the existing empirical literature, the study reported in this chapter 
investigates whether the following seven propositions are applicable to the serious 
fraud offenders examined as well as the validity of one prediction of the ROP model 
and one of the Loebbecke et al. (1989) model of fraud risk assessment: 
i. the probability of fraud occurring is a function of opportunity, a motivated 
crime prone individual and rationalisations; 
ii. a serious fraud offender will tend to have weak self.control, be egocentric and 
indifferent to the consequences ofhi~/h;o:: behaviour; 
iii. some of their motives for committing the offence are such as to distinguish 
them from common offenders (i.e., persons perpetrating major index crimes 
other than fraud). More specifically, unlike common offenders like burglars or 
armed robbers, their motives will include greed, revenge and committing frnud 
as a challenge, i.e., in order to beat the system. 
iv. they generally utilise techniques of neutralisation to reduce their status 
' 
incongruenr..e that arises out of their offending (Matza, 1969); 
,_"c_- j\V• 
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the majority are first offtnders (Cressey, 1986); 
.i. there are identifiable clues to the crimes perpetrated in the lives of such 
offenders; 
vii. a criminal profile of such offenders is possible; 
viii. that, generally, Pr(Fraud)= JtR,O,P); and 
IT\ 
' .. , ix. according to Loebbeckc ct a\. I'(MI) = f(C,M,A), However ifthc hypothesis 
that fraud is possible with two components, is borne out by the findings, it wi!l 
cast doubt on Loebbecke ct al.'s (1989) fhtud risk assessment model by 
falsifying its basic premise that all three conditions must be present for a 
material irregularity to occur. 
The seven propositions and the two predictions listed above were tested in a study of 
50 major fraud cases prosecuted by the Major Fraud Group of the Victoria Police. 
2,0 A CASE STUDY APPROACH OF 50 MAJOR FRAUD CASES IN 
VICTORIA 
2.1 Methodological considerations 
2.1.1 Why study MFG records? 
The MFG is the largest of the crime squads within the Victoria Police. The MFG was 
selected for two reasons: 
i. Access was granted by the Victoria Police to MFG records. 
ii. There are a large number of cases processed by the MFG, a relatively quick 
turnover of cases, and a high conviction rate of offenders. The basis for this 
expectation was the fact the MFG comprises teams of investigators from 
different specialist fields (detectives, accountants, lawyers, computer 
specialists, and criminal intelligence analysts), the specialist function of the 
MFG and its length of expertise and resources. 
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According to the then Ollicer-in·Chargc of the MFO, Commander Allen Bowles, the 
criteria !Or the MFG to take on a fmud investigation arc: instruction by the Assistant 
Police Commissioner for Crime to undertake a particular fmud investigation; the 
complexity of a fraud being such as to be impossible for divisional detectives to 
investigate; and/or evidence of corruption by public officials. The study was 
commenced at the beginning of 1995 once approval was granted by the Victoria Police 
and it took 10 months to complete. 
When a criminal prosecution case file is created by the MFG it contains the following 
information: 
i. details of the charge (the charge, under what law the suspect has been charged, 
whether it is a summary or an indictable offence, whether there arc more 
charges); 
ii. the person charged; 
iii. details of the offence (statement to the police by the accused and other parties 
interviewed by the police in investigating the matter, and the police record of 
the interview(s) with the suspect{s)); and 
iv. when a defendant is sentenced by a court {the date(s) of the trial, the date of 
sentencing, the identity of the court and of the judge concerned,, the 
presentment (i.e., how many counts of a particular charge), type of plea and 
details of the sentence{s) imposed. 
During the pcrind January 1990- October 1994 the MFG investigated 196 fraud 
matters. It is not possible to be 100% accurate about how many cases arc investigated 
by the group annually since investigations are a continuing exercise and the group ht~S 
only recently attempted to computcrisc it~ records and create a comprehensive 
database. At the time of writing, a national database was in the process of being 
created. The 196 cases were listed by occupation of the offender (see Table 1). 
Occupation was used because the study was concerned with financial fraud by people 
in positions of financial trust. To have used instead the type of fraud committed would 
have meant including cases such as social security fraud, medical fraud and credit card 
fraud which were outside the scope of the research. 
Table 1: Occupation of Offenders in the Population 
Number of %of Occupation of Offender 
offences offences 
76 38.7 other (chefs, gardeners, cleaners, clerks, 
salesmen, receptionists) 
29 14.8 unemployed, pensioners, prisoners, 
students 
22 11.2 .. management, finance consultants, bank 
managers 
20 10.2 .. company directors 
19 9.7 .. lawyers 
IS 7.6 .. accountants and bookkeepers 
8 4.0 .. bank tellers 
4 2.0 .. brokers, gold dealers 
3 1.5 other professionals (doctors, engineers) 
..., Occupational categories included iri the cases studied 
l.lfi 
2.1.2 Selection of major fmud cases 
ln view of the study's focus on major fraud commiucd by people in positions of 
financial trust, a case was selected for inclusion in the study on the basis of three 
criteria: 
i. it had been processed by the court and the defendant had been sentenced (in 
which case infonnation about the offenders would be considered public 
knowledge) and the fi!e was accessible; 
ii. it involved one or more of the following convictions for deception (as 
opposed to theft): 
a. obtaining property by deception; 
b. obtaining financial advantage by deception; 
c. forgery and uttering; 
d. false accounting; and/or 
e. deception; and 
iii. the offender(s) belonged to such occupational categories as company 
directors, lawyers, bank officials, accountants, brokers, share traders and 
management which involve financial trust. 
In deciding which cases to study from those prosecuted by the police, it was 
considered important that the types of frauds and the individuals involved be of the 
kinds encountered by auditors. It could be argued, however, that cases of fraudulent 
financial reporting (in order to support earning trends, plans for bonus compensation, 
n7 
proxy ~tlpport li1r n bro,1d rnnbrc of propll.~nb, nr merger und m:quisitions) as opp!~~cd 
to framlulcnt financial reporting to conceal theft of assets, should be preferred 
because that is where auditors are at a greater legal risk and where financial 
statements arc most likely to contain material misstatements. On the other hand, 
frauds involving theli of assets or misappropriation of a%ets arc what the majority of 
auditors in Australia are most likely to encounter in their work and there have been 
eases agninst auditors for failing to detect them. Supp0rt for the types of fraud cases 
studied was provided by the survey of Australian aUl!itors' experience with fraud 
detection (see next chapter) which found that a minority of the respondents had 
encountered a fraudulent financial reporting1 case as opposed to theft cover up. 
Selecting cases processed by the court is justified on the basis that if someone has 
been convicted of a crime it is accepted as evidence that they committed the act in 
question. The alternative of using cases of individuals investigated and charged with 
deception offences by the police was decided against for the fol!owing reasons: (I) a 
person is considered innocent until proven guilty; (2) the charge(s) of which 
someone is/are convicted by a court or pleads guilty to after being charged is/are 
sometimes different from the original charge; (3) if a trial is pending, the police 
would be reluctant to allow access to information about a case as the infonnation 
only becomes public when considered during the trial which results in conviction; 
I According to SAS 82 (AICPA,1997, parn.4) "fraudulent finMtial reporting refers to intentional 
rnissll!lcmen~ or omissions ofnrnounts or disclosures in finMcial statements. Frnudulcnt fimmci~l reporting 
may Involve acts such as the following: (a) mMipulation, falsification, or nltcrotion of accounting records or 
supporting documents from which fimmcial statements an: prepared; (b) misreprcsenllltion in, or intention•! 
omission from, the financial statements of events, transactions, or other significnnt infolll!ntion; 1111d (c) 
intentional misnpplicntiou of accounting principle> relating to wnonnts, clnssifiCIItion, mrumcr or prcsenllltion, 
or disclosure." 
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and (4) vitnl information about the respon~e of the criminal justice system to such 
convicted offenders (e.g., the penological approach to sentencing, the type und k:ngth 
of tbe sentence) becomes available only if a person is found guilty und is sentenced 
or pleads guilty and is sentenced. 
As in Benson and Moore (1992) and Wcisburd et al. (1990), :m offence-based 
definition was used to select cases, thus making it possible to compare results. 
Application of the three criteria resulted in a final list of 50 cases of fraud. The final 
list of cases was obtained as foilows. Drawing on the computerised records of the 
MFG, at the end of October 1994 there were 196 briefs for fraud matters since 
January 1990 where the occupation of the accused/defendant was given. Of those, 
the investigation was completed (i.e., there was a completed brief available) for 99 
cases. Thirty-seven matters involved occupations that were either beyond the scope 
of the research or where the cases should have been included but were not because it 
proved impossible to locate the files. Cases that were excluded involved social 
security fraud by, for example, an unemployed prostitute, two unemployed 
professional punters as well as 13 unemployed persons, four prisoners and two old-
age pensioners convicted of social security fraud. A number of doctors involved in 
medicare fraud, a concreter who falsified invoices, 1md a housewife who collected 
large amounts of money for fictitious charity causes should have been included but 
were not because it proved impossible to locate their files. Four additional cases 
were also not included; they involved two cases where the police investigation 
concluded there was "no case", and two others which had been prosecuted and been 
dismissed by the court at first hearing because no prima facie case was established 
by th6 pro:-.x:cution against the acctl<>ed. 
I! 
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Like Langdale (1990), a number of difficulties were expcriinccd in gelling hold of 
the brief's. Once commencement of the search of the briefs began, it became 
apparent that all completed pre· 1993 briefs had been destroyed due to Jack of storage 
space and some of the post-1993 cases were net located at the Major Fraud Group's 
offices but at other Metropolitan police squads or stations anr.! some in country 
stations1 • Hence, it took a Jot more resources and time than anticipated to locate, 
arrange access, and code the data for analysis. 
It proved impossible to access a total of eight files also relating to fraud by persons 
in positions of financial trust. Three of the files were located at country police 
stations a fair distance from Melbourne and the detectives responsible for them 
proved impossible to meet with due to their being on leave and/or allending court for 
other cases and/or attending training courses. The other five additional cases were 
not included in the study because (even though the offenders had been convicted and 
sentenced) they were the subject of an appeal to a higher court against conviction or 
sentence imposed and case infonnation could not be made available to the author at 
that stage in the legal proceedings. Those eight cases identified as relevant to the 
study but not included were not different from the 50 that were studied because they, 
too, involved deception offences by person~ in positions of financial trust. In other 
2 It is the prncticc at the MFG that dctectlvcs working on nn ongoing investigation who arc transferred 
from !he MFG to other stations are llllpected to take the brief with them nnd to follow the case through to 
its completion. 
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words, no systcmntic bias existed in those eight case~. 
It was not considered necessary, as in Langdale ( 1990), to attend court hearings since 
the briefs had all the details required about the case and the offender. Unlike 
Langdale, the present study was not designed to look at "legal difficulties in alleged 
business fraud, the loss and hardship it may or may not cause, the offender's 
perspective and cons~;;quential media report" (p.l7). In addition, as Langdale 
discovered, "the length of each brief was considerable and the fixed court date not 
less than eight weeks" (p.17), factors that made it impossible for the research to 
focus on additional aspects of fraud trials in view of the constraints on time and 
resources available to the researcher. The amount of money involved in a fraud case 
varied from $17,173 to $108,580,000 with the mean average dollar loss to the 
victim(s) per case being approximately $4.4 million. While the cases studied cannot 
be said to be representative of serious fraud cases investigated by the MFG in 
general, they can be said to be representative of major management fraud 
investigated by the MFG (e.g., misappropriation of trust accounts money, false 
valuations, false loans, stealing customers' money) and prosecuted by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions in Victoria. 
Unstructured interviews were also conducted with MFG detectives to supplement the 
data on offenders available in the MFG briefs. The data were collected for the 
purpose of generating a taxonomy (i.e., a list of typologies) of such offenders. A total 
of 13 interviews were carried out with detectives who headed particular 
investigations and were responsible for preparing the prosecution brief, 
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The types of fraud involved in the fifty MFO cases used in this study arc shown 
below in Table 2. 
Table2: Types of Fraud in the MFG Cases 
Types of Fraud Number of %of 
Cases cases 
Financial statement manipulation and theft of 23 46 
assets 
Trust account fraud 14 28 
Theft of assets II 22 
Financial statement manipulation I 2 
Financial statement manipulation and trust I 2 
account fraud 
Total 50 100 
2.2 Data collection and coding 
For the purposes of the study, following lengthy discussions about fraud offenders 
with three experienced senior members of the Major Fraud Group !)'vtFG) of the 
Victoria Police, a pilot qualitative case study (N='6) was canied out to familiarise the 
author with the content of the police files and to enable a coding guide to be 
constructed3• Subsequently. major fraud cases investigated and successfully 
prosecuted by the MFG were studied and data coded for quantitative analysis. The 
3 A coding guide was prepared beforehnnd to cn~ble the rcscru:chcr to identify key ru:cas for statistical 
analysis of the data. The researcher followed two approaches: (I) once the brief was read, the case wru 
given a number and, in order to guarantee wnfidcntiality, the case was also summru:ised anonymously; nnd 
(2) the facts of each cas~ were coded for nnolysis. 
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coding guide cn[lblcd the coding of data pertaining to 27 variables largely lfom the 
literature revie\V (sec Chapter 2 and Appendix JJJ). Data was also eol!ected to test the 
OJ;~POrtunity and person compooents of the ROP model. Qualitative data on 
offenders' rationalisations were also collected. 
The following arc the main demographic and criminal justice characteristics for 
which data were collected a..11d coded and the rationale for their inclusion: offender's 
gender, marital status, age, occupation, criminal record, type and number of frauds 
committed and other non-fraud offences, under what legislation (state or federal) the 
offender was charged, number of victims, relationship with the victims, number of 
accomplices, how the fraud was discovered, motivation, whether the offender was 
specialist or versatile, pre-trial status, type of legal representation, court of first 
instance, severity of sentence, amount of money involved in the fraud(s), type of 
irregularity committed, and whether fraud indicators were present. Two additional 
variables, ethnicity of the offender and the length oftime it took police to prosecute a 
case, were dropped from the analysis because the former was difficult to detennine 
reliably and the latter because it was decided not to address the issue of MFG 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
The variables were chosen because they had been identified as relevant to the 
aetiology of fraud in the discussion of the empirical literature and/or because they 
form part of the ROP model. Additional variables relating to processing of the cases 
by the courts were dropped at the data-analysis stage following a decision to focus 
more on fraud. 
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i. Gender 
Goltfrcdson and Hirschi (1990); Ross (1977); Wheeler ct a!. (1988, 1982); and 
Weisburd et al. (I 990) discuss males a~ offenders of whitc-eollar crime. Whcelt:r ct 
nl. (I 988) argued that women offenders are under-represented among the highest tier 
ofwhite~collar offenders, such as antitrust and securities fraud, because they occupy 
relevant organisational positions in lesser numbers than males. The Wheeler et al. 
(1988) sample was drawn from 1976-1978 records. Nowadays, however, women 
have higher educational achievements and are more likely to choose a professional 
career. As mentioned earlier, it has been claimed that women commit fraud for 
different reasons than men, Zietz (1981) reported that women who committed white· 
collar crime were more likely to do so due to family needs than to fund high living, 
unlike their male counterparts. However, limitations of the Zietz study (discussed in 
Chapter 2) mean that we crumot accept unquestioningly her conclusion that women's 
criminality is motivated by family needs more than men's. Zietz (1981) was also 
testing Pollak {1950) and Reckless' (1961) findings that female crime has 
traditionally been underestimated in criminology (Pollak, 1950:161) as well as the 
claim that female crime is due to women being "more deceitful than men" (Reckless, 
1961:8). Reckless argued that women belong to a "special order of criminal 
behaviour" (p.78) and findings should not be generalised. Gender differences in 
criminal behaviour have also been proposed by Barnes and Teeters, (1959:62) who 
stated that there is a group of women who are "calculating, fascinating and 
intelligent, who capitalise on their chann and femininity", However, the question of 
whether women white-collar offenders nrc more deceitful than their male 
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counterparts cannot be answered on the basis of existing empirical evidence'. 
Gender was not used us a dctcnnining factor when the sample of cases wus selected 
by the present author. Finally, on tho:: basis of the existing litt:raturc, there is no 
reason why the ROP model should distinguish between male and female fraud 
offenders. 
ii. Marital status 
While neither Wheeler et al. (1988) nor Weisburd et a!. (1990) investigated the 
marital status of the white-collar crime offenders, Ross (1977:32) wrote that the 
white-collar crime perpetmtor is not anti-social and "is likely to keep his marriage 
vows, pay his debts, mixes well, stands by his friends, he is ready to protect maidens, 
or help poor widows". However, the study of female prison inmates by Zietz 
(1981: I 04) found that "all of the women in this group had one or more unsuccessful 
marriages and were currently living alone, with or without children, or with their 
parents". Marital status, as an indication of a defendant's social tics, is a legally-
relevant factor at the sentencing stage (Thomas, 1979), and may be useful in 
understanding offenders' motives and rationalisations. Both financial and non -
financial pressures for someone to commit fraud can be related to their marital status. 
4 Gender is n foetor that is tnken intD nccount by the judiciary in imposing sentences Dn convicted crimin~l 
dcfcndnnts (ThomiL'I, 1979). Discussion of the issue ofscxism in sentencing Is beyond the scope ofthisthcsis. 
iii. Age 
In contrast to the majority of convcntional/strct:l offenders who lend to be aged 
under 18 (Feldman, 1993), the average white-collar offender in Wheeler et al. (19~ll) 
and Weisburd et al. (1990) was 40 years old. The average age for street criminals in 
Weisburd et al. was 20 to 30 years. Weisburd et al. (1990) also reported that white-
collar offenders are likely to begin their careers later than street criminals. 
Undoubtedly, there is a link between age and white collar offending, since by the 
time one completes one's tertiary education and obtains sufficient professional 
qualifications and experience to command a highly paid position of financial trust 
such as accountant, solicitor, or bank-manager, one would be at least 30 years old. 
There is, however, scope for age differences between different major fraud offenders. 
Interestingly, as far as female inmates serving sentences for fraud are concerned, 
Zietz (1981:114) found that "age did not appear to be a significant factor, although 
the majority were less than 30 years of age". 
iv. Occupation 
Wheeler et al. (1988) compared convicted white-collar and common crime offenders 
on a variety of social and demographic indicators. As would be expected, they found 
that white-collar offenders had a higher educational attainment than street offenders, 
and had histories of steady employment. Coleman (1987) believes that white-collar 
offenders use their occupation as an opportunity, but Spark (1994) goes a step further 
and argues that in addition to using one's job, if there is a complicated group 
structure or financial dictatorship then that is an added opportunity. 
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v. I1r:md ch:1rgcs :md other non-fraud offences 
Kom and McCorkle ( 1959) pointed out that "the earliest and still the most common 
way of classifying criminals is in terms of the legal title identifying the criminal act" 
(p.l42). The categories of fraud charges used most frequently by the MFG were: 
a. obtaining property by deception; 
b. obtaining financial advantage by deception; 
c. theft; and 
d. forgery. 
One of the issues in the literature concerns the question of whether white-collar 
offenders are specialists or genemlists (like street offenders) in the types of crimes 
they commit. Using official New Zealand data, Thomas (1992) reported that many 
fraud offenders reoffend; more specifically, 34.1% were later reconvicted for the 
same offence, and 68.2% reconvicted for fraud or any other crime (p.l25). Benson 
and Moore (1992) concluded that white-collar offenders were a lot less involved in 
crime than street offenders. White-collar offenders were reported by Wheeler eta!. 
(1988) as having a surprisingly high number of prior arrests and convictions, but 
were still lower in that regard than common criminals. Weisburd et al. (1990) found 
that more than one in seven securities fraud offenders had a prior felony conviction, 
as did more than a quarter of those convicted of credit fraud, false claims, and mail 
fraud. Even with the more elite population of white-collar offenders such as doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, office managers and owners of substantial capital, there was 
evidence "of criminal careers ... within a highly restricted population of elite white-
collar offenders" (p.347). They reported that a nontrivial "proportion of white-collar 
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offenders were !Ound to be repeat offenders and some had serious and lengthy 
criminal records" (p.343). The same authors suggest that white-collar ofTcndcrs do 
not specialise in white-collar crime. 
vi. Relationship to the victim 
The offender-victim relationship is of importance as far as both patterns in criminal 
behaviour and implications for its detection and prevention arc concerned. It is also 
significant in sentencing because the violation of trust (a basic feature of many 
deception white-collar crimes) is an aggravating factor {Thomas, 1979). Regarding 
the type of victim, Wheeler et al. (1988:338) claimed that "common crimes victimise 
individuals. In contrast, the majority of federal white collar offences involves 
victimisation of organisations ... they are also likely to use an organisational fonn for 
their commission". 
vii. Number of accomplices 
For some deception offences to take place, more than one offender is needed because 
of a need for collusion. An example might be a bank manager and a real-estate agent 
operating a deception ploy, whereby the bank manager approves housing loans for 
properties he/she knows have been overvalued and is paid secret commissions by the 
real estate agent. Furthennore, an important question of interest to both police, 
detectives and the judiciary is whether an offender has been operating alone to 
commit a fraud or with accomplices, At the sentencing stage, hrwing accomplices is 
an aggravating factor as it often points to more planning being involved (Thomas, 
1979). Wheeler eta!. (1988), the only researcher in this area to have looked at this 
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variable, found thut "only about nineteen percent of the common crimes involve Jive 
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or more person<; in addition to the defendant, while more than one-third of the white 
collar of!Cnces have as many participants" (p.J39). It should be noted here, that any 
of the categories listed under "motives" in the ROP model could involve an offender 
with or without accomplices. 
viii. How the fraud was discovered 
Fraud is often carefully concealed and it would be of interest to know how it comes 
to light (e.g., who becomes suspicious and reports the matter to the police or 
someone else). Infonnation about this variable was also considered in order to gauge 
the apparent involvement of auditors in fraud detection. 
ix. Motivation 
One of the essential components of the proposed ROP model is a crime-prone person 
with a motive for committing fraud. Offenders commit their crimes for many and 
various reasons. Business failures, drug addiction, gambling and particular lifestyles 
needing large amounts of money are important factors in understanding why 
someone might commit fraud. Other possible motivations might be revenge, greed 
and megalomania. Cressey (1986,1980) discounted gambling, alcohol or spending 
beyond one's means as causes of embezzlement, and reported that one of the 
offenders studied was willing to do anything to give his wife and children what they 
needed. For Cressey, "ascribing bad motives to behaviour docs not explain that 
behaviour" ( 1980:121 ). According to Thomas (1992: 125), family needs is more of an 
acceptable justification coming from women rather than men. As criminologists arc 
not tired of telling us, drug addiction is·a major cause of various criminalnffcnccs in 
society. Benson and Moore (1992:263-264) indirectly tested for this variah!c and 
found that "neither white-collar nor common offenders are likely to have drinking 
problcms ... only 6% of white-collar criminals are reported to have used illegal drugs, 
compared to almost half of the common criminals". Knowledge about 
vice(s)/motivation(s) of an offender helps to construct the offender profile and to 
develop a model to explain the ;·~asons why major fraud is committed. Some of the 
vices identified for testing were: gambling, drugs, greed, to pay penonal bills, to pay 
business bills, and lifestyle (e.g., leading a double life or othetwisc living beyond 
one's means in order to maintain a particular self-image). 
x. Pre-trial status of the offed.der 
The decision to grant a defendant bail or remand them in custody indicates how the 
courts view a defendant (i.e., whether they pose a serious risk they may abscond, or 
whether they will commit another serious crime), a factor that can be expected to 
impact on sentence choice and severity. 
xi. Legally represented by a private lawyer or by a court-appointed lawyer 
This is to identify if the offender had the resources available to finance his/her legal 
defence. 
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xii. Scn·rity of sentence 
A lot has been \VTiltcn about white collar-crime offenders not receiving a fair 
punishment tOr their crime. Bologntl ( 1993) claims tht~t U.S. fraud oflCnders believe 
that "if you are going to be a financial crook be a big onc ... [since] the greater the 
offence t~gainst the ct~pital, the less the punishment imposed by the sentencing judge" 
(p.7). information about the type and severity of sentence imposed was collected 
because it is relevant to a discussion of deterrence theory . The severity of the 
sentence is looked at where applicable. 
xiii. Amount of money involved in the fraud 
Information on this factor was collected in order to throw some light on sentencing 
decisions, as it largely determines perceptions of hann done, i.e., perceptions of 
offence seriousness. Furthermore, it could be argued that the greater the money 
involved, the better the position the offender is in to bargain his plea with the police, 
who might be also interested in recovering some of the money involved in a spate of 
deception offences, so that the victims can recover some of their losses. Finally, that 
victims have recovered part or the total of their financial losses is a mitigating factor 
that the judiciary would normally take into account (Thomas, 1979). Information 
about this variable would also be useful in gauging the scale of the frauds 
investigated by the MFG. 
xiv. Type of irregularity 
As already mentioned above, one of the aims of the research is to test Locbbeckc et 
al.'s fraud risk assessment model which differentiates between "defalcation" and 
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"mmmgemcnt fraud". Information on this !Uctor was also collected bccuuse dilfcrcnt 
types of irregularities have different implications for auditors, as !Ur as their duty to 
detect and report such illegal acts is concerned. 
xv. Fraud-facilitating conditions (i.e., fraud indicators) 
Information was collcctect on this factor because of its potential importance ~or 
auditors. In addition, "conditions" is one of the components of the ROP model (0) 
and ofLoebbecke et al.'s (1989) model being tested by this research. 
xvi. Ratiomliisations 
Possessing rationalisations (i.e., neutralising verbalisations) is a necessary 
component for fraud to take place. As Cressey {1986) pointed out, it is an 
individual's ability to rationalise and justifY perpetrating the offence(s) that makes 
fraud possible. Qualitative data about the offenders' rationalisations was extracted 
from sworn written statements made to the MFG detectives investigating. 
3.0 THE MFG CASES USED IN THIS STUDY 
Representative case summaries nre provided below, with the ROP model 
components present being indicated, in order to provide the reader with an idea of 
the type of r.nses studied. Cases where the facts are similar arc not repeated. Due to a 
confidentiality agreement signed by the author, the cases crc presented without any 
identifYing details about the offender or the victhn(s). The decision whether an 
·.~ffender had certain characteristics e.g., low self-control and his/her type of 
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motivation (e.g.,, greed) was arrived at allcr careful examination of all the 
information in the MFG tile. 
Case one involved a fraud of $1,785,000 committed by a member of middle 
management in a finance company. The male offender had sole responsibility over 
computer assets, recording, and investments at a time when the company's bank lost 
the original authorised signature card with a specimen of the two signatories (Person 
and Opportunity). He was t:ngaged to get married and needed money (Motive: 
financial problem). Exploiting his company's weak internal controls, he submitted 
one card with one signatory only. He redeemed clients' Commercial Bills without 
their eonst:nt, paid them the interest due and paid the remainder into his personal 
account. He used the money to buy a house and a car for himself and his fiancee. 
After his first "success" he became both over-confident and more greedy and 
proceeded to commit more frauds. He justified the frauds on the basis that he would 
one day pay it back (Rationalisation). Realising he would not be able to pay back the 
money after all, one day he left his fiancee a note admitting having defrauded his 
company. She, in tum, infonned the police. 
The second case was for $1,600,000. The offender, was a director who was an 
undischarged bankrupt and a career conman (Person) who without adequate 
screeniilg of applicants for management positions deceived his two co-directors into 
signing blank cheques (Opportunity). He opened eight bank accounts in the names of 
each of the other directors with overdraft facilities of $200,000. He then debited each 
account with $200,000 and credited his own account with that sum of money. As far 
1:"i.l 
as he was conecmed, he was entitled to whatever money he could gel 
(Rationalisation). A fellow co-director suspected the fraud and the police were called 
in. 
The third case involved a female accountant who committed n [mud of $2,300,000. 
She banked a client's bank cheque into the practice's trust account. The bank 
incorrectly credited the account with three zeros too many (Opporfllnily). Once the 
offender became aware of this, seeing no reason why she should not appropriate the 
money for herself and perceiving a low risk of being prosecuted (she felt that the 
bank did not really need the money- Rationalisation), the account was debited and 
the money sent off to various friends and the offender's spouse. The bank soon 
realised a mistake had been made and contacted the offender. She claimed that she 
had assumed the money had come from an inheritance she had been expecting. 
Case four was for $174,211. A 30-ycar old single male finance manager, with low 
self-control needed money to pay university fees for his brother as well as to help his 
sister who was living overseas (Motivated crime-prone person). He was responsible 
for investing $1.5 million to maintain a minimum working capital. He exploited the 
company's weak internal controls (Opportunity) to falsifY payment vouchers and to 
appropriate the money from his employer's bank account. He justified defrauding 
his employer on the grounds L~at "nobody would get hurt" (Rationalisation). He was 
found out by the external auditor. 
Case five involved a fraud of $345,000. Perceiving a low risk of being apprehended 
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(Opportunity), a crime-prone 40-year old married male solicitor (Person} deceived 
17 clients (from convcyancin~ and divorce cltscs) into investing money in u company 
supposedly !Or better returns. l-Ie did not inlbrm his clients that he owncd the 
company concerned. He then misappropriated the invcstmcnls. He covered up the 
frauds by making it appear that the clients had loaned their money to him. His 
justification was that he had the clients' authority since there were only "technical 
deficiencies" in their trust accounts' (Rationalisation). He was found out when a 
client died and the beneficiaries asked for their money held in the trust account, 
Case six involved a fraud of $1,381,304. The offender was a 37-year old male 
solicitor who had a serious financial problem because he could not meet interest 
payments on a loan he had taken out to build a medical clinic (Person with a motive). 
Since he had access to his clients' land titles and their money in his trust accounts 
and in the absence of capable guardians (Opporl!lnity), he raised the money he so 
urgently needed via false accounting. He rationalised the frauds in terms of "merely 
borrowing money" from clients with the intention of paying them back later when 
his investments would yield a significant profit (Rationalisation). He was found out 
when a client insisted on withdrawing his money from the trust account. 
Case seven concerned a fraud of $280,000. A 40-year old opportunist married male 
solicitor, (Person) had access to clients' trust accounts and perceived a low risk of 
being found out if he committed fraud against his clients (Opporlrlnity). He invested 
his clients' monies under an alias and used some of the money to purch11sc pcrsonll! 
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property. He justified the fmmls on the grounds that he was "only borrowing money 
from clients" and intended to pay the money back into their accounts at a later stage 
(Rationalisation). He was found out when a client asked for the money in her trust 
account, became suspicious and contacted the Law Institute. 
Case eight was for $886,769. In this case the offender a 50-year old consultant 
accountant, a professional conman who in the past had used three different aliases 
and was a compulsive gambler and a liar, purported to be a qualified accountant 
(Person with a motive). He was employed by a company (with weak internal controls 
to prevent fraud) as a consultant and was entrusted to requisition cheques as required 
(Opportunily). The offender would write up requisition forms, attach supporting 
documentation and write up the cheque details in erasable ink. Once the cheques 
were signed he would alter the payee and amount. The changes made were not 
obvious on the cheque. He forged a total of 341 cheques thinking of himself as a 
professional fraudster who was entitled to whatever he could get away with 
(Rationalisation). He was found out by an auditor. 
Case nine was for $100,327. This fraud was committed by a 42-year old male bank 
manager who perceived a low risk of being found out and being greedy for money 
(Person with a motive) took advantage of weak internal controls (Opportunity). He 
approved unsecured loans to two business partners above and beyond what he was 
authorised by the bank to approve. They had promised him a senior position in their 
company in the near future as well as a financial reward in rctum for his "services" to 
them. To cover up the unsecured loans, he also approved loans to fictitious 
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customers. 'l11c money was paid into a number of account~ opened under assumed 
names. There was a need to avoid the excessive unsecured loans from being included 
by the bank's computerised internal control system on a list of loans that 
management would review regularly. That he did by using money from the fictitious 
accounts to reduce the balance of the unsecured loans. As far as he was concerned, 
what he was doing was justified as a means to an end (Rationalisation). He was 
found out by the bank's auditors. 
Case 10 involved a fraud of $136,161 which was committed by a member of middle 
management, a 40-yenr old married male. He was a compulsive gambler with a 
propensity to lie and a financial problem (Crime-prone person with a motive). He 
was in charge of accounts payable and had access to the computer system 
(Opportunity). He used the lack of segregation of duties to create fictitious 
accounts/files. He then made unauthorised alterations or deletions to document 
which allowed him to generate seven cheques made payable to himself. He 
subsequently negotiated the cheques in his personal account. His justification for 
what he did was that he "really needed the money" (Rationalisations). 
Case 11, was a $10,860,000 fraud committed by a finance broker. Two credit union 
members had taken out a ioan for a business venture, but due to financial difficulties 
they could not pay it back. They found an Australi:m living in Asia (a megalomaniac 
male, dreamer and schemer who loved "flaunting himself' in the business world as a 
high-flier, a motivated crime-prone person) who was willing to buy the business and 
re-finance the loans but required in excess of $10 million. The credit union rules, 
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however, prohibited such large amounts being loaned to one individual. Exploiting 
weak internal controls (Opportuniry), he made 20 fictitious names and addresses and 
provided false or overstated properties as security. The purpose for the large amount 
being borrowed was to pay off existing loans with other financial institutions. At the 
suggestion of the external auditor, an upper manager of the credit union obtained 
sworn valuations and discovered that the mortgaged properties were worth only $4 
million rather than $14.1 million. He justified the frauds on the basis that they were 
necessary for the project to succeed and save the company (Rationalisation). 
Case 12, involved a $1,250,000 fraud committed by a 47~year old grandmother 
accountant who had been dismissed by her previous employer for committing fraud. 
Acting out of greed (Motivated crime-prone person) she exploited weak internal 
controls. A lack of segregation of duties allowed her to be both in charge of 
personnel records as well as responsible for paying salaries (Opportunity). She 
defrauded her employer of the stated amount via fraudulent transactions. Using a 
variety of methods to cover up her frauds, she misappropriated cheques issued by her 
employer who was a foreign government and had them paid into her own account. 
She did this by getting subordinates to sign "pay cash" cheques or by forging 
cheques to alter the amount stated to a larger amount and have the difference paid 
into her account. She also misappropriated bills (meant to pay employees' salaries) 
upon their maturity by adding "or pay cash". She believed she had a very good 
chance of getting away with her frauds (Rationolisati011). With a salary of only 
$27,000 and employment of 10 odd years the offender managed to own four houses 
in her name, buy another two for family members, pay school fees for grandchildren 
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and to hold cash deposits of$! million. II is unknown why a number of her assistants 
or c\'l.'ll upper management co-operated with her and banked the cheques or even 
authorised the alterations. No charges were laid against those people. She wa~ found 
out by the bank when she tried to have a bill paid into her own account which had 
already been paid. When interviewed by the police, she appeared naive and used the 
language barrier as an excuse not to communicate. 
Case 13 was a fraud of$1,700,000. In this case, a megalomaniac 42-year old male 
solicitor with low self-control (Crime-prone person) needed money to finance his 
excessive property investments (Motive). He had access to clients' accounts and was 
in charge of making mortgage payments while his wife was in charge of the 
disbursement~· of interest payments (Opportunity). Acting out of greed, he misled 
and manipulated the partner in charge of the law firm he worked at to use the term 
deposits for his own benefit. He had control over bank accounts and informed the 
bank that any transactions (mortgage payments) that were meant to go through that 
account sho~ld go to his personal account. To cover up his fraudulent activities, he 
would transfer money from one of his accollilts to replace the stolen money from the 
c1!:~;nts' accounts. He exploited loose controls and took letters supposedly to deliver 
personally to clients, but they never reached their destination. He believed he would 
be able to pay back the money one day and that he would not be found out 
(Rationalisation). An aged client whose trust account he had misappropriated died 
and the beneficiary of the estate asked for the money in the account. 
Case 14 was a fraud of $1,063,900. This case involved a 55-year old married male 
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bank manager with low self-control (Crime-prone person) who was at liberty to 
redeem clients' bills upon maturity (Opporfllnify). Acting out of greed (Motive) and 
believing he could avoid being found out (Rationali.l·atirm), he used three 
commercinl bills owned by a friend and his associate for personal usc. He paid off 
the bills and bought property. To cover up the frauds he transferred money from one 
of his accounts to replace the stolen money. The friend who had invested the money 
was receiving the interest earned from the bills for nearly a year, but became 
suspicious when he decided he wanted to redeem one of the investments and another 
bank manager could not determine its existence. 
Case 15 involved a fraud of $1,141,104. A 37-year old professional conman, 
practising as finance consultant (Crime-prone motivated person). He believed he was 
justified in defrauding people because that was his job (Rationalisation). He used II 
aliases to open 16 separate bank accounts in three banks and utilised the serviced 
offices and business name of some reputable accounting practices around Melbourne 
(he created the Opportunity) in order to commit frauds as follows: 
i. He scrutinised share registers to find personal details of large shareholders, 
assumed their identity and, using a series of false documents, he changed 
address and amended the share register accordingly. 
ii. Following the alteration to the share register, he informed the share registry 
that due to the change in address the original share certificate was lost and a 
new one was issut:d to him. 
iii. Upon receipt of the duplicate share script, the shares were sold to innocent 
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shareholders and he managed to obtain $432,000 which he banked in his 
personal account. 
He was found out as a result of one company's practice of confirming a "change of 
address" with the shareholders. In addition to this fraud, he was charged with 
involvement in a fraud in 1990. The details of that fraud are as follows: He used an 
alias to negotiate the purchase of two life insurance companies supposedly on behalf 
of a U.S. investor. He deceived the bank into drawing cheques in favour of creditors 
of the company that sold one of the life insurance companies and had part of the 
money paid into various accounts he had opened under a number of false names. He 
used $65 million ofthe $150 million funds held by the bank on behalf of one of the 
insurance companies to deceive the parent company to settle the deal on the pretext 
that the money was from the bank of New York. He then instructed the bank to draw 
bank cheques of nearly $10 million payable to a particular company which he 
owned. He cashed those cheques and the same month he received the money he 
distributed it to various persons. He seemed to have been shifting from state to state 
and defrauding innocent people. 
Case 16 was a fraud of $17,173. In this case a 38-year old male director and 
principal shareholder indifferent to the consequences of his behaviour, had a 
financial problem but continued living beyond his means (Crime-prone motivated 
person). He used cheques from an account that had been closed by the bank six 
months earlier to pay his daughter's school and tuition fees, pay the mechanic, and 
go on holidays. His justification was that he was "doing it for the family" and since 
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he was able to i~-suc cheques to people who did not question him and his integrity 
(Opportunity), he was "entitled to whatever he could get" (Rationa/isatiun). lie was 
found out when one of the victims alerted the police. 
Case 17 was a $417,500 fraud committed by a director and principal shareholder. A 
35-year old single male career conman (Crime-prone motivated person) who had no 
need to justify committing fraud to himself (i.e., no need for rationalisation), set up 
a corporate hospitality for sporting events to victimise gullible individuals 
(Opportunity) by selling sporting entertainment packages to companies in Sydney 
and Melbourne. There were four packages organised over one month period which 
he sold to a number of companies. He was found out when staff of the relevant 
companies arrived for the event and as there were no such tickets they complained. 
The offender left the country before the events occurred. He was brought back and 
convicted. 
Case 18 involved $340,000. This froud was committed by middle management. The 
company's fleet cars were to be sold at public auction or traded-in against the 
purchase of a new vehicle (Opportunity). The transport office would obtain three 
quotations from various dealers and submit a requisition for a new vehicle. In 
collusion and acting out of greed, three single male employees in their 30's and of 
low self-control (Crime-prone persons) authorised documentation, drew and signed 
cheques, advertised and sold the trade-ins to family members or innocent purchasers. 
New vehicles were purchased for family members but paid for by the company. 
Their justification was that "nobody would get hurt" by the frauds (Rationalisation). 
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They were found out by the internal auditor. 
Case 19 wns !Or $65,000. In this case, u single 40-ycar old male bank manager of 
low self-control (Crime-prone person) acted out of greed and exploited weak internal 
controls (Opportunity) to lend two individuals a total of $900,000. The amount was 
in excess of the amount of money he was authorised to lend. He did not verify that 
the valuations the two borrowers provided were not false. He was paid a secret 
commission of $65,000. His justification was that he was "not harming any people 
but the bank" (Rationalisation). He was found out when another bank who knew the 
low credit rating of the two offender~ infonned the bank manager's superiors. No 
case could be brought against the borrowers due to limited evidence, even though 
once that case was completed another banking institution was conned into the same 
thing by the two borrowers and once again the bank manager was the one charged 
for the secret commission. 
Case 20 involved a fraud of$108,580,000 which was committed by a bank manager. 
He was 38-year old single male with low self-control (Crime-prone person) who was 
conned by two individuals who had cQnned another bank, whose company (X 
Group) wanted to build a retirement village. The offender circumvented the bnnk's 
weak internal controls (Opportunity) over a three-year period and continued re-
financing the loans to the two individuals even though he knew it was a bad loan and 
that he had exceeded his authority. His justification was that "it was for a good 
purpose". (Rationalisation). It was later determined that he was the designated 
manager of X Group. When the bank promoted the o!Tcnder because it felt he wns 
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doing very well, he continued to provide assistance to thl: person who took his 
position and even reconciled his old accounts; he was always very helpful and never 
took holidays. He was found out when a colleague suspected the fraud. 
Case 21 was for $4,500,000. A 57-year old married male chief executive officer of a 
multinational company had weak self-control (Crime-prone person). He had been 
with the company for over 30 years and nobody dared question him. Acting out of 
greed, and believing he was entitled to the money (Rationa!islJiion), he renovated his 
house using company frauds. Exploiting the company's wt:ak internal controls 
(Opportunity), he instructed one of the managers to charge $4.5 million of 
renovations to various company stores. However, he was not aware that the Chief 
Accountant also renovated his house and some of the expenses were hidden into his 
··expenses. The disgruntled accountant as well as one of the builders who realised 
what was going on infonned the police. The offender's justification was that ·.the 
company owed him the luxury he sought to have (Rationalisation). 
Case 22 involved a fraud of $3,700,000. A 46-year old male general manager with 
low self-contrul (Crime-prone person) colluded with the marketing manager 
(Opportunity) and approved invoices twice to a particular supplier who maintained 
two sets of books for tax purposes, The general manager was acting out of greed and 
justified the fraud as "a means to an end" (Rationalisation). One set was paid into the 
computerised accounting system of the supplier and the other into his personal 
manual system. The marketing manager was only doing it to keep her job and the 
general manager was receiving Gecret commissions. 
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Case 23 was for a $60,000,000 fraud eommittctl by a Trust manager. He was a 37-
year old mule with low self-control (Crime-prone person) who was approached by 
two overseas promotional managers to invest money overseas. He agreed to collude 
with them to defraud the company (Opportunity). His justification was that "the 
potential reward was worth it" (Rationalisation). The trust sent some money and a 
high return was received. However, they did not know that the interest received was 
from the money sent, so they kept on sending more funds and continued to receive 
interest that was really part of their original investment principal instead of from 
earnings. 
Case 24 involved a $500,000 fraud committed by a general manager of an insurance 
company. In the late 1980's in Australia if someone set up an agency for insurance 
policies he would receive I 00% of the total insurance for the first year back as a 
commission as soon as the first monthly premium was received by the insurance 
company (Opportunity). Exploiting this practice, a 40-year old male with low self-
control, who had a serious financial problem (Crime-prone person) set up an agency 
and got a list of his friends to draw the first premiwn cheque for an insurance policy 
he was supposed to take up. As soon as the insurance company received the first 
payment they returned it as 100% commission back to the three agents. 80% was to 
be returned to the policy holder as a loan and the 20% was for administration costs. 
The agents were to obtain as security a list of assets owned by the policy holders in 
case they ceased paying the insurance policy, TI1e offender refunded the money to 
the policy holders and received the total commission from which he built his house, 
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His justification was that he was "not doing anybody any harm" (Rationalisations). 
In two months all policies ceased and when the insurance company tried to recover 
the insured assets, it realised they did not exist. The insurance company auditors had 
not checked the internal controls in this case, and nobody in the company ever 
checked the securities held. 
4.0 FINDINGS 
4.1 A comparison of fraud indicators present in the ROP model and in 
Loebbecke eta!. (1989) 
Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) paper does not provide details of the definition of 
"d(;:faleation" and "management fraud" used. The definitions used, however, have 
been provided to the author (personal contact). Defalcation is employee fraud, 
embezzlement, and larceny. Management fraud is deliberate fraud committed by 
management that injures investors and creditors through materially misleading 
financial statements. The class of perpetrators is management. 
It should also be noted that misappropriation of trust accounts by lawyers and 
accountants was classified as a defalcation not a management fraud. 
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Table 3: Clussif1cation of the Filly Cases into Irregularities by Deceptive 
Action 
Type oflrrcguhtrity All cases Defalcations Management 
Fraud 
No %of50 No %of30 No % of20 
. 
----- ·---
Assets overvalued or 2 4 2 7 
incorrectly valued 
Transactions/events not I 2 I 5 
recorded 
Expenses recorded 5 10 I 3 4 20 
incorrectly 
Liabilities understated I 2 I 5 
Misappropriation of 20 40 13 43 7 35 
funds 
Theft of cash receipts 26 52 7 23 19 95 
Falsified and altered 33 66 13 43 20 100 
records 
Totals 88 36 52 
Average per occurrence 1.8 1.2 2.6 
Table 3 shows that, using the same classification as Loebbeeke et al. (1989), in order 
to commit the irregularity a perpetrator curried out more than one deceptive action~. 
This explains why N "' 88 and not 50. For all perpetrators, the average number of 
deceptive acts for the 50 cases reviewed is 1.8 Loebbeeke et al. also reported an 
average of 1.8 acts. The average for defalcations and management fraud is 1.2 and 
2.6 respectively compared to Loebbecke ct a!. conesponding figures of 1.4 and 2.0. 
Again, in agreement with Locbbeeke's findings, largely the same deceptive uctions 
underlined both defalcation and management fraud. However, "assets overvalued or 
5 Unlike Loebbccke cl al.'s study, "rcv~nuc or other credits recognised impwpcrly", •·,p"clous nccounting 
judgement made", or "tmnsncllons in the wrong period" and "disclosures omitted or 111is!cilding" were not 
contained in !he irregularities included in the sample ofMFG c:1scs. 
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incorrectly valued" only featured in defalcations, while "transactions/events not 
recorded only featured in management fraud". 
The fact that the findings obtained in the present study are very similar to those 
reported by Loebbecke et al. is interesting given that their study was based on a 
survey of auditors whereas the findings of the present study have been obtained from 
prosecution briefs of major fraud cases. 
The implications of this observation for auditors are that: (a) the modus operandi of 
serious fraud offenders is very much the same whether they operate in Australia or 
United States and (b) upon discovering evidence of a deceptive action an auditor 
should assume that it is not an isolated event underpinning an irregularity (see Table 
4). 
Table 4 provides infonnation about the incidence of different types of deceptive 
action by type ofirregulari~. 
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Table 4: 
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Classification of Number of Charges for the Fifty MFG Cases into 
Irregularities Committed by Deceptive Action 
Type of Irregularity All cases Defalcations Management 
Fraud 
No %or so No % orJo No % (}[20 
Assets overvalued or 12 24.0 12 40.0 
incorrectly valued 
Transactions/events not I 2.0 I 5.0 
recorded 
Expenses recorded 26 52.0 5 16.7 21 105.0 
incorrectly 
Liabilities understated 2 4.0 2 10.0 
Misappropriation of funds 330 660.0 220 733.3 110 550.0 
Theft of cash receipts 603 1206.0 112 373.3 491 2455.0 
Falsified and altered records 568 1136.0 68 226.7 500 2500.0 
Totals .,1542 3084.0 417 1390.0 1125 5625.0 
Average per occurrence 30.8 13.9 56.3 
With few exceptions the fraud offenders studied are prolific serial offenders. A 
review of Table 4 reveals that the offenders averaged 30.8 irregularities each. More 
specifically, the average number of charges for defalcations was 13.9 and 56.3 for 
management fraud. However, these averages are inflated by the presence of one 
management fraud offender who was charged with 340 counts of falsifying and 
altering records and with as many theft offences. Similarly, another offender w~s 
charged with 91 counts of misappropriating funds. Excluding those two offenders 
the average number of irregularities per occurrence of major fraud is 17.7. The 
implication of this finding is that upon discovering evidence for an irregulnrity tlll 
auditor should assume that many more have also been perpetrated. 
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4.2 Fraud indic;ltors 
4.2.1 Testing the ;lpplicnbility of the ROI' model 
It needs to be ncknowlcdged that using the MFG cases to test the applicability of the 
ROI' model provides a useful but limited test of the models. The reliSon for this is that 
the MFG cliSes involved fraud convictions; in otherwords, they involved a person with 
a crime-prone personality who exploited opportunities to perpetrate fmud, This is a 
limitation of the methodology used. 
Table 5 provides support for the ROP model. Examination of the Opportunity 
indicators shows the importance of a nwnber of both "situational factors" and 
"company characteristics" predicted by the model liS facilitating the conunission of 
fraud. Regarding the situational factors, the great majority (80%) of the offenders 
perceived a low risk of being apprehended. This finding provides empirical support for 
deterrence theory (Walker, 1980) according to whieh a potential offender is 
discouraged through fear of consequences from committing a particular crime if he/she 
perceives a high risk of being apprehended and expects a severe enough sentence upon 
conviction. It should be noted here that, on the bliSis of their statements during the 
police interviews as well as on the basis of lengthy discussions the present author had 
with MFG investigators, the majority of the offenders studied perceived a low risk of 
being apprehended and the issue of the likely penalty if convicted did not seem to have 
concerned them. 
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In support of Clurk·c ( 191!0) rnul Cohen and Felson ( 1979), Table 5 also shows that the 
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absence of cupablc guardians is another significant situational factor. A closer look at 
the cases concerned, revealed that as long as the Law Institute of Victoria failed to 
audit regularly solicitors' trust accounts, it allowed enough solicitors (in ten cases) to 
perceive a low risk of being found out and to defraud their clients by stealing from 
their trust accounts. Similarly, so long as there were no regional managers to inspect 
the work of bank managers, it made it easier for five of them to defraud their own bank 
whether by colluding with outsiders (see below) or to steal money from their clients. 
Of course, both solicitors and bank managers, like accountants in private practice, 
enjoy the trust of their clients and the existence of gullible people is another situational 
factor that made fraud possible in 34% of the cases. 
In addition to situational factors, the opporwnity component of the ROP mode! 
includes "company characteristics". Table 5 shows that the ROP model correctly 
predicted the importance of lack of adequate control procedures (90%) that prevent 
fraud. This supports the KPMG (1996, 1995a, 1995b, 1993a, 1993b) fraud surveys 
which found that poor internal control was the one factor that underpinned most frauds 
both in Austmlia and in 17 other countries. In addition to a lack of adequate control 
procedures, the ROP model correctly predicted the importance of non-control factors 
(64%) that provide opportunities for fraud to be committed. Such factors include, for 
example, inability to judge the quality of perfonnancc; lack of access to information; 
ignorance, apathy or incapacity, and lack of audit tmil. 
Further support for the ROP model is the finding that 36% of the offenders belonged to 
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11 criminogenic occupational/corporntc culture which appears to condone solicitors or 
accountants who "borrow" money from their client~' trust accounts or bank managers 
who authorise tmsccurcd loans or loans far in excess of the amounts they arc authorised 
to approve for clients they know well and trust. Weak internal controls may well mean 
that collusion between a number of company employees is possible. There was a total 
of six (12%) such cases. Three separate bank managers conspired with outsiders: two 
approved loans for "trusted" clients on the basis ofinfonnation they knew to be untrue, 
and one approved excessive loans to a company in return for secret commissions. In 
another case, an employee of a disposal company paid secret conunissions to the 
operator of a rubbish tip for lower rates per truck load. There were two cases of 
collusion within a company: three employees in a ministry conspired to steal cars that 
should have been traded in when new ones were purchased, and the manager of a credit 
corporation who sent all printing work to the same company and in return was being 
paid secret coiillllissions. 
Regarding the person component of the ROP model, Table 5 provides support for both 
its constituent parts "motive" and "crime-prone personality". About the latter, it can be 
seen that while 30% were professional, unscrupulous deceivers, the motive in 40% of 
the cases was a financial problem. There was only one case involving the restoration of 
social identity and one in order to obtain personal justice respectively. In further 
support of the ROP model, Table 5 also shows that the most frequent characteristics of 
a crime-prone p~rson who has perpetrated fraud are a propensity for lying {92%) and 
weak self-control (62%), egocentricity (34%), someone having a strong sense they arc 
entitled to whatever money they can get by deceiving others (28%) and low self-
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esteem (20%). As would be predicted using the ROP model, the cases studied involved 
a variety of motivrs. The two main motives were: being a professional fraur.lstcr (30%) 
and sheer greed in the case or opportunistic o!Tenders (24%). 
A category of predator, professional conmcn (N-=15) had no moral scruples and 
therefore felt no guilt for committing the crime but justified committing the offence 
usm:.;· a variety of rulionalisations (in Cressey's, 1986, tenn neutra/ising 
,, 
verbalisations). The most frequently used rationalisations were: "I can make better use 
of the ~.oney than the company", "deceiving is what I do fora living"/ "I'm entitled to 
whatever money I can get" (30%); "the end justifies the means" and so forth (16%); 
''nobody will ger hurt" and so forth (12%) and "I am only borrowing the money and 
will pay it back" (12%). 
The study's results regarding rationalisations. provide support for one o( the ROP 
model's basic premises, namely that its three components {R, 0, P) are necessary for 
fraud to occur. The same results also cast serious doubt on the Loebbecke eta!. model 
since, as has already been pointed out, one of its components- attitudes - comprises a 
set of company characteristics that come under the opportunity cv:nponent of ROP. In 
other words, Loebbecke et al.'s model has nothing to say about mtionalisations. This 
major omission may well be due to the fact that they only used data from audit partners 
and had no data on fraud offenders. Table 5 also shows that the following indicators 
had a frequency of over 50%: propensity for lying (92%), lack of adequate control 
procedures that prevent fraud (90%); perception of low risk of being apprehended 
(80%); non-control factors providing opportunity for fraud to be committed (64%) 
and weak self-control (62%). 
Table 5: Indicators and Frequency of Occurrence by the ROP molcl's three 
Components 
Indicators Number of cases % of cases with 
with component components in the 
MFG cases 
N=SO 
Opporfllllities* 
Situational Factors• 
Perception of low risk of being 40 80 
apprehended 
Absence of capable guardians 18 36 
Existence of gullible people willing to 17 34 
' 
trust strangers with their money 
Perception of lenient sentence 4 8 
Collusion opportunities 2 4 
Company Characteristics* 
Lack of adequate control procedures that 45 90 
prevent fraud 
Non-control factors providing 32 64 
opportunities for fraud to be committed 
Criminogenic corporate culture 18 36 
Collusion opportunities 4 8 
Inadequate screening of applicants for 3 6 
management positions 
Ratio11alisatio11s 
Deceiving is what I do for a living; I am 15 30 
entitled to whatever money I can get /I 
can make better use of the money than the 
company 
!l 
r;,, ... 
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The end justifies the means/ It's for a good 8 16 
pmpose/lt's to: save the company/pay the 
staffll'm doing it for the family 
Nobody will get hurtll am not really 6 
" 
12 
hurting anybody/the bank won't miss the 
money . 
I am only borrowing the money and will 6 12 
pay it back 
I just need the money, there's no other 4 8 
W'Y 
It's OK to borrow from client's accounts . 3 6 
because he/she does not really need the 
money 
I can get away with it 3 6 
The potential reward i~ worth it I 2 
The company owes me I 2 
I've deceived no one; these are only . I 2 
technical deficiencies 
I, too, have a right to enjoy my life I 2 
' 
Others do it too I 2 
Perso11 
Motive 
Predator/career serial fraud 15 30 
offender/unscrupulous deceiver " 
' 
Opportunist acting out of greed in 12 24 
professional occupation 
Serial fraud as response to unshareable 5 10 
financial pressure on the family . 
Serial fraud to solve a financial problem 4 8 
of a personal nature 
" 
Serial fraud to assist loved one5 with a 4 8 
financial problem 
Serial fraud due to a vice 3 6 
Isolated fraud as response to unsharcable 2 4 
financial pressure on one's self 
17!\ 
Isolated fraud as response to unshurcable 2 4 
financial pressure on tl1e family 
Isolated fraud to restore social identity I 2 
Fraud under an nsswncd professional I 2 
identity 
.10 
Fraud as personal justice I " 2 
Crime-prone personality" 
Propensity for lying \\ 46 92 
Weak superego/self-control 31 62 
Egocentricity 17 34 
A strong sense of entitlement lo whatever 14 28 
one can get by deceiving others 
Low self-esteem 10 20 
' Oversensitivity to monetary gain 9 18 
Being indifferent to the consequences of 7 14 
one's behaviour 
Lack of anxiety, remorse and empathy 6 12 
Impulsiveness 5 10 
Authoritarian 5 \0 
Inability to postpone gratification I 2 
Not being attached to other people I 2 
• It is possible for an indicator to be present in more than one category, e.g., 
egocentric and authoritarian. 
17/l 
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Table 6: Frequency with which one, two or all three of the Components in the 
ROP model were Present in the MFG Cases when Fraud Indicators 
were Present and Relevant 
Where indicators were No of Rationalisations Opportunity Person 
present and relevant cases 
AI! three components present 
Totals 50 50 183 202 
Percentage of cases 100% 
Average No. of indicators 1.0 3.7 4.0 
Two components present 
- -
-
Totals 
Percentage of cases " 
,J Average No. ofindieators 
One component present - - -
Totals 
" • 
Percentage of cases 
Average No. of indicators 
No components present 
Totals 
Total of all material 50 50 183 202 
management fraud cases 
Average No. of indicators 1.0 3.7 4.0 
In support of the ROP model, table 6 shows that 100% of the MFG cases had a!! three 
components of the ROP model's components present when fraud indicators were 
present and relevant. Examination of Table 6 also shows that the average number of 
fraud indicators when all three ROP components were present was 1.0 for 
rationalisations, 3.7 for opportunity and 4.0 for person. 
' I 
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11te MFG study shows the importance of all three components of the ROP model in 
understanding the aetiology of fraud and demonstrates the model's applicability to the 
MFG cases, as had been predicted. Regarding crime opportunity, as Gottfrcdson and 
Hirschi (1990: 12~ 13) would have predicted, it is particularly important where: the 
offence produces inunediate rather than delayed gratification; committing the crime is 
easy in terms of the mental and physical effort required; and, finally, in situations 
where the perceived risk of being fotu1d out is minimal. In other words, in most cases, 
situational circwnstances (e.g., strong internal controls) could mute or counteract the 
effects of a person's low self-control. However, the findings in Tables 5 and 6 
emphasise that it is the interaction of both self-control and crime opportunity that 
largely explains the genesis offraud. Of the two factors, however, and contrary to what 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) and Grasmick eta!. (1993) would have predicted, a 
crime-prone person with a motive and the necessary rationalisations is a better 
predictor of fraud than opportunity for fraud. 
Finally, careful interrogation of the 11FG data indicates that whether someone in a 
position of financial trust will commit fraud appears to vary to some extent 
independently of self-control or opportunity. The motivation for crime appears to 
influence the extent to which people perceive situations as constituting criminal 
P. 
opportunitY as well as the extent to which low self-control produces crimes, given the 
opportunity. 
Without ignoring the limitations of the MFG cases studied, the policy implication of 
the findings in Tables 5 and 6 is that the ROP model can be used by auditors to 
enhance their li-aud-dctcction ability by alerting them to particular chamctcristics of 
individuals tmd companies tlmt arc nssociated with fraud. The successful test of the 
ROP model highlights the importance of the auditor utilising infonnation contained in 
all three of the model's components when planning the audit. 
When considering the applicability of Loebbecke et al's model to the MFG cases (see .. 
Table 7) and comparing it with the results in Tables 5 and 6, it should he noted that, as 
already pointed out, their model fails to account for offenders' rationalisations since 
their attitude component refers to a list of company characteristics that is part of 
opportunity in the ROP model. 
4.2.2 Testing the applicability of the Loebbecke et al. model 
In order to test the applicability of the Loebbecke et al. model to the MFG cases, fraud 
indicators were categorised as: (1) conditions; (2) motives; and (3) attitudes to 
determine if the Loebbecke et a!. model holds true in the 50 major fraud cases. 
Loebbecke et al. assert that for material management fraud to occur, al! three 
components have to exist. If any one of the requirements is absent, then it would be 
deemed highly unlikely that a material irregularity has taken place or is likely to do 
so (1989:4). 
Loebbecke et al.'s fraud-risk assessment model was tested as foltows. First, the fraud 
indicators present in the major fraud eases were checked against Loebbecke's 
reported indicators (see Table 7 below for details). Second, an assessment was made 
of the degree to which all three comprnents of Loebbecke et al.'s model (i.e., 
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conditions, motivations ami allitmlcs) were present in the cases examined 
(sec Table 8 below). 
Table 7: Indicators ond their Frequency of Occurrence by Locbbecke et al.'s three 
Components 
Indicators Number of cases with %of cases with 
component component In the SO 
cases 
-
Conditions: 
Weak internal control 45 90 
Difficult to audit transactions 36 72 
Conflict of interest 35 70 
Dominated decisions 32 64 
Major transactions 31 62 
Inexperienced management 24 48 
Related party 18 36 
Significant judgements 10 20 
Decentraliscd organisation 5 10 
Assets subject to misappropriation 4 8 
High management turnover 3 6 
New client I 2 
Rapid growth I 2 
Motivation: 
lndustty decline II 22 
Inadequate profits 9 18 
Significant contmctual commitments 7 14 
Emphasis on earnings projections 4 8 
. 
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Attitude: 
Dishonest management 37 7:1 
Lies or evasiveness 21 42 
Aggressive attitutlc toward financial 14 28 
reporting 
Personality anomalies 3 6 
Prior year irregularities 2 4 
Poor reputation 2 4 
Emphasis on earnings projections 2 4 
Table 7 shows that 6 out of the 24 indicators listed (weak internal controls, dishonest 
management, difficult to audit transactions, conflict of interest, domiuated decisions, 
and major transactions) had a frequency of greater than 50%. Comparing and 
contrasting the frequencies in Table 7 with Loebbecke et al.'s results (their Table 9, 
pp.IS-19), it emerges that: 
i. In support of Loebbecke et a\., the following red flags occurred with high 
frequency in both studies: dominated decisions; weak internal controls; conflict 
of interest, and difficult to audit transactions. 
ii. In support of Loebbecke et al, high management turnover occurred with low 
frequency in both studies. 
iii. The following three red flags occurred with high frequency in Loebbecke et al. 
but did so with very low frequency in the present study: the company is in a 
period of rapid growth; significant contractual agreements, and industry 
decline. It could be argued, of course, that, excluding "industry decline", the 
other two red flags would not be relevant in cases where accountants and 
'"' 
solicitors steal lhun trust runds. 
Regarding the extent to which all three of Locbbcckc ct al. ·~· components Wt'rC 
present in the cases studied (sec Table 8), it was found that, contrary to what the 
Loebbeckc ct al.'s model predicts, in only 36% of the cases reviewed were all three 
components present; in other words, in the majority of the cases (64%) fraud 
occurred despite the fact that all three components were not present. In 52% of the 
cases, two of the indicators were present. In most cases, the presence of any two 
components is sufficient for management fraud and defalcations to occur. It can be 
seen that of the three components depicted, the average number of conditions-related 
indicators is higher than for motivations and attitude ones, irrespective ofthe number 
of components present. This finding emphasises the importance of the opportunity 
component of the ROP model in the aetiology offraud and has implications for fraud 
prevention. 
IR2 
Tllhlc 8: Frequency with which one, two or all three of the Component~ in 
Locbbcckc ct al.'s Modd were Present in the MFO Cases when Fraud 
Indicators were Present and Relevant. 
Where indicators were present No. of Conditions Motivations Attitude 
and relevant cases 
All three components present 
18 94 27 30 Totals 
Percentage of cases (36%) 
Average No. ofindicators 5.2 1.5 1.7 
Two components present 
' 26 124 4 47 Totals 
Percentage of cases (52%) 
Av!lrage No. of indicators 4,8 .2 1.8 
One component present 
6 27 - 4 Totals 
Percentage of cnses (12%) 
Average No. of indicators 4.5 - .7 
No components present 
0 0 0 0 Total cases 
Total of all material management 
50 245 31 81 fraud cases 
Average No. of indicators - 4.9 .6 1.6 
An examination of Table 8 also shows that 88% of the cases looked at had two or 
Utree indicators present, i.e., conditions, motives and attitudes or a combination of 
two.' Therefore, in their efforts to as5ess whether there is fraud, auditors can utilise 
both infonnation about profiles of fraud offenders as wei! as about the type and 
frequency of fraud indicators present since, as Loebbeckc ct a\. (1989) found tl1al as 
~he number of indicators increased the chance of fraud increased. As far as 
'1,' 
IR:\ 
Locbbcckc ct a I.'s assessment model of irregularities li; concerned, the findings of the 
' 
Major Fraud C.rl:l~Jl stud.Y cuntmdict one of its basic premises, that all three 
component~ need to be present for un irrcgulurity to occur. In 64% of the cases only 
one or two of the indicators were present. 
5.0 CHARACTERISTICS OF MA.JOH FRAUD OFFENDEltS 
5.1 A profile of major fraud offenders 
The majority of offenders studied shared ~orne characteristics one would normally 
have expected them to have by virtue of the fact that they needed to be in 
occupational positions where they could, alone or with accomplices, effect major 
fraud. To hold such positions, they almost invariably had to be professionals with 
tertiary qualifications and over 30 years of age. As expected, the great majority were 
male (92%), married/defacto (63%) and aged 31-45 inclusive {65%). As far as their 
occupation is concerned, 24% were company directors, 20% were solicitors, 
accountants made up 18%, office/bank managers 18%, finance managers 8%, 
··bookkeepers 4%, sharetraders 4%, brokers 2% and other6 2%. These findings support 
similar results reported by Wheeler et al. {1988). 
Rather interestingly, it was also found that most of them had acted alone in 
perpetrating their fraudulent acts against two or more people they knew well and 
only committed deception offences, in other words, they were specialists and not 
versatile. 
6Th!s is the CIISC of the IISSIImcd !dcnlily person who pmcliccd as a_~olicilor. 
IH4 
These gcnl!rul dmractcristics comprise the lirst of two components of the prolilc 
constructed. The second is the taxonomy of offenders and circumstances (i.e., a set. 
of typologies, categories and sub·categorics) discussed in section 5.3 bdow. The two 
components are meant to be used in tandem by auditors. 
The majority (91 %) of the offenders examined were convicted under state legislation 
(Crimes Act, 1958 (Vic)), with 44% convicted _of 10 fraud charges or less while a 
significant proportion (39%) were convicted of20 or' more charges. Approximately 
half (51%) of the cases involved one or two victims, but in 26% of the cases the 
offender defrauded 10 or more separate victims. The presence of one or two victims 
in a prosecution does not, of course, mean the offender only committed one or two 
frauds, because a single victim may have been repeatedly defrauded. 
As far as the treatment of the perpetrators by the courts is concerned, most offenders 
(73%) pleaded guilty, were granted bail (85%), all were legally represented at the 
trial and most (89%) were represented by a private lawyer. Slightly over half (52%) 
of the cases were tried by a higher court, namely the county or supreme court. 
Overall, the MFG had a high conviction rate (84%). As far as sentencing by the 
courts is concerned, the majority of the offenders studied were imprisoned (68%), 
14% were given a good behaviour bond, 11% a suspended term of imprisonment, 
4% a fine and, finally, 3% were given a community-based order. Of those who were 
lll!'i 
sent to prison, the mt~urity were sentenced to live years or lcss1• 
Cross-tubulations of the muin variables lOr which dat.1 were l'olll:(,'\d in the MFG 
study yielded the following findings: accountants were more likely to be scnt!lnccd 
to a longer {more t!mn five years) !l.."nn of imprisonment than other occupational 
categories (Chi-square= 6.82105, p = 0.009)*. The most likely explanation for that 
is to be found in the fact that accountants were convicted of more fraud charges ami 
not because they defrauded a larger amount of money. Because an offender was 
convicted of more than one charge against the same victim, it is bette~ to talk about 
victimisation per fraud. It was found to be one in over one-third (36%) of the cases, 
two vietimisations (15%), 3-10 vietimisations (23%) and over 10 victimisations in 
26% of the frauds. One rather prolific offender was convicted of 98 charges. There 
was some limited evidence that those with a relatively "small" number of 
victimisations per fraud (i.e.,< I 0 victims) were more likely to plead not guilty. 
In support of U.S. research, most (70%) of the offenders did not have prior criminal 
convictions while about one-third (30%) were also charged with a non-fraud (mainly 
theft) offence. Company directors and accountants were more likely (though not 
statistically significant) to have a prior criminal record. There was some indication 
that those who had a criminal record were more likely to perpetrate frauds netting a 
7 The Chi·squ~rc test of association when denting With frequencies was used to test the stutistical 
significance of the relationship between pairs of characlcdstics pertaining to the offence, the offender, the 
victim. and the imposition of sentences by the courts. In~~~ the reponed results the significance [eve[ (p) is 
with one degree of freedom (ldf) :md for a two-tnilcd test In some instances, small numbers in the celts of 
the frequency tables hns meant thnt, even though a relationship between two variables was significant at 
least nt p ~ 0.05, 1hc result was dismissed in order to comply with the requirements of the chi-square test 
(e.g., having less th!lll 2(1% of the cells in a table with frequencies of less than 5). S11ch ca.o;cs nrc indicated 
lfl(i 
"larger" amount of money (more thlln $500,000) tlmn were lirsl ufkndcrs and tim\ 
lirst oiTcndcrs generally acted more out of greed and wen: more likely to plead 
guilty. 
Of the professional groups involved, accountants and solicitors (unlike bank 
managers or company directors) were the rr.ost prolific in terms of the number of 
deception offences they were charged with (Chi-square "' 3.65350, p = 0.05). In 
contrast to bank ffi[lJlagers and company directors, the rest of the occupational 
categories (e.g., accountants, solicitors, finance managers) were significantly more 
likely to perpetrate their fraud offences without accomplices (Chi-square = 11.72959, 
p = 0.0006)*. As a rule, accountants and company directors were significantly more 
likt:ly (Chi-square "' 12.82184, p "' 0.0003) than other occupational categories to 
have "specialised" in such deception offences as obtaining property or financial 
advantage by deception. 
Regarding the relationship with the victim, in 25% of the cases the victim was the 
employer, a client/customer (61%), a fellow company director (6%) or a stranger 
(6%), but only 2% were employees of the offender, 
Most of the offenders (70%) perpetrated the fraud(s) acting alone and of those that 
had accomplices, the tendency was to have one only accomplice. 
Unlike conventional offenders, most (87%) of the offenders studied were not 
"·"O:L 
with nn •. 
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versatile, us Gottfrcdson and I lir~.chi ( 1990) would have predicted, but sp~cialists, 
i.e., ihcy pcrpctratctl only particular deception offences, hardly changing thcit modus 
operandi. The specialist lfaudstcrs {i.e., those commilling only dcccplinn offences) 
were significantly more likely than their versatile counterparts to have a criminal 
record (Chi-squ;;rc "'5.45185, p = 0.0195)\ and were significantly more likely to he 
imprisoned (Chi-square= 3.47222, p = 0.0624). 
The fraud came to be investigated because a victim suspected the offender (40%), or 
because of the work of an auditor (13%) or as a result of a bank (14%) or a 
colleague/fellow co-director II%, a client (II%) or the Law Institute of Victoria 
(9%) or, finally, the police (2%) becoming suspicious/acting on infonnation 
received. While half of the solicitors involved were suspected by the Law Institute of 
Victoria, accountants and company directors were significantly more likely than all 
the other occupational categories to be suspected of having perpetrated fraud by one 
of their victims (Chi-square "' 7.07087, p = 0.007). 
These inter-relationships indicates a need to desegregate major fraud offenders. Tiw 
findings suggest that, at a general level, such offenders differ from common 
offenders in a number of significant ways, such as in being employed, specialists and 
first offenders. However, the way they go about committing their crimes, how many 
offences of the same kind they commit, whether they act alone, whether they plead 
guilty and what sentence they receive, appear to be related. In combination with the 
taxonomy of fraud offenders described below, these findings go some way towards 
painting the picture ofthe major fraud offender. In this sense the research can be said 
'"" 
to have succeeded in r"Jiiling such oflCndcrs. This knowledge could he used to alert 
auditors to potential management fraud risks and their likely modus opcran,Ji ugainst 
the backdrop of fraud-prone companies and areas within companies detailed ir. the 
next chapter. 
5.2 Criminal typologies 
The criminological literature cont&ins a number of criminal typologies. The main 
concern has been with typologies of male juvenile delinquents (see Gibbons, 1975) 
and pri~on inmates (sec Schrag, 1961 ). Typologies of white-collar offenders has been 
a neglected topic in criminology. In considering the typologies yielded by the MFG 
study it should be remembered that they are aetiological ones, i.e., they identify the 
types of persons in positions of financial trust who perpetrated fraud and the 
circumstances under which fraud is done. 
5.3 A taxonomy/typologies of major fraud cases 
Close examination of the 50 cases and the interviews with the detectives yielded the 
following taxonomy of major fraud cases described next. The taxonomy {see Table 
9) shows that if a profile of fraud offenders is to be useful in fraud detection, it needs 
to accommod<J.te a broad range of ca!cgories and, in some cases, sub-categories of 
cases, which result from the combination of particular types of offenders committing 
different types of fmud under different circumstances!. The fact is that many 
professionals of the age group and with the types of pressures mentioned below do 
8 According to Gibbons ( 1975), the malo criteria a typology must satisty in order to be useful Me: clarity 
and objc;:tivity: mutual exclusiveness; and comprehensiveness nnd parsimoay (p.l4J). 
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not resort to fraud. Consequently, if a profile of fraud offenders docs not include 
in!Ornmtion on particular combinations nf diflCrcnt types of profCssilmals, 
cornmilling di riC rent types of irregularities under dif!Crcnt circum:;tanccs, then it will 
not be of much usc to an auditor. In other words, the taxonomy of types of !i'aur.l 
ofl'cndcrs and circumstances reported below can be thought of a~ enriching the 
sketch broad outline of a person who is likely to be a fraud risk, and is therefore 
likely to be of use to an auditor. 
The predator/professional fraud offender. For example, an accountant with a 
record for committing fraud against a previous employer also defrauds his/her latest 
employer of a much larger amount of money. Another type of predator gets a 
position in a company in order to commit the fraud. In other words, the offender has 
the opportunity, is crime-prone due to the absence of a strong self-control as 
evidenced by his/her previous criminal activity of a similar nature, and justifies the 
fraudulent activity in tenns of "I can make better use of the money than the 
company". Another example is where a rareer fraud offender (with a record for 
identifying, selecting major shareholders, asswning their identity, and selling their 
shares) sets up a company to defraud a banlc Here we have a crime-prone individual 
who creates the opportunity for fraud, commits deception offences and justifies the 
crime as "This is what I do for a living''. Another example is where one individual 
who, after defrauding a company in his own country, flew to Australia to repeat his 
scheme here. Again, we have a predator who sets up a company purporting to offer a 
service for a fee, collects a lot of money from clients and then simply disappears and, 
like serial killers, sees nothing morally wrong with what he does. Eight cases were 
I IJ!I 
perpetrated by predator, professional offenders who, like some of the other 
categories. stup 'uf!Cnding when caught. 
An opportunist profe~sional with low selr • control and without a previous 
record for deception who is in a position of trust. The second li>:'ge~·t category 
identified is where a person with a predisposition to commit fraud as a r~su!t of 
having low self-control, perceives an opportunity to acquire additional money. 
Acting out of greed, he/she exploits it alone or with one or more accomplices, in the 
belief they will get away with it. For example, a bank manager steals a friend's 
commercial bills and converts them to money. The opportunity lies in the fact that 
people trust him with their money, the crime-proneness stems from a lack of a strong 
conscience and, finally, the fraudulent activity is rationalised in tenns of "It's easy 
money to pay off bills and buy property" and avoid being found out. Another 
example is where, motivated by greed, an insurance company manager in collusion 
with two outsiders exploits weak internal controls to commit a iong series of frauds 
against the company. A weak conscience predisposes him to exploit the opportunity 
provided by the weak internal controls and the frauds are justified in tenns of "If I 
can make money and get away with it, why not?". In another case (motivated by 
greed since his financial position is good), a solicitor induces a client to invest in a 
company. The client is not aware the company is owned by the solicitor who then 
proceeds to misappropriate the investment. The fraud is rationalised as "the client 
does not really need the money". A total of 12 cases belong to this category and 
involved first·offenders whose low self-control and greed led them to exploit 
opportunities for fraud. 
Jl)l 
Fraud under un assumed professional identity. Irrespective of whether living a 
fantasy or not, au individual presents himself as qualified to practice law and enjoys 
the status and salary that comes with the job until unmasked (one single case). 
Isolated fraud in response to unshareable financial pressure on the family. 
C ... gnisant of his family's financial circumstances and need 10r money, one of the 
parents in a position of financial trust and of low internal control avails himself of an 
opportunity, commits an isolated offence, and then ceases the criminal activity (two 
cases). 
Serial fraud in response to unshareable financial pressure on the family. Also 
cognisant of hts family's dire financial circumstances and need for money, a crime-
prone professional commits fraud, gets over-confident that he can get away with it, 
and commits more frauds. Having satisfied the financial need of the family his real 
motive now for continuing to commit fraud offences is sheer greed (five cases). 
Fraud as personal justice. A disgruntled, vindictive ex-employee exploits an 
opportunity and commits a fraud to get back what he believes the company owes him 
(one case). 
Isolated fraud as response to unshareablc financial pressure on one's self. 
Motivated by a need to resolve financial difficulty of a personal nature (i.e., not a 
family need and not a business need) an individual with weak self-control seizes an 
opportunity and commits fraud but does not become a serial offender (two cases). 
11)2 
Serial fraud. Motivated by a wish to snlvc a linunciul problem of a personal nature, 
a person (e.g., an overoptimistic lawyer driven by greed) commits fraud by 
exploiting an opportunity in the belief that there will be an upturn in the economy, 
his/her investments will improve and he/she will thus be able to pay the money back 
into his/her clients' trust accounts (four cases). 
Serial fraud due to a vice. Motivated by a need to solve a serious financial problem 
due to big losses at the gambling <able, a compulsive gambler commits fraud time 
and time again, as he sinks deeper into financial trouble, and stops when discovered 
(two cases). One case involved a 40-year old male (Mr. L), married with three 
children, was the manager of the accounts payable of a company. He worked there 
over 20 years but had a gambling habit. In 1993, th<! manager of business systems 
had difficulty reconciling an account. He found that seven cheques drawn on the 
company's name of $136,161 had unlawfully been paid into Mr L's account. Mr L 
then admitted that in his role as manager, he was able to access the computer system, 
create fictitious accounts/files, and make unauthorised alterations and/or deletions to 
this infonnation. This unauthorised activity allowed Mr L to generate seven cheques 
of various amounts drawn on the company's account and payable to his personal 
account. He did this to feed his compulsive gambling habit. 
A third case in this typology is the case of a married woman living with her 
unemployed husband who was socialising in an extravagant manner with her lover. 
She bought him expensive gifts including a house. The lover was not aware how Mrs 
[4)_1 
X obtained the funds. l-Ie just thought she was wealthy. She worked for an insurance 
company uml once a lite for a cur accident was completed she would re-opcn it, usc 
someone'$ passwonl 10 put an invoice in, use a thin! person's password to approve it 
and draw a cheque to herself or her husband. She would then retrieve the cheque 
from the printer which was on another floor in the same building. No one found out 
for some months until the intcmal auditor noticed some inconsistencies. 
Fraud to restore social identity. A megalomaniac type of individual who cannot 
not endure the status incongruity brought about by some disastrous business 
investri1ents, believes he can commit the crime and not get caught and exploits an 
opportunity to commit an isolated fraud to ensure his social identity docs not suffer 
(one case). 
Serial fraud by an unscrupulous deceiver. A first-offender psychopathic 
megalomaniac high flier of low integrity commits frauds against close friends, 
clients and business partners repeatedly, without having any qualms about it. A total 
of seven cases belonged to this category. For an example see case description No. 14 
above. 
Serial fraud to assist loved ones wifh a financial problem. An example is where a 
finance manager falsifies payment vouchers IUld misappropriates money from his 
employer's bank account. He use3 the money to pay university fees for his brother 
and to assist his sister who lives overseas. He justifies the frauds in tenns of"nobody 
will get hurt" (four cases). 
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Interestingly, the cases examined did not include a cJL~c of someone committing 
fraud a~ a challenge to the system, as a thrill, even though such cases have been 
reported in the litcmturc. 
Table 9: Number of Cases per Typology 
Typology No. of % 
cases of cases 
N=SO 
Predator/career serial fraud offender! 15 30 
unscrupulous deceiver 
Opportnnist acting out of greed, first offender in 12 24 
professional occupation 
Serial fraud as response to unshareable financial 5 10 
pressure on the family 
Serial fraud to solve a financial problem of a 4 8 
personal nature 
Serial fraud to assist loved ones with a financial 4 8 
problem 
Serial fraud due to a vice 3 6 
Isolated fraud as response to unshareable 2 4 
financial pressure on one's self 
Isolated fraud as response to unshareable 2 4 
financial pressure on the family 
Isolated fraud to restore social identity I 2 
Freud under an assumed professional identity I 2 
Freud as personal justice I 2 
Table 9 shows that where fraud is committed, there is a significant likelihood that it 
is not an isolated event. The explanation for this finding is that the offender(s) will 
only stop when found out, irrespective of whether the offender(s) is/are without a 
I~IS 
criminal record or of the prctlator/carccr kintl; the former type of offender linds more 
frauds need to be committed to cover the money missing while the latter feel no 
remorse about stealing as much money as possible. It needs to be borne in mind, 
however, that the frauds studied were frauds which had been discovered. lbcreforc, 
caution is needed in extrapolating this finding tu all fraud. Table 9 also shows the 
heterogeneity of both the type of persons committing major fraud as wc!l as the 
circumstances under which they offended. It can be seen that the largest category 
(30%) is the predator career fraud offender and the second largest (24%) the 
opportunist unscrupulous first offender, with low self-control, in a professional 
occupation and holding a position of financial tmst, commits fraud alone or with 
accomplices, motivated by greed. The third largest category (10%) involves cases 
where in response to unshareable pressure on the family, a person with low self-
control exploits an opportunity and embarks on a spree of frauds against people 
he/she knows well. We see that the predator career fraud offender comprises a large 
proportion of such offenders whose frauds could be reduced significantly by means 
of better vetting of job applicants by employers. However, it needs to be emphasised 
that even if a person in a position of financjal trust does not have a criminal record, it 
does not mean that he/she is not crime-prone. lberefore, in selecting candidates for 
such positions, one could administer them written tests of degrees of self control (see 
Grasmick et al., 1993) in order to identify those who are fraud risks. Finally, what 
the typologies identified make clear is that an effective preventative measure against 
fraud is undoubtedly strong internal controls. 
In summary, the categories of people in positions of trust who commit fraud 
Jl)(i 
comprise a variety that includes: over-optimistic opportunists; the vindictive type; 
professional conmen who arc likely to have a criminal record; people who commit 
an isolated of!Cncc (and others who become greedy and commit a number of 
offences) to solve a serious financial problem of a per.~onal or family or business 
nature; unscrupulous high fliers, and investors or compulsive gamblers whose 
excessive optimism that "things will soon improve" ]cads them into committing a 
spate of deception offences. Fraud is made possible by the existence of the three 
components depicted in the ROP model, namely a motivated crime-prone individual, 
opportunity and rationalisations. The classification offered above should be treated 
with caution since: (1) there is some degree of overlap between some of the 
categories of offenders (e.g., a married compulsive gambler has a financial problem 
which impacts on his family); (2) the offenders were not interviewed; and (3) 
because of the sample of cases studied. The typologies offered do, nevertheless, 
support the view that major fraud offenders comprise a range of categories of 
offenders who perpetrate their crime{s) under a broad range of circumstances, for a 
diversity of motives and use ditferent modus operandi. 
Cressey (1986) considers rationalisations the most vital component of an explanation 
for why people commit fraud. Cressey interviewed imprisoned embezzlers in the 
U.S. about their rationalisations. No interviews were conducted with any of the 
imprisoned major fraud offenders included in the MFG study due to time constraints 
and Jack of necessary resources. Therefore, infonnation about such offenders' 
rationalisations was extracted from sworn written statements made to the MFG 
detectives investigating. This means that what is reported about rationalisations (sec 
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Figure 3 in Chapter 7) must be treated with caution. Offcndem made their sworn 
statements, which were subsequently used in evidence during the trial, presumably 
acting on advice from their lawyer. It is possible thnt how they rationalised their 
fraudulent activity in the course of police interviews may be different from how they 
really justified the fraud(s) to themselves at the time. With this limitation in mind, it 
is interesting to note that the st•!dy identified more rationalisations (see Figure 3) 
than had been listed in Figure I on the basis of the literature discussion in Chapter 3. 
Table 10 shows the different types and frequency of rationalisations used by the 
MFG offenders. The most frequently used rationalisation was "I am entitled to 
whatever money I can get" and so forth (30%) that characterised predator, career 
offenders. The most common rationalisations in this study are almost identical to 
those reported by Cressey (1986) in the U.S. 
In considering the rationalisations listed in Table 10, it needs to be remembered that 
in classifying the rationalisations as articulated by the offenders, an attempt was 
macie to convey the essence of the justification used as they would often give a long 
an~wer to the question "why did you do it?". It should also be remembered that an 
apparent belief that the risk involved was low and the offender could avoid being 
found out was common to the majority of cases. However, in only three cases was 
that belief actually spelled out by the offenders. 
Tublc h): Fr:md Offenders' Rationalisutions 
R:1tionalisations No, of Cases 0/o of cases 
N=SO 
Deceiving is what l do for a living, lam entitled to 15 30 
whatever money ! can get. I can make better use of 
th" monev than he coffinanv. 
Tite end justifies the mcanslll's for a good purpose/ 8 16 
It's to: save the company/pay the staffn'm doing 
it for the family. 
Nobody will get hurtll am not really hurting 6 12 
anybody/the bank won't miss the money. 
I am only borrowing the money and will pay it 6 12 
back. 
IjiL'lt need the money, there's no other way. 4 8 
It's okay to borrow from client's accounts because J 6 
he/she does not really need the money. 
I can get away with it. J 6 
The potential reward is worth it. I 2 
The company owes me. I 2 
I've deceived no one; these are only technical I 2 
deficiencies in the accounts 
I, toO, have a right to enjoy my life. I 2 
Others do it too. I 2 
Table 10 shows that while a proportion of offenders justifies the fraud as a means to 
an end, others did it as merely "borrowing" from clients' accounts or in order, for 
example, to prevent bankruptcy, or "borrowing" from their employer or clients in 
order to pay personal debts. Those offenders indicated that they intended to pay back 
the money when their business picked up, when they won sufficient fwtds through 
gambling or when the investments they had made using the money returned n 
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sullicicnt profit. In considering the mtionulisutions listed in Table 10, the reader 
should note that they definitely existed uficr un offender was apprehended by the 
police. Future research should investigate the existence of rationalisations before an 
offender is apprehended and whether they predict fraud. To understand fraud 
victimisation further, future research should study more systematically the 
rationalisations used by different typologies of fraud offenders and explore the 
different styles of interpersonal interaction learned by fraud offenders in childhood 
and adolescence and/or as part of their socialisation into particular subcultures in the 
workplace or elsewhere. 
6.0 HOW DETECTIVES CLASSIFY FRAUD OFFENDERS 
Common sense would dictate that because police detectives often encounter the 
worst side of human nature in dealing with criminals, they would be biased when 
attributing motives to serious offenders and to assume they are rational decision 
makers with malicious intent. At the same time, however, one could argue th11t 
because of their extensive experience in questioning and otherwise investigating 
major fraud offenders, the detectives involwd are in a position to give a reliable 
opinion regarding the reasons why someone committed fmud. In the opinion, then, 
of the 13 police detectives responsible for investigating the cases examined and 
preparing the briefs, the most common motives are: (I) sheer greed (46%)9; (2) 
9 ens~ 21, discussed in section 2.2.1, has now been finalised by the courts in Victoria and been made public. 
The CEO involved, received a 4 year jail sentence, including n minimum lcrm of two and one-half years, 
despite lhe foct thai !te bas repaid $3.453 mlllion of lhc funds misappropriated. Juslicc Eames while 
delivering !he scnlcnce emphasised the factlhat the person in queslion was "motivated by gn:cd" and while he 
"cngngcd in fmud npon the company" h~ expressed concerns lotlic rcsl ofthcmcmlx:11< -:>fstaiJofthe problem 
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megalomania, i.e., continuing to enjoy a very expensive lifc~tylc as fitr as holidays, 
houses, cars, clothes and parties arc concerned beyond one's limmcial mc<Jns in order 
to keep up appearances for one's peers (23%); (3) financial problems (personal or 
business) 26%; and, finally, (4) vices (i.e., gambling or double life (5%)). 
Comparing and contrasting the detectives' classification of the offenders' motives 
with the distribution of typologies identified (see Table 7 above), we see that a 
"fin'ancial problem" of one kind or another features in 31% of the fanner and 34% of 
the latter. This finding is of some interest since we might expect police detectives, 
who spend a signihcant part of their working Jives investigating serious crimes, to 
have a jaundiced view of offenders due to the insularity and isolation of their job 
(Worden, 1993). Finally, it comes as no surprise to find that the detectives' 
perception of the offenders' motives differs significantly from the offenders' ovm 
rationalisations for committing the crimes concerned (see Table 8). 
7.0 MFG CASE RESULTS AND THE ROP FRAUD MODEL 
The findings provide support for the validity of the eight assumptions of the ROP 
model identified in Chapter 4. The findings obtained indicate that heterogeneity is a 
basic characteristic of fraud offenders and their crimes. In addition, crime-proneness 
(in the form of low self-control) is an essential component of fraud offenders and a 
broad variety of motives underpins the aetiology of fraud; while financial pressure is 
ofthell(PhesanL, 1997:1 and8). 
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the most frequent motive, correlates of ll·aud exist at different levels of analysis and 
supplement one another. Finally, there nrc individual differences in how a crime 
opportunity and a rationalisation is constructed. 
The results highlight the importance of the three components of the ROP model • a 
motivated crime-prone person (P), crime opportunity (0), and rationalisations (R) -
in the aetiology of fraud. Considering first crime-proneness as an attribute of the 
offenders, the findings confinn the crucial importance of low self-control. More 
specifically, the results reported add some support to the following components of 
self-control proposed by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990:89) and as re-defined and 
measured by Grasmick et al. (1993): 
i. impulsiveness: this is evident in those cases where an offender exploits an 
opportunity that presents itself and commits fraud without any reservations; 
ii. risk-seeking: many of the offenders appear to have perpetrated their frauds in 
a way that betrays a tendency to be adventuresome; 
iii. preference for simple tasks: many of the offenders exhibited a preference for 
easy gratification of their desire for money; and 
iv. being self-centred: a large number of the offenders can be described as self-
centred, insensitive to the suffering and needs of those they victimised. 
2112 
8.11 lliSCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The results of this study show that the research into the MFG offenders achieved its 
seven designated aims. The results obtained show the validity of all eight 
assumptions of the ROP model. More specifically, the data analysis confirmed the 
importance of all three components of the ROP model in understanding why people 
in a position of financial trust commit fraud. When comparing the fraud indicators 
present in the ROP model with those in Loebbecke et a!. (1989) it was interesting to 
find that the modus operandi of serious fmud offenders is very much the same 
whether they opemte in Australia or in the U.S. 
While results of the study support Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) emphasis on 
crime opportunity and low self-control, no support was found for their claim that 
fmud offenders are versatile or that crime opportunity is a better predictor of fraud 
than a crime- prone person with a motive. 
All eight asswnptions of the ROP model appear to be valid. The two-component 
profile of the serious fraud offender that emerges from the study and which includes 
the taxonomy of cases is a lot more detailed than has hitherto been reported in the 
litemture. To illustrate, Robertson (1996:294), for example, claims, white-collar 
offenders have these characteristics: 
Likely to be married, probably not tattooed, educated beyond high school, 
range in age from teens to over 60, employment tenure from I to 20 or more 
years, not likely to be divorced, member of a church, no arrest record, 
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socially con!Orming, usually act alone. 
Auditors need more details of such a profile in order to improve their fraud detection 
ability. The profile of fraud o!Tendcrs reported in this thesis has been developed from 
data pertaining to actual major fraud offenders prosecuted by the police. Offenders 
and their crimes exist in a context. A profile that focused solely on features of the 
individual and ignored the interaction between a particular individual offender and 
particular circwnstances and conditions (such as type of opportunity, type of victim) 
would not have much utility for auditors. The present research indicates that, at a 
general level, a fraud offender is one who: (I) is likely to be a male first offender; 
(2) aged 31-45; (3) occupies a position of trust; (4) acting alone and mainly out of 
greed, breaches that trust and commits a spate of deception offences defrauding a 
nwnber of victims; (5) is in a position to bargain with those that prosecute him (see 
Katz, 1978); and (6) ends up going to prison for a relatively short period of time. The 
fmdings pertaining to demographic characteristics and lifestyle, criminal history, 
modus operandi and "distorted stories" of the major fraud offenders examined, 
indicate that a criminal profile incorporating all this information is possible. The 
profile constructed comprises infonnation at a general level and an account of 12 
SPeCific offender typologies, The auditor, of course, needs to look for the most 
frequent factors associated with fraud. With this need in mind, the two-component 
profile constructed in the MFO study wi1! assist auditors to enhance their fraud-
detection ability, but not if it is used by itself. This is because what the general 
profile describes could be any professional in a position of financial trust. Rather, it 
ought to be used in combination with: (I) the knowledge concerning the inter-
i:' 
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relationship found llctwccn offence, offender and victim characteristics; aml (2) the 
fraud-detection model reported in the next chapter. 
Contrary to what Gottfredson an'd Hirschi's (1990) Genera{ Theory of Crime 
predicts, most major fraud offenders are not immersed in crime in the sense of being 
recidivist career offenders. It is possible, of course, that an offender has been 
perpetrating fraud and/or other offences for much longer but managed not to come to 
police attention. Future research should aim to identify and interview major fraud 
offenders whose crimes remain part of the dark figure of white-collar crime. 
The findings, however, support Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory to some extent in so 
far as the offenders in this study evidenced low self-control and exploited 
opportunities available to them. Future research should interview fraud offenders in 
order to explore the different styles of interpersonal interaction learned by such 
individuals in childhood and adolescence and/or as part of their socialisation into 
particular subcultures in the workplace or elsewhere. Such data would throw some 
light on the question of how it is possible for fraud offenders to be insensitive to the 
needs and suffering of those they victimise in order to explain the use of different 
rationalisations by them. Future research should also explore personality differences 
wnongst fraud offenders (e.g., in tenns ofEysenck's three scales-see Chapter 2) to 
add to our understanding of their offending. The offender-circumstances typologies 
identified by the MFG study need to be explored further in an attempt to produce 
"social profiles" of the offenders. Regarding the career/professional fraud offender, 
future research should examine the possibility that, as a profiler would predicl, the 
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way such ofiCndcrs carry llUt their crimes on one occasion has some chnwctcristic 
similarity to the way they carry out their crimes on other occasions. Finally, thc1c is 
a need to investigate further the relationship betwce11 a person's characteristics ~nd 
their fraud. Initially, one could focus on simple one-to-one relationships. It might 
then be possible to build on such simple relationships and generate canonical 
equations which provide an objective way of 11nalysing the relationship between two 
sets of variables such as a person's characteristics and his/her actions (see Canter, 
1995:345). 
The offenders did not, as the general theory of crime would have predicted, engage 
in a variety of criminal acts but stuck to fraud. It becomes apparent that the offenders 
studied comprise a number of typologies of major fraud offenders, many of whom 
experienced situational pressures (e.g., high personal debts, financial losses) and who 
rationalised their offending to make it acceptable to them and thus to continue to 
perceive themselves as successful professionals in their fields. Also, it should not be 
forgotten that solicitors, accountants and bank managers, operate in an occupational 
culture that values wealth and corporate success, considers failure quite 
unacceptable, and, at the same time, provides opportunities for major fraud. 
Whether the sentences imposed by the courts on such offenders (mostly five years' 
imprisonment or less) serve the purpose of individual and/or general deterrence is 
impossible to say on the basis of the research carried out. However, an examination 
of voluntary statements made to the police by the offenders indicates that a term of 
imprisonment of five years or less is unlikely to be a deterrent because: (I) they 
·'I 
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limcy their chances of not being apprehended; (2) if charged, believe they "can beat 
the charges" against them; and {3 J even if they arc incarcerated they know they 
would be unlikely to serve their full sentence. Without a perception by serious fraud 
offenders that there is a high risk of being detected and that the likely penalty upon 
conviction will be severe, a court would not be justified in imposing a very severe 
sentence on an inCividual offender in order to discourage him/her and/or other 
potential offenders from committing the same crime (Braithwaite, 1989). 
The two-component offender profile yielded by the data analysis is that the 
commission of fraud is not a random process and that a number of individuals who 
share a number of demographic characteristics (gender, age, marital status, 
occupation) and criminal justice features experience pressures to raise money for 
themselves, or their companies, or their loved ones. Since by virtue of their 
occupational position, they have the opportunity and the knowhow, they often do 
not require accomplices, and proceed to commit a number of deception offences 
following a characteristic modus operandi. Furthermore, they rationalise their 
behaviour in ways that neutralises any guilt they may feel as a result of their frauds. 
A sizeable minority of the offenders are best thought of as predators. 
It is not claimed that armed with the criminal profiling results obtained, auditors can 
identify an offender ru~d significantly increase their fraud-detection effectiveness. 
This is simply because, on the basis of existing knowledge in this area, it is just not 
possible to predict accurately who in a company will commit or has been committing 
fraud. Without ignoring its limitations, what the research reported in this chapter can 
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do is to increase the fraud awareness of auditors ami point'tn:~omc indicator~, i.e., 
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red !lags, which should ulert auditors to au in~reasi~· pos,sibility of fruud. Together 
with empirically obtained knowlcdge··.about other sets of red flags pointing to 
vulnerable types ofindustries/companics as well as vulnerable areas within particular 
types of industries/companies, the red flags inherent in the offender profile provided 
above can be used to alert an auditor to a greater likelihood of fraud and thus negate 
an auditor's sense of complacency. 
The findings obtained in the study reported in this chapter suggest that auditors 
played but a rather limited role in the detection of the frauds involved. The eclectic 
fraud detection model proposed in this thesis {see Chapter 6) shows how auditors can 
improve their fraud detection ability. Future research should expand the two-
component profile of major fraud offenders constructed by the research, using in-
depth psychological interviews with such offenders. Given that most frauds involve 
financial pressure on an individual and that factor plays such an important part ia 
contributing to fraud taking place, a simple income-expenditure assessment of 
professional people in positions oftrust should help to identify potential/actual major 
frauds. Future research should also consider fraud by a variety of officially-known 
and self-reported offend~:rs in order to identify the factors that best explain their 
specific nature and prevalence. 
,'i 
208 
9,0 CONCLUSION 
'Without forgetting i'.s limitations, the MFG study has tested ami demonstrated the 
applicability of the ROP model and its three components. It is the first time a 
comprehensive model of the aetioh:gy of fraud (in tenns of the components that are 
necessary for fraud to occur) has been proposed and tested successfully. As already 
stated, Loebbeckc et al. 's model has nothing to say about rationalisations and one of 
its basic premises has been shown to be wrong. As far as it has been possible to 
ascertain, the ROP model is the only one which accounts for the broad range of 
persons who perpetrate fraud and the circumstances under which they do it. Future 
research should test the ROP model with a larger and more representative sample of 
fraud cases involving people in positions of financial trust. The fraud indicators i; 
identified for 0 and P can be used by auditom to enhance their fraud-detection i,' 
ability. 
A profile of major fraud offenders would be useful to auditors if used in conjunction 
with other relevant knowledge about fraud risk such as different industries and 
financial areas. The findings of this study show that the modus operandi (deceptive 
action) of serious fraud offenders is very much the same whether they operate in 
Austtalia or in the U.S. and that the offenders are very prolific. 
Tabulation of data concerning fraud indicators shows that the presence of any two of 
Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) three components is usually sufficient for fraud to occur. 
This finding is contrary to a basic premise by Loebbecke et al. that for fraud to occur 
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all three components {CMA) of their model must he present. 
Reflecting the importance of opportunity, most of the offenders (94%) victimised 
someone they knew. Approximately one-third of the offenders had a criminal record, 
and that was especially the case with managing directors. This finding points to the 
importance of screening applicants for position of financial trust through background 
checks, to reduce the risk of fraud victimisation. The finding that about one-third of 
the offenders had accomplices means that for such offenders the decision to commit 
fraud follows group discussion, a factor catered for in the ROP model. 
The findings show that it is not appropriate to talk about major fraud offenders as a 
homogeneous population. Future research should explore further patterns identified 
between offence, offender, victim and criminal justice characteristics with a larger 
sample of offenders in order to replicate the two-component criminal profile reported 
above and, also, to measure fraud offenders' level of self-control using the instrument 
developed by Grasmick et al. (1993). The next chapter reports a broad range of 
empirical findings from a survey of Australian auditors' experience in detecting 
material irregularities including fraud. 
CIIAI'TI.:R 6 
A SURVI<:Y OF AUDITORS' DETECTION OF MATERIAL 
IRREGULARITI!t~S. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chaptrr describes the methodology used for and discusses the results of a postal 
survey of auditors concerning both their experiences with detecting a broad range of 
irregularities (including employee and management fraud) provided in AUS2l0 .A.ARF 
(1995a) which could have a material impact on the financial statement as well as their 
sensitivity to red flags. Findings, which supplement the MFG study, are also reported 
regarding the perpetrators of the material irregularities and their motives, as perceived 
by the auditors. The aims of the swvey were to test the eclectic fraud detection model 
and Loebbecke et al.'s fraud assessment model. Findings are also discussed pertaining 
to both fraud-reporting by auditors as well as the extent to which auditing finns are 
utilising specialist fraud investigators, namely fraud auditors and forensic accountants. 
Finally, the results of the survey are discussed in the context of the edeetic fraud 
detection model. 
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1.0 INTROUUCTION 
I· 
Despite the importance of auditors' detecting and reporting material irregularities, there 
is not a great deal of infonnation in the professional or academic literature about these 
matters. No work has been undertaken of such a magnitude in Australia. Australian 
auditors' experience in encountering irregularities and their knowledge about the 
perpetrators and the aetiology of irregularities generally was obtained by means of a 
self-administered structured questionnaire1• The questionnaire collected data on 
auditors' experience in detecting a broad range of irregularities, namely: management 
fraud, employee fraud, other illegal acts, other acts, intentional but not fraudulent or 
other illegal misstatements, and errors (see AUS 210 (AARF, 199Sa, para. 05)). 
2.0 RESEARCH METHOD 
2.1 The questionnaire 
The questionnaire was modelled on the one used by Loebbecke et al. (1989). As a 
result their findings can be compared, despite the fact that each study used a different 
sample of auditors. A copy of the questionnaire is shown in Appendix I. 
1 According to Moses and KnUon (1981:257·259), compared to other rcsen:rch methods, mall surveys bnvc 
some advantages that include the following: they arc cheaper, take less time to do, and mvold such sources 
of error as interviewer bias. Snch surveys, however, face the difficulty of a low response rate, 
gencraliz:abllity of the findings, not knowing that a respondent completed the qncslionnnirc alone, and that 
the researcher is in no position to probe the respondent's answers further (sec also Judd, Smith and Kidder, 
1991:216). 
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BefOre the questionnaire was sent to auditors, it wa~ piloted in July I 995 by 
administering it to five auditors known personally to the author. In order to make the 
questionnaire more easily comprehensible, the following suggestions by the 
respondents were incorporated in the revised version used in the study: to provide a 
definition of the tenns "code of conduct/cthics/proctice"; to define each type of 
irregularity addressed and to illustrate by providing an example of one; instead of the 
industry classification U'led in Loebbecke e! al. (1989), to list the one used by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (1993); instead of Loe~becke et al.'s list of fraud 
indicators, to we the list in AUP16 (AARF, 1993- <!pplicable at the time); instead of 
Loebbecke et al.'s terminology of "occurred", "relevant", and "apparent" when 
referring to red flags, to use "applicable to the engagement", "relevant to the 
irregularity", and "alerted[the auditors] at the plaruting stage" respectively. Finally, on 
the basis of suggestions by those respondents, three questions were rephrased to make 
their meaning clearer. 
The questionnaire comprised tlrree parts. Part I collected sununary infonnation about 
each of the irregularities which the re.spondent had experienced during the last five 
years. This information was collected to increase our knowledge about auditors' 
experien.:.e with material and immaterial irregularities, their nature and frequency of 
occwrence, as well as whether they had a material impact on the financial statements 
of the clients involved. 
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Respondents were provided with a delinition of: (I) irregularities ami (2) code of 
corporate cunduc/lo ensure consistency. Respondents were asked about the following: 
a management frnud1 (to provide a description); the number of times that irregularity 
was encountered; the industry the client operated in; what alerted the auditor to the 
irrcgula;!ty; whether there were effective internal controls in place; whether a code of 
conduct existed and, finally, whether there was a material financial impact on the 
accounts. They were asked to repeat the exercise for five more types of irregularities, 
namely: 
employee fraud; 
other illegal acts; 
other acts which contravene the constitution of an entity including non-
compliance with trust deeds or memorandum and articles of association; 
intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements; and 
errors which are unintentional mistakes. 
The info[Il).ation collected on the different types of irregularities was expected to throw 
some light on both the types of industries that are prone to particular frauds as well as 
on the question whether having a code of conduct or effective internal controls assists 
in combating fraud. 
2 In lhc SUI"'cy of auditors' Cllpericnoc wllh. detecting irregularities reported in !his chapter mnn~gcmem nnd 
employee froud were lre3ted ns two Clltcgorics of fmud to ennblc n oompruison of the results obtained with 
Locbbcclt:c ct al.'s {1989) r.ndings Md Ute Kl'MG ( 199Su) fmud sul"/ey. 
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Part II requested information about one material irregularity selected by the 
respondent. 
The respondents were asked to: 
describe how the irregularity was committed; 
who was involved; 
the industry and the status of the cliene; 
audit areas affected by the irregularity; 
how long the audit firm had been an auditor of that client when the irregularity 
\\ 
was discovered; \. )): 
over what time period that particular irregularity had been committed; 
the audit procedures first indicating the irregularity; 
• whether the presence of a fraud auditor or forensic accoW'Itant on an audit team 
would have assisted in discovering it earlier than it had been; 
a profile of the perpetrator; and 
to v.hom the material irregularity was reported. 
The respondents were in no position to provide data on offenders' mtionalisations (R)" 
or crime- proneness and motives (P). Therefore it was not possible to test the ROP 
model. 
3 The Industry dc.!lgnat!on used Is th~ one found in lhc Austra111lll DIU'CIIu ofStn11st!r;s (1993) Austrollan and New 
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Part II also· provided participants with a list of red flags that comprised those 
. mentioned in AUP 16 (AARF, 1993t. With reference to one particular material 
irregularity they had encountered themselves in the last twelve months, they were 
asked to tick the indicator{s) applicable to the engagement and relevant to the 
irregularity and whether it alerted the auditor during the planning phase. The 
categories "applicable ... ", "relevant ... " and "whether alerted ... " were independent 
but not mutually exclusive. 
In Part Ill, the respondents were asked to provide demographic data about the 
respondent and his/her experience, which included: 
state of residence; 
gender; 
current position; 
• number of years of experience as an auditor; 
position in the partnership; 
• number of years in current position; 
approximate number of engagements worked on; 
industry specialisation; 
Z4a/and S1arukud lndu.str/al Cltmlficalicn, hence it is slightly different to Locbbcl:ke et al.'s 
4 Since the stlldy was concerned with Au;tml!nn auditors' expc:riC;ice in ftnud deted!on l! wns considered 
appropriate Louse the fmud indicators {red nngs)prcvided in the Auslnll!an Auditing SUUldnnl {MRF, l99J)which 
ore the same as inA US 210 (AARF, l995a) mther than th~ ones provided by Locbbcl:ke ctul. (l9S9).ln comparing 
the diff<:rent red /lags, however, It bccnmc uppnrcnt that the Au;tmlinn list of fmud Indicators is n lot more 
comprehensive (it covers the EDP = as well) than the one u,;cd by Loebbeckc ct ul. 
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size of employer (e.g., Big Six- applicable at the time); 
whether the audit finn provides forensic and fmud auditors and their 
qualifications; and 
number of times a fraud auditor/forensic accountant had been required by the 
respondents themselves or their client in the last 12 months. 
2.2 The respondents 
The respondents were external and internal auditors as well as public sector auditors. 
They were accessed as follows: first contact was made with the managing audit partner 
in several large, medium and small firms to seek their cooperation in the study. Initial 
contact was made with 117 partlers in the Big Six, medium tier finns, and small 
practices in Australia in the middle of September 1995. The practices were selected 
from the yellow pages and telephone contact was made to identify the partner in charge 
of audit in a particular practice. Personalised letters were sent to the 117 partners 
stating the research being carried out and soliciting their finn's participation. A follow-
up telephone call was made two weeks later. A total of 76 partners (65% of finns 
initiaUy approached) agreed to participate. At the end of October 1995 they were 
provided with 433 questionnaires to distribute to their staff. The letter to the partners 
made mention of the fact that the Major Fraud Group of the Victoria Police was 
actively supporting the research into fraud and a Jetter to that effect by the then 
Commander of the MFG, Allen Bowles, was attached to the questionnaire (see 
Appendix 1). 
II 
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In order to avoid duplication of data, it was agreed with the participating partners that 
they would distribute only one questionnaire per fraud investigated. Partners were also 
asked to distribute questionnaires only to those who had some experience in fraud 
detection, or worked on a fraud investigation. Where finns employed fraud auditors or 
forensic accountants they were asked to distribute a questioiUlaire to them as welL 
In addition to financial auditors, the Western Australian and Victorian Auditor 
General's offices were approached to participate in the research. The Western 
Australian Auditor General expressed some interest and he asked for 13 questionnaires 
to distribute as instructed. The Auclitor General of Victoria, however, initially 
expressed an interest in participating in the study, but changed his mind after receiving 
i) 
' 
copies of the questionnaire. Given that a lot of fraud is identified by the internal 
auditors, 25 questionnaires were distributed at a meeting held by the Internal Auditors' 
Association on fraud detection addressed by Commander Bowles. 
A total of 125 questionnaires were returned during the period from the last week in 
October until the middle of December 1995. Of those, 17 were blank. Thus, 108 (86%) 
completed questionnaires were used for the data analysis. The low (23%) response mte 
is probably due to the fact that: (1) as Loebbecke eta!. reported, it is rarely that auditors 
detect a material irregularity (including management and employee fraud); (2} only one 
questionnaire was distributed by the participating partners per fraud; and (3) mail 
surveys generally have a low response mte. 
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In the present study, the following incentives (discussed by Moses and Kalton, 1981) 
were provided for the respondents to complete the questionnaire: a covering letter was,, 
attached which explained the main aims of the survey and which, also, informed the 
respondents that the research had the support of the MFG; a stamped addressed 
envelope was provided; the respondents anonymity and confidentiality of the data was 
assured; a follow-up letter was sent, and a gift voucher was offered, It should also be 
noted in this context that the response mte "is not the only consideration in evaluating 
the quality of data from a survey" (Judd et al,, 1991 :217). Even though the response 
rate is low, since it rises above 20% the failing is not so critical as to make the survey 
results oflittle value (Moses and Kalton, 1981 :268). 
Of the 108 useable respondents, 87 (80.5%) completed all sections of the questionnaire 
while the remaining 21 completed only parts I and III. Part II asked respondents to 
discuss only material irregularities encountered by them in the last 12 months. It is 
assumed that those who did not complete Part II either had not come across a material 
irregularity in the last 12 months or might have felt that they were to give away too 
much infonnation about their client if they did1• Part III of the questionnaire collected 
demographic data about the respondents and their audit experience. 
fl 
Overall, it can be said that the survey had a reJatively high response rate rilost likely 
due to the tact that partners solicited the respondents. The process by which the 108 
$ Loebbeckc c1 al. (1989) IISSUIIied th!lt those auditorn who did not pnrticipatc in their survey did so bc:couse they had 
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respondents came to participate in the survey, and whose data fonn the basis of the 
•• -_'.1 
findings reported below, means that as a sample they can not be considered a random 
. (I 
sample of auditors with experience in detecting irregularities, including man~~emcnt 
and employee fraud. At the same time, however, it is clear from discussions with 
riUmerous partners that fraud-detection is such a specialist field that the proportion 'Or 
, fraud-experienced auditors in accmmting fmns is very small. 
Most respondents resided in Victoria (40%), QLD. (17%), N.S.W. (15%), S.A. (15%), 
W.A. (8%), ACT (3%) and TAS (2%). The majority (85%) were males. While 39% 
held manager positions, 28% were partners, 13% seniors, 12% supervisors and 8% \' 
assistant n1anagers, (see Appendix II for full details~ 
Regarding their position at the time of the survey, most {82%) were financial auditors, 
7% public sector auditors, 7% fraud auditors and 4% internal auditors. Forty-two per 
cent had been auditors for II years or more, 38% had been in their position for over 
three years and there was no one with under three years' experience, About three 
quarters (73%) were working for one of the Big Six firms. 
About half (52%) had worked on more than 50 engagements and about two-thirds 
(67%) had specialised in auditing more than three different industries. The following 
are some interesting characteristics of the auditors who participated in the survey and 
nut encountered nn im:gulnrily (p.7). 
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should be borne in mind when interpreting the finding.~ reported below: 
Table 1: Respondents' Fraud Experience 
. 
Average audit experience (in years) 10 
Average years in current position 3 
Average number of engagements worked on I 06 
Average number of engagements where an irregularity had 
been encmmtered 5 
Average number of engagements where a material 
irregularity bad been encountered 39 
Engagements where an irregularity had been encountered as 
a% of all en a ements wod:ed on b the res ondents 19% 
The participants in the present study, are slightly yotmger in age, with fewer years' 
experience in audit and with less experience in encountering irregularities, compared to 
those in Loebbecke et al. (1989). The reason for these differences is that Loebbe<:ke et 
al. surveyed only partners whereas in the present study partners made up 28% of the 
respondents. 
As already mentioned, the sample of auditors who took part in the survey did so 
because they had experience in detecting irregularities, including management fraud 
and defalcations. Furthennore, the auditors concerned are a heterogeneous sample by 
virtue of the fact that they belonged to different firms, had different lengths of audit 
experience, and held different positions. The nature of the sample, therefore, limits the 
extent to which the findings obtained can be generalised to auditors in general. Unlike 
the auditors in Loebbecke eta!. (1989) and Pincus (1989), however, the respondents in 
the present study did not come from one single finn. Hence, it is argued that the 
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research findings can be cautiously generalised to auditors experienced in detecting 
irregularities (including management fraud and defalcations) more justifiably than in 
the cnse ofLocbbeckc et al. (1989) and Pincus (1990). 
3.0 SURVEY RESUJ~TS 
3.1 Part I of Survey: Irregularities Encountered by Auditors and Discussion 
of Findings 
3.1.1 Respondents' expcrit!ncc with irregularities 
Table2: Number oflrregularities Encountered by the Respondents 
' 
Number.'.lf Number of respondents who Number or respondents who 
Irregulur".tics had encounterd l1ad encountered material 
cncountc'i·cd immaterial irregularities irregut~-itics 
% Number % Number 
0 19.6 20 34.0 36 
I 20.6 21 34.9 37 
2 16.7 17 13.2 14 
,, 43.1 44 17.9 19 
Total 100% 102 100% 106 
Table 2 shows that auditors are much more likely to encounter an inunaterial than a 
material irregularity. More specifically, 66% of the respondents had come across at 
least one material irregularity while 80.4% had encountered immaterial irregularities 
during the last five years. Table 2 also shows that a significant proportion of thr 
auditors concerned had encountered 3 or more immaterial irregularities within the 
last five years. By comparison, Loebbccke et al. {1989) found that 40% of the 277 
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audit partners who participated in their survey had not encountered a material 
irregularity of any kind and, of those, only II% had done so on man: than five 
occasions (p.8). In the present study of those who had encountered a material 
irregularity, 8.9% had done so on five or more occasions. The results obtained 
support Loebbecke ct al. (1989) who also found that for many auditors encountering 
a material irregularity is a rare event. One could, therefore, argue that it is not 
reasonable to expect the average au-liter to be proficient in detecting such 
irregularities as fraud when he( she) does not seem to have the necessary experience. 
According to Loebbecke et al. (1989:3), experience in fraud detection is one of the 
attributes needed since fraud detection is without doubt a "multi*attribute, high-level 
judgement task that requires knowledge, experience and reasoning" (Loebbecke et 
a!., 1989:3). 
When asked to provide detailed infonnation in respect of specific irregularities, the 
108 respondents indicated they had come across 768 incidents of irregularities 
during the past five years which comprised: 305 management fraud (39.7%), 185 .' 
(24.1%) employee fraud, 146 (19%) other illegal acts, 32 (4.2%) other acts, 52 
(~\8%) intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements and, finally, 48 
(6.2%) errors. These are the irregularities the respondents chose to discuss. It is 
possible, of course, that there might have been some irregularities they did not want 
to divulge or did not remember well enough to discuss in Part I of the survey. 
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3.1.2 Management fraud 
Management frnud was defined in the questionnaire as an act which involves the usc 
of deception to obtain an illegal advantage by managemcnt6• The respondents had 
encountered a total of305 cases of management fraud during the last five years (i.e., 
39.7% of the total irregularities encountered by those surveyed) and provided 
detailed information on 153 (50.1%) of them. 
Table 3: Types of Management Fraud Encountered 
Tvnc ofmamt~>emcn.t fraud Number of cases 0/o of cases 
Window dressin 31 20.2 
Misannronriation of funds 27 17.6 
Cash s ent without a roval 14 9.2 
Maninulation of reconciliations 14 9.2 
Kickbacks 12 7.8 
Conflict of interest II 7.2 
Other 10 6.7 
Theft of e ui men\ 8 5.2 
Overstatement of 8 5.2 
sales/revenue/debtors 
Overstatement of stock 8 5.2 
Pavroll fraud 6 3.9 
Theft of stock 4 2.6 
Total lSl w"" 
Regarding the type of management fraud encountered by auditors, Table 3 shows 
that the most frequently encountered management frauds in the present study were 
6 This term is not specifically defined in AUS 210 (AARF, 199511, parn.O~) 11hioh only defines frnud as "1u1 net 
which Involves the usc of deception to obtain Ill\ ilkg~~lndVM\llgc" ll.lld, since it is "mMagemcnt", it was added by 
the author lhnt it oughllo be commi!lcd by manogcmcnt. The some definition of"mnnagcmcnt frnud" wns used by 
Loebbccke ct nl. (1989) [personal communic:Uion], nwncly "the motcriol, intentional mis.slolcmcnl nf financial 
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window dressing and misappropriation of assets. Locbbcckc et a!. (1989) reported 
that assets overvalued or incorrectly valued was the highest ranking management 
fraud, which is similar to window dressing. 
Concerning the industry classification used in the present study, it should be noted 
that the respondents provided a long list of industries in which their clients operated 
in, responding to Part I of the questionnaire. A number of industries did not belong 
to any of the categories listed in Table 4 and subsequent tables which are based on 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (1993) classification. Such categories included, 
for example: Fuel distribution, aviation, international service provider, "various", 
and subsidiary company. Such categories were assigned to the no industry category 
because they were very few in number to show separately in the analysis and did not 
come under any of the ABS classification. In other words, the no industry category is 
a miscellaneous category. To this category it was also added "fund mansgement and 
trusts" which the respondents had listed on its own as a separate category worthy of 
attention, despite the fact that it would be listed under Financial Services. 
Table 4 indicates that most management fraud occurs in the manufacturing and 
construction industries. This may be because there are more companies in these two 
industries than in most others. In manufacturing it often takes the form of window 
dressing, overstatement of stock, theft of cash and equipment, payro!l fraud and cash 
statemento; to dcfmud U5cr.;". 
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spent without approval. In construction, management frau!l involves window 
dressing, misappropriation of funds, cash spent without approval and kickbacks. 
Table 4: Type of Industry by Type of Management Fraud and Ways of Being 
Alerted and their Incidence 
Industry 'lo of Types of management Main ways ofbclng 
mnaGement frauds commUted alerted 
fuud 
Manufa~:turing 16.3 Window dressing; Analytical and 
(N=25) overstatement of stock; management reviews, 
theft of cash and stocktake, 
equipment; payroll fraud; whistleblower 
cash spent without 
approval 
No industry 13.1 Window dressing; Tests of controls 
(N=20) misappropriation of funds; and/or management 
cash spent without review 
approval; kickbacks; 
overstatement of stocks 
Construction 12.4 Window dressing; Analytical; 
(N=19) misappropriation of funds; management review; 
cash spent without substative testing; 
approval; kickbacks and/or knowledge of 
client 
Government 8.5 Misappropriation of Substative and tests of 
Administration funds; kickbacks controls and/or 
and Defence management review 
(N=IJ) 
Finance and 6.5 Misappropriation of funds Management review 
Insurance and/or tests of controls 
(N=IO) 
Accommoda- 5.9 Conflict of interest; Management review; 
tion, Cafes and manipulation of tests of controls/ 
Restaurants reconciliations substantive testing 
(No9) 
, Retail Trade 5.2 Window dressing Substantive testing; 
(N=S) co-worker 
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Wholesale 5.2 Window dressing Tests of controls 
Trade (N"'8) and/or anonymous 
caller 
Health and 4.6 Misappropriation of funds Anonymous caller; 
Community substantive testing 
Services (N=7) 
Property and 3.9 Misappropriation of funds Financial analysis; 
Business tests of controls and/or 
Services(N=6) management review 
Personal and 3.4 Cash spent without Tests of controls; 
Other Services approval management or 
(N=S) analytical review 
Transportation 2.6 Window dressing After balance date 
and Storage review; analytical nnd 
(N=4) managcmllnl review 
Communication 2.6 Manipulation of Tests of controls; 
Services (N"<l) reconciliations; substantive testing; 
misappropriation of funds and/or management 
review 
Education 2.6 Misappropriation of Substantive and tests 
(N=4) funds; conflict of interest; of controls and/or 
manipulation of management review 
reconciliations 
Mining (N=4) 2.6 Cash spent without Tests of controls 
approval; and/or analytical and 
misappropriation of funds; management review 
conflict of interest 
Electricity, Gas 1,9 Mis~ppropriation of Fin~ncial analysis 
and Water funds; window dressing; and/or tests of controls 
Supply (N=3) manipulation of and/or management 
reconciliations review 
Cultural and 1.4 Cash spent without Tests of controls 
Recreational approval and/or management or 
Services (N=2) analytical review 
Agriculture, 1.3 Theft of equipment; Review of asset 
Forestry and window; window dressing register 
Fishing (N=2) 
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Table 4 also shows that there is no relationship between the type ofindustry, the type 
of fraud and which audit procedurc(s) alertcd7 the auditors. Table 4 docs, however, 
show that management review and tests of controls are two audit procedures most 
likely to detect such fraud. 
Manufacturing also had the highest incidence of management fraud in the KPMG 
(1995a) fraud survey and in the Loebbecke et al. study, The other industries with a 
relatively high incidence of management fraud in the present study were 
construction, government administration and defence as well as finance and 
insurance. In Kl'MG (1995a), the financial services and the mining industries 
reported the second and third highest average fraud per occurrence respectively, 
whereas in Loebbecke et al.'s study they were merchandising and Banking. 
The industries with the !owes! incidence of management fraud in Australia are 
cultural and recreational services, electricity, gas and water supply, agriculture, 
personal and other services. 
Close scrutiny of the data on which Table 4, is based found that the four most 
common types of managcmrnt fraud across the different industries in order of 
7 ]I should be noted that the auditors' responses rcg~rding the different wnys they were nlc~cd (o the odstcncc of 
different lm:guhuitios me presented below ilS they were sl.ntcd, I.e., where two such wnys overlap (e.g., ·~ub5tnntivc 
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prevalence were misr~ppropriation of funds, window dressing, cash spent without 
approval, and manipulation of reconciliations. In contrast, the KPMG ( 1995a) survey 
reported thm, out of 14 types of management fraud, the four most common were: 
expense account (16%), purchase for personal use (15%), theft of inventory/plant 
(13%), and conflict of interest (11%). The difference in prevalent fraud types 
between the present study and KPMG (1995a) is probably attributable to their 
different sample of companies and sample ofrespondcnts1• 
Cross-tabulating the type of management fraud with whether the fraud had a material 
impact on the accounts, it was found that window dressing (24%), manipulation of 
reconciliations (21 %), misappropriation of funds (16%) and overstatement of stock 
(12%) were the main types of management fraud that had a material impact on the 
accounts. 
The present study found that auditors were more likely to be alerted to the possible 
existence of management fraud as a result of management review (14 out of 18), 
followed by tests of controls, which featured in 12 out of the 18 industry categories 
listed, and, finally, substantive testing in 7 out of 18 industry categories (see Table 
4). This is different than Loebbecke et al,, who highlighted the utility of substantive 
testing. 
testing" and "uudit tc~t cfb~lanccs") no attempt lllls been made to merge or reclassify the two tenns. 
8 In the KPMG survey the respondents comprised the following Clltcgorlcs; chief financial officer (36%), chief 
l:llectlllve officer/ mlll!aglng director (24%), company secr=laly (II%), internal auditors (I 1%), other (tO%), gcncml 
mDil.!lgcr (4%), chlcf opemting officcr(2%), lll!d bend of security (2%). As already sl!!ted, most (82o/o) rcspo>1donts in 
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Further analysis of the data investigated whether a company belonging to a particular 
industry category lacked: (I) an effective system of internal control and (2) a code of 
conduct as well as (3) whether the management fraud impacted materially on the 
accounts (see Table 5). The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient test was carried 
out to test whether there is a statistically significant relationship between (1), (2) and 
(3). The same analysis was carried out for the other five types of irregularities 
reported below. 
As several of the categories reported in Table 5 have small sample sizes, caution 
must be exercised in interpreting the results. With this caveat in mind, a significant 
relationship was found between a company having an ineffective system of internal 
control and lacking a code of conduct (p = 0.000) and between each of those features 
and the management fraud having a material impact on the accounts (p = 0.000). 
These significant relationships lend support to the view that an ineffective system of 
internal control (as was also found in the MFG study, see Chapter 5) and the absence 
of a code of conduct do indeed facilitate the commission of management fraud. 
Consequently, any steps taken to reduce fraud must include both improving internal 
controls and implementation of a code of corporate conduct. These two fraud-
prevention steps were the two most frequently reported as having been taken in the 
KPMG (l995a) survey. 
tile present sludy were financi!!l auditor.;. 
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Table 5: Industries Involved in Management Fraud by Ineffective lntcmal 
Controls, Without a Code of Conduct and the Management Fraud 
Having a Material Financial Impact on the Accounts 
Industry With Without Material 
ineffective a code of lmJmct on 
internal conduct Accounts 
control 
% N % N % N 
No industry designation (N'='20 80 16 60 12 40 8 
Agriculture Forestry and Fishing (N"'2) 100 2 100 2 so I 
Mining (N=I) 75 3 so 2 25 I 
Manufacturing (N'='25) 64 16 76 19 56 14 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 100 3 66 2 0 0 
(N=3) 
Construction (N'='l9) 68 13 63 12 58 II 
Wholesale Trade (N'='S) 63 s 75 6 so 4 
Retail Trade (N=S) 63 s so 4 so 4 
Accommodations, Cafes and J3 3 44 4 22 2 
Restaurants (N"'9) 
Transport and Storage (N=I) 75 3 25 I 100 4 
Communication Services (N=I) so 2 75 3 25 I 
Finance and Insurance (N=IO) 80 8 60 6 so s 
Property and Business Services (N=6) so 3 33 2 so 3 
Government Administration a11d 69 9 46 6 31 4 
Defence (n=l3) 
Education (N=4) so 2 0 0 so 2 
Health and Community Services (N=7) 100 7 14 I 100 7 
Cultural and Recreational Services so I 0 0 so I 
(N=2) 
Personal and Other Serviccs(N=S) 80 4 80 4 20 I 
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3.1.3 Employee fraud 
Employee fraud was the Eecond type of irregularity respondents were asked to 
comment on9• Employee fraud was defined in the questionnaire as an act which 
involves the use of deception to obtain an illegal advantage by an employee. The 
terms "employee fraud", "defalcations", "employee theft" and "embezzlement" are, 
used as synonymous in the context of this thesis. A total of 185 incidents of 
employee fraud had been encountered by the I 08 respondents in the previous five 
years. This was the second higl:v;:st category after management fraud, making up 24% 
of the total number of irregularities discussed in this chapter. The respondents 
provided infonnation on a total of93 (50.2%) cases. 
Wrong expense claim was the most common example of employee fraud (as in 
Loebbecke eta!.), followed by product theft and cheque forgery. This contrasts with 
the KPMG (1995a) survey, wh;ch found that theft of inventory or plant was the most 
common type of employee fraud, occurring almost twice as often as manipulation of 
petty cash, the next most common fraud, In the present study employee fraud did not 
include any assets overvalued or transactions not recorded, as in Loebbecke et a!., 
but did have a relutively high incidence of cheque forgery, 
9 This lrnn is not specifit:~~lly defined !n AUS 210 (AARI', 1995") but it wus t:~~nsidcn:d uppropri•tc to di~inguish 
between frnud C~Jmrnitted by mMagcrncnt nod employees to sec if lhcro is a difference in the types of fmud 
CllmmiUcd. In Austmlln, un!ik~ In the U.S., lhls tcm1 is not commonly used in the profcssionallitcrotme hut it is 
undmtood more clearly thml the tenn "defalcation" which is used in the U.S. 
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Table 6: Types of Employee Fraud Encountered 
Type of employee Number of cases %of cases 
rraud 
Wrong expense claim 25 I 26.9 
Stealing cash 24 25.8 
Product theft 14 15.1 
Cheque forgery 11 11.8 
-
Payroll fraud 7 7.5 
Lapping 6 6.5 
Kickbacks 3 3.2 
Other 3 3.2 
Total 93 = 
Table 7 indicates both the type of industries that are prone to employee fraud by the 
type of such fraud to affect each industry as well as the ways the auditors were 
alerted. It shows that manufacturing makes up the largest share of employee fraud 
out of the 16 industry categories, followed by government administration and 
defence and finance and insurance. In Loebbecke et al., banking and savings was the 
most employee fraud*p~one industry, 
,-,·. 
'/ 
(; 
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Table 7: Type oflndustry by Employee Fraud and Ways ofBcing Alerted 
Industry %of Types of employee Main ways 
employee fraud committed alerted 
fraud 
Manufacturing 21.5 Cheque forgery, Reconciliation:;, 
(N=>20) payroll fraud, cash and management 
product theft, lapping and/or analytical 
review and/or 
substantive testing 
and whistleblower 
Government 12.9 Steal cash, lapping, Management 
Administrntion wrong expeilse cl~im review and/or 
and Defence substantive/ tests 
(N=12) of controls and/or 
reconciliations 
Finance and 10.7 Wrong expense claim, Reconciliations 
Insurance (N=IO) steal cash and/or discussions 
with management 
and/or tests of 
controls 
No 1ndustry (N=7) 7.5 Steal cash and products Tests of controls 
and/or 
management 
review 
Health and 6.5 Steal cash Internal audit 
Community 
Services (N=6) 
Retail Trade 5.4 Wrong expense claim, Reconciliations 
(N=5) stealing cash, lapping and cash counts 
Accommodation, 5.4 Stealing cash Management 
Cafes and review and/or test 
Restaurants (Noo5) of controls 
Personal and 5.3 Wrong expense claim Management 
Other Services review, tests of 
(N=5) controls 
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Transp:·;11 and 4.3 Wrong expense claim Management 
Storage (N=4) review 
Communication 4.3 Wrong expense claim Tests of controls 
Services(N=4) and/or 
whistleblowcr 
Education (N=I) 4.3 Steal cash, cheque Analytical review, 
forgery, payroll fraud, and/or discussion 
kickbacks with management 
Electricity, Gas, 3.2 Product theft Whistleblowcr 
and Water Supply 
(N~3) 
Construction 3.2 Steal cash Internal audit, 
(N~3) reconciliations 
Wholesale Trade 2.1 Cheque forgery, wrong Analytical and/or 
(N~2) expense c!aim management 
review 
Mining (N=2) 2.1 Product theft Internal audit and 
management 
review and 
wbistlcblower 
Agriculture, 1.3 Wrong expense claim Tests of controls, 
Forestry and and/or discussions 
Fishing(N"'i) with management 
Table 7 also shows that management review and/or tests of controls was the audit 
procedure most likely to detect employee fraud. However in Loebbecke ct a!. it was 
substantive testing. 
The next question addressed by the data analysis was the relationship, if any, 
between a company lacking both an effective internal control system and a code of 
conduct and whether the employee fraud had a material impact on the accoWlts (sec 
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Table 8). 
Table &:Industries Involved in Employee Fraud by Ineffective Internal Controls, 
Without a Code of Conduct and the Employee Fmud !laving a Material 
Financial Impact on the Ac::ounts 
Industry With WiiiiOUID Material 
Ineffective code of Impact on 
internal conduct Accounts 
control 
% N 
_•;. N 'lo N 
N1 indus! desivnation fN==7\ 71 5 71 5 2R 2 
--~~~lture Forestcy and Fishing 100 1 100 1 100 1 
Mi"i"' (N- 2l 50 1 50 1 0 0 
Manufacturin > IN=-20) 65 11 50 10 25 5 
~':~icity, Gas and Water Supply 66 2 33 1 0 0 
r.onstruction I'N=3\ 100 3 100 
' 
100 3 
Wholesale Trade JN=2) 100 2 50 1 50 I 
Retail Trade I'N==5) 00 5 80 4 20 1 
Accommodation, Cafes and 
____Restaurants ft..: ...,-5, 80 4 40 2 60 3 
Transoort and Storaae IN-""4) 25 1 50 2 0 0 
Com un"cationSeJV·c :I'N==4\ 50 2 75 3 0 0 
Finance and Insurance IN=-! 0) 60 6 66 4 10 1 
Government Administration and 92 11 71 10 16 2 
Defence fN-]2) 
Education CN=--4) 50 2 50 2 0 0 
Health and Communitv ~eJVi e.~ fN=fi'l 66 4 50 3 0 0 
Personal a~d Other SeJVices fN"-'5) 80 4 60 3 0 0 
Speannan's rank correlation coefficient tests carried out yielded a statistically 
significant relationship between having an ineffl!ctive internal control system and 
lacking a code of conduct (p = 0.000) as well between having an ineffective internal 
control system and the employee fraud impacting materially on the accounts (p == 
0.001). Having no code of conduct was also positively related to whether the 
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employee fraud impncl<::d materially on the accounts (p "' 0.008). The following 
industries exemplify the relationships found: manufacturing, accommodation, 
government administmtion and defence. A number of government departments 
(government administration and defence; health and community services; education) 
appear to be prone to employee fraud and to be lacking an eff::ctive system of 
internal control and a code of conduct to a significant degree. 
3.1.4 Other illegal acts 
Other illegal acts refers to "acts which involve non-compliance with laws and 
regulations which may, or may not result in misstatements including omissions of 
amounts or other disclosures from an entity's accounting records or financial reports" 
(AUS 210, AARF, 1995a, para. 05). This was the third highest irregularity (N=l43) 
encountered by the participating auditors comprising 19% of the total 768 
irregularities reported in the survey. The respondents provided detailed infonnation 
on 31 (21.6%) other illegal acts. 
It can be seen that the most common illegal act encountered by the respondents was 
non-compliance with accounting standards, fo!lowed by breach of security and 
insurance industry regulations. 
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Table 9: Types of Other Illegal Acts Encountered 
Types of other illegal acts Number %of cases 
Of cases 
Non-compliance with accounting 14 45.1 
standards 
Breach of security and insurance 9 29.3 
industry regulations 
Fictitious stock and invoices 2 6.4 
Lending on false information I 3.2 
Trust accounts regulations altered I 3.2 
Non lodgement of ASC documents I 3.2 
Money laudering I 3.2 
Non-maintenance of statutory registers I 3.2 
Other I 3.2 
Total 31 = 
I 
1( 
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Table 10: Type of industry by Other Illegal Acts and Ways of llcing Alerted 
Industry %of Types of other illegal Main ways of being 
olhcr acts committed Alerted 
Illegal 
acts 
Finance and 32.3 Non compliance with Audit tests of balances 
Insurance (N=JO) accounting standards and/or statutory 
and breach of securities records review and/or 
and insurance tests of controls and 
industries lel!islation substantive testinl! 
Manufacturing 16.2 Non compliance with Substantive and/or 
I (N~S) accounting standards tests of controls 
Property and 12.9 Breach of securities and Audit tests of balances 
Business insurance industries 
Services(N=4) legislation 
Health and 9.6 Non compliance with Test of controls and 
Community accounting standards substantive testing 
Services (Noo3) and breach of securities 
and industries 
legislation 
No industry 9.6 Non compliance with Substantive testing 
(N~3) accounting standards, and statutory records 
fictitious stock, non review 
maintenance of records 
Wholesale Trade 6.5 Non compliance with Statutory records and 
IN•2l accountinl! standards review 
Communication 6.3 Non lodgement of ASC Statutory records 
Services (Noo2) documents review 
Retail Trade 3.3 Non compliance with Statutory records 
IN•Il accountin standards review 
Personal 3.3 Trust account After balance date 
Services {Noo}) violations review 
As shown in Table 10, finance and insurance accounts for the largest proportion 
(32%) of other illegal acts encountered, followed by manufacturing (16%). Auditors 
were alerted to the existence of other illegal acts (most often non-compliance with 
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accounting standards) mainly by substantive testing and/or a statutory records 
review. As with the previous two types of irregularities, there docs not appear to be a 
clear relationship between ways of being alerted and industry designation or type of 
other iliegal acts. 
Data analysis also addressed the question of whether there were adequate internal 
controls in place and a code of conduct as well as whether the other illegal acts had a 
material impact on the accounts. 
Table 11: Industries Involved in Other Illegal Acts by Ineffective Internal 
Controls, Without a Code of Conduct, and the Other Illegal Acts 
Having a Material Financial Impact on the Accounts 
Industry With Without a Mntcrlnl 
lneff~clive code of impncton 
Internal conduct Accounts 
control 
% N % N % N 
No indust desi nation IN=3) 66 2 66 2 66 2 
Retail Trade IN=!) 100 I 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturin11 11\ """5) 60 3 60 3 20 .~L 
Wholesale Trade rN=2) 100 2 100 2 100 2 
Communication Services (N=2) 100 2 50 I 0 0 
Finance and Insurance (N=IO) 30 3 50 5 30 3 
Property and Business Services 50 2 75 3 50 2 
' {N.;,) 
Health and Community Services 
. ;;,;3) 100 3 33 I 33 I 
Personal and Other Services CN""'i) 100 I 100 I 0 0 
I 
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In view of the small number of cases per industry in Table II, any conclusions 
drawn need to be treated with caution. Speannan's rank correlation coefficient tests 
carried out found a significant relationship between an industry category (finance 
and insurance and property and business services) without a code of conduct and the 
other illegal acts having a material impact on the accounts (p "'0.005). 
3.1.5 Other acts 
Other acts are defined in AUS 210 (AARF, 1995a, para. 05) as acts "which 
contravene the constitution of an entity including non-compliance with trust deeds or 
memorandum and articles of association". The respondents reported having come 
across within the last five years a total of 32 other acts within the last five years 
(comprising 4.1% of the irregularities reported in the survey} provided information 
for about 15 (46.8%) ofthem. 
Table 12: Types of Other Acts Encountered 
Types of other acts Number of o/o of cases 
cases 
Non comoliance with trust deed 6 40 
Non compliance with memorandum and 3 20 
articles 
Incorrect accountin treatment . 2 13 
Non com liance with a licable le islation 2 13 
Unintentional non com liance with trust deed I 7 
Other I 7 
Total 15 l.OO% 
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Table 13: Type of Industry by Type of Other Acts uml Ways of Being Alerted 
Industry %of Types of other acts Main ways of being 
other committed alerted 
acts 
No industry (N=6) 19 Non compliance Review of records 
with trust account, and/or financial 
non compliance statement review 
with memorandum 
and articles of 
association, 
unintentional non 
compliance with 
trust deed 
Finance and 16 Non-compliance Audit procedures: 
Insurance (N=5) with memorandum solicitor's 
and articles representations and 
checklist 
Mining (N=l) 3 Non compliance Audit procedures: 
with memorandum solicitor's 
and articles representation and 
checklist 
Manufacturing 3 Non compliance Review of financial 
(N=l) with legislation statements and 
records 
Retail Trade (N=l) 3 Non compliance Review of records 
with trust deed 
Government 3 Non compliance Financial statement 
Administration with legislation review 
and Defence (N=l) 
Table 13 shows that companies in the no industry category (which for the purpose of 
Table 13 comprised mainly trusts and fund management and finance and insurance 
industry) accounted for II out of the 15 other acts encountered. In view of the main 
types of other nets in Table 13, it is to be expected that trusts and fund management 
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would have a high incidence of such acts. In the main (in three of the six industries), 
auditors were alerted to other acts as a result of a review of records. 
Table 14: lndwtries Involved in Other Acts by Ineffective Internal Controls, 
Without a Code of Conduct and the Other Acts Having a Material 
Financial Impact on the Accounts 
lndu!lry With incff,ctlvc Without a code of Material impact 
Internal control conduct on accounts 
% N % N % N 
No industry 50 3 16 I 16 I 
designation (N=6) 
Mining (N=l) 0 " 0 100 I 0 0 
Manufacturing (N=l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Retail Trade (N=l) 100 I 0 0 0 0 
Goverrunent 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Administration and 
Defence (N=l) 
Finance and Insurance 80 4 40 2 80 4 
(N"5) 
Statistical analysis of the relationship between the three factors shown in Table \4 
found a significant relationship between a company belonging to a particular 
industry category Jacking a code of conduct and an effective internal control system 
and the other acts having a material impact on the accounts {p = 0.005 and p = 0.06 
respectively). The statistical relationships found, however, should be treated with 
caution due to the small sample size. 
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3.1.6 Intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements 
Intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements arc acts "which include 
omissions of amounts or other disclosures from liD entity's accounting records or 
financial reports" AUS 210 (AARF, l995a, para.OS). The auditors participating in 
the survey had come across 52 such irregularities, comprising 6.7% of the total 
irregularitie3 encountered. Respondents provided information on 26 (50%) cases. 
Caution is, therefore, warranted in interpreting the figures given below due to small 
numbers in each industry category. Table 15 shows that the most common 
intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatement is "Accounts did not add 
up", followed by overstatement of debtors. 
Table 15: TYpes of Intentional but not Fraudulent or Other Illegal 
Misstatements Encountered 
Types ofintentional but not fraudulent Numherof %or cases 
or other illegal misstatements cases 
Accounts did not add u 5 19.2 
Overstatement of debtors 4 15.4 
Balance date window dressin 3 11.5 
Falsifvin items 3 11.5 
Other errors 3 11.5 
Non disclosure 2 7.7 
Understatement of provisions 2 7.7 
Non disclosure of contigent liabilities 2 7.7 
Recognising sale in the wrong period I 3.9 
Unintentional omissions from the I 3.9 
Financial Statements 
I T"'' 26 JOO% 
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Table 16 also shows that companies in the "No Industry" designation made up the 
biggest share of intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements 
(38.4%), followed by manufacturing (30.7%). 
Table 16: Type of Industry by Type of Intentional but Not Fraudulent or Other 
Il!egal Misstatements, and Ways of Being Alerted 
Industry %or Types or other illegal Main ways or being 
otbCI' acts committed alerted 
illegal 
acts 
No industry 38.4 Accounts did not add Review of financial 
(N~IO) up; non disclosure of statements and/or 
contin~nt liabilities knowled~e of client 
Manufacturing 30.7 Overstatement of Review of financial 
(N~8) debtors; accounts did statements and records 
not add up; and/or knowledge of 
understfltement of client and/or cut off 
provisions; falsifying tests 
items 
Retail Trade 7.7 Overstatement of Review of financial 
rN~2! debtors stutcments and records 
Finance and 7.7 Balance date window Review of financial 
Insurance (N=2) dressing; unintentional statements and/or 
omissions review of records 
Construction 3.9 Balance date window Review of accounting 
(N~!) dressing records 
Government 3.9 Accounts did not add Review of financial 
Administration 
"P statements and 
and Defence I rN~n knowledge of client 
Health and 3.9 Falsifying items Review of financial 
Community statements and/or cut 
Servicesi'N=J) off tests 
Agriculture 3.8 Accounts did not add Review of financial 
(N~t) 
"P statements and/or 
k ow led •e of client 
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As shown in Table 16, a review of financial statements and/or accounting records is 
the audit procedure most likely to identity the various types of intentional but not 
fraudulent or other illegal misstatemenW in the industries concerned. 
Table 17: Industries Involved in Intentional but not Fraudulent or Other Illegal 
Misstatements by Ineffective Internal Controls, Without a Code of 
Conduct and the Intentional but not Fraudulent or Other Illegal 
Misstatements Having a Material Financial Impact on the Accounts 
Industry With in effective Without n code of Material 
Intcmnl control conduct Impact un 
Accounts 
% N % N % N 
No industry 
desil!natio~ m=IO) 
20 2 50 s 60 6 
Agricultur~ ~~stry 100 I 100 I 0 0 
and FishinQ --])-
Manufacturin!! rN~8l 50 4 37 3 37 3 
Construction fN= n 100 I 100 I 100 I 
Retail Trade rN=2) so I 0 0 50 I 
Finance and Insurance so I 0 0 50 I 
JN~2) 
Government 100 I 100 I 100 I 
Administration and 
Defence IN"' I) 
Health and Community 100 I 0 0 0 0 
Services IN= I) 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient tests carried out reveal that the intentional 
but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements have a material impact on the 
accounts of those industry-category companies which lacked a code of conduct (p = 
0.001). 
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3.1.1 Errors 
AUS 210, para. 05 (AARF, 1995a) defines errors as "unintentional mistakes in, or 
omissions of amounts or other disclosures from financial reports". The respondents 
provided information on 48 incidents of errors (6.25% of the total irregularities) they 
had encountered in the last five years. Where possible, the findings obtained about 
errors will be compared with similar findings reported by Entwistle and Lindsay 
(1994) and Sender and Moray (1991). 
Table 18: Types of Errors Encountered 
_Tvnes of errors N!Unber of cases %of Cases 
Financial_statement errors 13 27.1 
Omitting_creditors 8 16.6 
Omitting_disclosure 5 10.4 
Related_Q_arty transaction errors 5 10.4 
Non coam!iance with new AAS 4 8.3 
Understate en\ of creditors' accounts 3 6.4 
Understate ent of doubtful debts 3 6.4 
Overstatement of stock 3 6.4 
Overstatement of sales 2 4.0 
Mistakes in estimates 2 4.0 
Total 48 Ul'"" 
Table 18 shows that the most common type of errors are financial statement errors, 
related party transaction errors, and omitting creditors. Cross-tabulating the type of 
error by industry (see Table 19) found that the companies that mninly fell into the 
"No industry" category (i.e., unit trusts, fund manngement, marketing and 
electronics) accounted for most of the errors, followed by manufacturing. 
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Table 19: Type of Industry by Type of Error and Ways of Being Alerted 
lmlustry %of Type of errors committed Main ways of being 
Error alcrled 
No industry 54.2 Financial statement errors; Review of financial 
(N=26) omitted creditors; omitted statements and records 
disclosure; related party; and/or review of debtors 
understatement of doubtful and/or detail review and 
debts; non compliance with analysis 
new Australian Accounting 
standards 
Manufacturing 22.9 Financial statement errors; Review of financial 
(N=ll) related party; mistakes in statements, and/or detail 
estimates; omitting review and analysis 
creditors; non compliance 
with new accounting 
standards 
Finance and 8.3 Overstatement of sales; Review of aged trial 
Insurance (N=4) understatement of doubtful balance and/or cut off 
debts and financial tests and/or detail review 
statement errors 
Construction 4.1 Omitting disclosure Review of financial 
_lN=2) statements 
Electricity, Gas 2.1 Financial statement errors Review of financial 
and Water Supply statements and/or detail 
_l!H' review and anal sis 
Agriculture (N=l) 2.1 Related party Review of financial 
statements 
Retail Trade 2.1 Financial statement errors Review of financial 
(N=I) statements and/or detail 
review and anal sis 
Accommodation 2.1 Financial statement errors Review of financial 
Cafes and statements and/or detail 
Restaurants fN"'l) review ami analvsis 
Personal and 2.1 Overstatement of sales Review of financial 
~~~r) Services statements and cut off 
tests 
Auditors were most frequently alerted to the existence of errors as a result of a 
review of financial statements, followed by detailed review and analysis of accounts. 
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Table 20 shows that there is no clear relationship between the different audit 
procedures whicli alerted the auditor and type of error or type of industry. 
Table 20: Industries Involved in Committing Errors by Ineffective Internal 
Controls, Without a Code of Conduct, and thC Error Having a 
Material Financial Impact on the Accounts 
Industry With ineffective Without a code Material impact internal control ufconduct ., 
Accounts 
% N % N % N 
No industry designation 15 4 12 3 15 4 
(N=26) 
Agriculture (N=l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing (N=ll) 27 3 36 4 9 I 
Electricity, Gas and 100 I 100 I 100 I 
Water Supply (N=l) 
Construction (N"'2) 0 0 0 0 50 I 
Retail Trade (N=l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Accommodation, Cafes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
and Restaurants (N=l) 
Finance and Insurance 100 4 75 3 75 3 
(N=4) 
Personal and Other too I 100 I 100 I 
Services (N=l) 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient tests on the figures in Table 20 found a 
significant relationship between a company having an ineffective internal control 
system and lacking a cocie of conduct (p = 0.05) and an ineffective internal control 
system and the error impacting materially on the accounts (p = 0.006). 
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Entwistle and Lindsay (1994) concentrated on "large dollar-value misstt~tements and 
found them to be concentrated in relatively few accounts and to have arisen primarily 
from judgement error or biases". They also suggest that non-recurring transactions 
such as cut-offs are more risky than recurring ones as far as errors made in financial 
statements are concerned. Entwistle and Lindsay found manufacturing to be an 
error-prone industry with cut-off errors, and judgement errors or mechanical errors 
being the main types. Th>;! present study found that the most frequently reported 
errors were financial statement errors, or errors regarding related party transactions. 
The auditors surveyed did not state how those errors were committed and whether, 
for example, they were cut-off errors. Whilst substantive testing was the main 
procedure signalling these errors in Entwistle and Lindsay's Canadian study, in the 
present study it was client knowledge and review of financial statements. 
Summarising the findings, Table 21 shows the relationship between a company 
having an ineffective system of internal control and lacking a code of conduct and an 
irregularity having a material impact on the ace counts of a company. 
Table2l: 
Ineffective 
internal control 
Without a code 
of conduct 
Type oflrregularity and the Relationship Between Jneffcctivc Internal 
Controls, Without a Code of Conduct and the Irregularity Having a 
Material Financial Impact on the Accounts 
Wlllwut n code of can~ud Material impact on account 
Management fraud (p~.OOO) Management Fraud (p~.OOO) 
Employee fraud (p~.OOO) Employee Fraud (p~.OOO) 
Error (p~.005) Other illegal acts (p~.OS3) 
Em' (p~.060) 
Management frnud (p~.oOO) 
Employee fraud (p~.ooa) 
Intentional acts (p~.005) 
Other illegal acts (p=.068) 
Intentional but not froudulent 
grother illegal misstatements (p-.001) 
Two of the company characteristics in the ROP model arc lack of adequate control 
procedures that prevent fraud and lack of code of conduct. The ROP model is an 
integral part ofthc eclectic fraud detection model proposed. In support of the eclectic 
fraud detection model, it can be seen that there is a significant probability of 
companies that have an ineffective internal control system and without a code of 
conduct, experiencing management and employee fraud and error. Furthennore, in 
those companies with an ineffective internal control system the management fraud, 
employee fraud, other illegal acts and errors impacted materially on the accounts. 
Finally, in those companies lacking a code of corporate conduct, the management 
fraud, employee fraud, other illegal acts, and other illegal misstatements had a 
material impact on the accounts. 
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Table 22: Patterns in Auditors' Detection of Different Irregularities 
Type of lndustry(les) Tllc fcrm(s) 111.1 Audit Statistically 
lrn~ularl!y wltll high Ukc!y to take procedure(s) signlfkant 
lnddence of likely to alert correlates of the 
irrcgulnrhy auditors to Irregularity 
irregularity Impacting 
edstence materially on 
company's 
accounts 
Manage- Manufacturing, Mis- Management Lack of effective 
meot fraud Trust~; and Fund Appropriation of review and/or internal control 
Management, funds; window tests of controls syotem, absence 
Construction dressing of a code of 
conduct 
Employee Manufacturing, Expenses Management Lack ofeffe.:tivc 
fraud Government recorded review and/or internal control 
Administration incorrectly tests of controls system, absence 
and Defence, of code of 
Finance and conduct 
Insurance 
Otbcr Fimuu;eand Non·compliance Substantive Absence of a 
HlegRI acts Insurance, with accounting testing code of conduct 
Manufacturing standards, breach andfstatutory 
of security and records review 
insurance 
industry 
regulations 
Otbtr acts Trusts and Fund Non-compliance Review of Lock of effective 
Management, with trust records internal contml 
Finance and accounts system, absence 
Insurance of a code of 
conduct 
Other Trusts and Fund Accounts did not Review of Absence of a 
Illegal Management, add up financial code of conduct 
Mlntatc• Manufacturing sllltcmcnts ~ndlor 
ments review of 
accounting 
records 
Errors Trusts and Fund Financial Review of Lack of effective 
Management, no statement errors financial internal control 
industry statements system, absence 
category, of a code of 
Manufocturing conduct 
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Table 22 shows the patterns identified in auditors' detection of the six types of 
irregularities. Irregularity-prone companies are characterised by a lack of an effective 
internal control system and the absence of a code of conduct. This finding is not 
surprising when we remember that 76% of the companies where management fraud 
had occurred had ineffective internal controls and 64% lacked a code of conduct. 
Similarly, of the companies where employee fraud occurred 65% had ineffective 
internal controls and 56% lacked a code of conduct. As already indicated, these two 
company characteristics are significantly correlated. Furthermore, the material 
impact of these deficiencies on the accounts is pervasive. These findings provide 
support for the eclectic fraud detection model and attest to the importance of auditors 
carrying out further tests if they are auditing a company with an ineffective internal 
control system and lacking a code of conduct. The sunrey results suggest that these 
two characteristics point to a higher probability that a material irregularity in the 
accounts exists. This finding is in agreement with the conclusion reached in the 
KPMG {1995a) survey that any steps taken by companies to reduce the possibility of 
an irregularity (including fraud) that will impact materially on the accounts must 
include improvement in internal control systems and the implementation of a code of 
conduct. 
4.0 CONSIDERATION OF LOEBBECKE'S ASSESSMENT MODEL 
4.1 Usefulness of red flags 
Part II of the sunrey addressed the usefulness of red flags in detecting material 
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irregularities. Participants were asked to indicate how useful a list of red flags had 
been to them concerning a material irregularity they had encountered in the la~t 12 
months. More specifically, the respondents were asked whether a red flag had been 
(1) applicable to the engagement, (2) relevant to the irregularity; and (3) whether it 
had alerted them during the planni~g phase. It should be noted here that a small 
number of respondents indicated that a particular red flag (see below) was relevant to 
the irregularity but did not also indicate that it was applicable to the engagement, as 
one would expect. It is for this reason that the figures in the columns 'Relevant...' 
and 'Applica'Jle ... ' in a number of Tables below is not consistent. Part II of the 
questimmaire was completed by 87 participants. As indicated in Chapter 3, and this 
is borne out by the findings reported below, red flags are of doubtful usefulness if 
used on their own to detect fraud. Tables 23-30 address the usefulness of eight 
categories of red flags in detecting irregularities listed in Appendices I and 2 of 
AUS210 (AARF, 199Sa). Using aggregate figures and not distinguishing between 
the different fraud indicator categories, Tables 23-30 examine whether the auditor 
was alerted during the planning stage to the possible existence of a particular 
irregularity by a red flag he/she considered applicable to the engagement and/or 
relevant to the irregularity. 
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Table 23: Business Environment 
Hr~sl11css Em'/ronmelll (Rc<l Flog) (Red Flag) (Red FlaK) 
Appllcuh/e to Relevant to tile A luted ltU! 
"' 
Irregularity dur/rJJ: tl1e 
engagement planning 
plune 
Na87 N=B7 N"87 
Nature of the business is susceptible to 29 24 8 
misappropriation 
Unduly influential circumstances 14 16 5 
Pressure to meet forecasts 13 II I 
Weak management integrity 19 29 6 
lneffectivefnon-existenl regulation by 6 10 2 
external parties 
Survival of company dependant on 2 5 3 
irrcgularity(ics) 
Ineffective or non-existent code of 15 ' 14 3 
conduct 
Transactious with related parties not nl 7 10 3 
arm's length 
Unusual transactions with comp:mics I 2 -
registered in \!1)[ havens 
Liquidily pressure 10 6 -
Total 116 127 31 
Table 23 shows the following four business environment fraud indicators feature to a 
significant degree as both applicable to the engagement and relevant to the 
irregularity: nature of the business is susceptible to misappropriation; weak 
management integrity; and unduly influential circumstances; and ineffective or non-
existent code of conduct. Despite this, only a minority of those indicators alerted the 
auditor during the planning stage to the existence of the irregularity. 
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Table 24: Internal Control 
lnttrnnl Control Structure (Red Hug) (Red Flag) (Red Flag) 
Appllcnbl~ ro He/evan/to tire Altrtedme 
tile /rreg/1/arlty drtrlng the 
engagement planning 
phase 
' 
N~ 87 N"'87 N"'87 
Organisation is dccentrnliscd 18 24 9 
with~ut adequate monitoring 
Management override 25 33 13 
Ineffective management 17 24 6 
Lack of segregation of duties 25 42 \3 
Weak internal controls 21 32 II 
Excessive authority vested in a 26 32 7 
senior officer 
Poor systems 16 23 7 
lnefiOctivc internal audit 21 14 4 
Total 169 224 70 
Auditing standards10 emphasise the importance of internal controls. However, Table 
24 shows that the auditors did not, in fact, pay particular attention to serious 
weaknesses in internal controls. Consequently, less than half of those indicators 
alerted them at the planning stage to the existence of an irregularity, despite the fact 
that they were relevant to the irregularity. 
10 Sec AUS402 (AARF, 199Sb). The criminogenic nature ar weak internal controls was confinncd by tbc 
succcs~rul test of the ROP model in the MrG ~tudy. 
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T~ble 25: Integrity/Competence of Management 
lnlegrlty/Comp<'lence of Mmw;:eme11t (Red Flag) (Red Flog) (R~d Flat:) 
Applicable to Relevallf to the Alerted me 
tile lrregularlly during/he 
engagement planning 
ph use 
N~87 N~87 N~B7 
Domineering management 21 23 7 
Complex corporate structure 5 2 I 
Continuing failure to correct Internal 17 17 5 
control weaknesses 
High executive staff turnover 2 5 2 
Significant/prolonged under·staffing of 8 5 2 
the accounting department 
Frequent chilllges of lawyers 
-
- -
The client has engaged in opinion 
-
I 2 
shopping 
The auditor's experience with 7 9 4 
management indicates a degree of 
dishonesty 
Internal audit is improperly starTed 8 8 6 
Total 68 70 29 
The only two indicators pointing to a concern about the integrity/competence of 
management were domineering management and continuing failure to correct 
internal control weaknesses. The auditors' apparent insensitivity to the presence of 
the other 7 indicators largely explains the finding in Table 25 that they were alerted 
at the planning stage to the existence of an irregularity to a limited degree. Support 
of the finding that indicators of management integrity/competence are not effective 
red flags was reported by Bernardi (1994a). Pincus (1994, 1990), however, reported 
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a contradictory finding on the same issue. 
Table 26: Unusual Pre~sures Within an Entity 
UmiSIWI Presmres wltMn an entity (Red Flag) (Red Flag) (Red Flag) Alerted me 
Applicable ta the Relevallflo the durlngtlte 
engagement lrreg/1/ar/ty p/ann/111: 
pluue 
N:o87 N-87 N-87 
lnadequ~te working capital 10 6 7 
Deteriomting quality ofeamings 11 11 4 
A need for n rising profit 10 8 .I 
A significant investment in an industry 6 7 3 
noted for mpid change 
Entity heavily dependent on a product 4 7 2 
or a customer 
Management displays an overly 11 10 5 
aggressive attitude toward limmcial 
reporting and forecasts 
Pressure exerted on accounting 3 3 . 
personnel to complete financial reports 
in unusually short periods 
Total 55 52 26 
It can be seen in Table 26 that only two out of the seven indicators of unusual 
pressures within an entity (Deteriorating quality of earnings, Pressure exerted on 
accounting personnel to complete financial reports in unusually short periods) were 
considered applicable to the engagement and relevant to irregularity. It should, also 
be noted however, that with most of the other indicators there is an average match of 
74%, i.e., in most cases they were both applicable and relevant. Suprisingly, 
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however, only half of the indicators listed alerted the auditor at the planning stage to 
the existence of an irregularity. 
Table 27: Unusual Occurrcncesrfransaction 
Unumal Occurrerwesirransactlons (Red Flag) (Red Flag) (Red Flag) 
Applicable to Rel<!l!antlo tile Alened me 
the Irregularity during the 
engagement planning 
plwse 
N,.87 N=87 N~B7 
Unusual balance date transactions 13 12 2 
Payments for services that appear 4 13 2 
excessive in relation to services 
provided 
Payments for goods which appear to be 5 12 3 
nboveibelow market price 
Evidence of falsified documents 8 31 2 
Lmgc cash payments 4 12 2 
Payments made to local or overseas 2 2 
-
officials 
Problems with rcgulatozy authorities 
-
2 -
Ignored advice by lc;::al adviser 
- 2 -
Evidence of unduly lavish sl}'lcs by 4 14 2 
officers or employees 
Investigations by police 2 2 I 
Total 42 102 14 
Table 27 shows that, even such crucial information concerning evidence of falsified 
documents that was relevant to the irregularity, did not alert the auditors to the 
irregularity concerned at the planning phase. The same is also true, for example, of 
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unusual balance date transactions and evidence of unduly lavish lifestyles by 
company or employees. The auditors concerned, do not appear to have been aware of 
the importance of such indicators and/or to have been vigilant about their 
importance. 
Table 28: Unsatisfactory Records/Problems in Obtaining Sufficient Appropriate 
Audit Evidence 
Unsatisfactory Recortls!Probletm /11 (Red Flog) (Red Flag) (Red Rag) 
Obtaining Sufficient Appropriate Applicable to the Relevant to lire Alerted me 
Audit Evldenu engagement lm:gular/ty during/Ire 
plorw/ng 
phase 
N"'87 N"'87 N=87 
Inadequate accounting records 16 19 4 
Inadequate documentation 14 29 8 
Excessive number ufdiffircnccs II 18 2 
between accounting records and third 
party confinnations 
Evasive, unreasonable or unsatisfactory 20 20 7 
responses by management to inquiries 
New client without sufficient 6 4 2 
information from predecessor auditor 
Conflicting audit evidence and 7 8 2 
inexplicable changes in operating 
ratios. 
Significantly fewer responses to 3 5 2 
confirmation requests than expected 
Total 77 103 27 
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The auditors' lack of vigilance at the planning stage is further evidenced in Tublc 28. 
It can be seen that they failed to be alerted to the irregularity in question by: evasive, 
unreasonable or unsatisfactory responses by management to their inquiries; 
inadequate accounting records, inadequate documentation; and excessive number of 
differences between accounting records and third party confinnations. 
Table 29: Market Pressures 
Market Pressures (Red Flag) (Red Flag) (Red Flag) 
Applicable /0 the Reii!Vatlt to tire Alerted me 
engagettll'n/ Irregularity durltrgthe 
planning 
phase 
N=87 Nc87 N=B7 
Declining industry 4 3 -
lndusuy subject te complex 2 I I 
legislation 
Volatile industry with numerous I 2 -
corporate takeovers 
Total 7 6 I 
Table 29 shows that evidence of a declining industry was overlooked by the 
respondents at the planning stage even though such evidence would normally justify 
an auditor to apply more reasonable care and skill by performing additional tests. 
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Table 30: Factors Relevant to an ED!' Environment 
f'11CI"rJ Re/el'Q/1( fa an ED I' (Red Flag) (Red Nul:) (Red Flail) 
Etwlronmelll Applknble to Relevant to tile Alerted me 
tile /rre~tulurily dnrlng tile 
engagement plamdng pllale 
N-87 Nc87 N-87 
Minimal planning forth~ installation of 2 I I 
new hardware 
Inadequate computer ski!ls amongst 7 5 I 
relevant onti staff 
Inappropriate hardware or software to 3 2 I 
crforrn im ortant functions 
Poor physical or logical access controls I 2 -
Inadequate or inappropriate file access 
- I -hiemr~lw 
Lack of clear audit trail and tramaction 5 7 -
lo 
Hardware f~ilures, including exc~ssive 
- - -
amounts of"dov.THimc" and resultant 
in ut backlo s 
Software failures 
-
- -
Failure to restrict access to soltware and 2 4 
,., 
-
documentation to authorised crsonncl 
Program changes that are not documented, 4 I -
app;oved and tested 
Inappropriate data and program storage 
-
- -
mcdin 
Inadequate detection procedures for I I -
s stem viruses 
Inadequate overall balancing of computer I I 
-
transactions and data bases to the financial 
~ccounts 
Shared or non-specific ownership of datu I I I 
Total 27 26 4 
Examination of Table 30 reveals that the respondents were not alerted to the 
existence of an irregularity at the planning stage by such important features of the 
EDP environment as lack of clear audit trail and lrausaction log as well as inadequate 
computer skills amongst relevant entity staff, despite the fact that they were both 
2(12 
applicable to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity. 
The findings reported in Tables 23-30 show that the following fraud indicators, 
provided for in the eclectic fraud detection model, featured to a significant degree 
both as applicable to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity: no code of 
conduct; weak management integrity; weak internal controls; financial pressure on 
management in the fonn of inadequate working capital (declining industry); Jack of 
clear audit trail; and unduly lavish styles by company officers or employees. 
Table 31 summarises Tables 23-30 and shows that only a minority of red flags 
alerted auditors to thCl existence of a material irregularity. Out of a total of 561 red 
flags that were considered applicable to the engagement, only 202 (36%) alerted the 
auditor during the planning phase, Also, even though a total of 710 red flags were 
relevant to the irregularity only 202 (28.4%) alerted the auditor at the planning 
phase. In other words, the auditor was not alerted to the )XlSSible existence of the 
irregularity concerned despite the fact that the majority of the red flags were 
applicable to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity. Red flags belonging to 
the unusual pressures within an entity, integrity/competence of management, and 
internal control categories alerted the auditor to the possible existence of a material 
irregularity to a greater degree at the planning phase than the other categories. 
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TablcJl: Applicability, Relevance und Whether the Auditor was Alerted by 
Categor)HofRed Flag 
<\ 
Red flag category Red flag Red flag Red flat: 
applicable relevant to alerted an 
to tile 
'"' 
auditor 
engagement irregularity during the 
planning 
phase 
Business environment 116 127 31 
Internal control 169 224 70 
Integrity/Competence of 68 70 29 
management 
Unusual pressures within an 55 52 26 
entity 
Unusual 42 102 14 
occurrence/transactions 
Unsatisfactory records/ 77 103 27 
problems in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence 
Market pressures 7 6 1 
Factors relevant to an EDP 27 26 4 
environment 
Total 561 710 202 
Taking each of the eight red flag categories separately, Speam1an's rank correlation 
coefficient tests were carried out to examine the relationship, if any, between a red 
flag being applicable to the engagement, relevant to the irregularity and whether it 
alerted the auditor during the planning stage. Table 32 shows the results of these 
tests. 
Table 37.: 
AP 
REL 
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The Statistical Relationship Between Applicability and Relevance of 
Red Flags and Whether the Auditor was Alerted by Them 
Relevant Alerted 
-
Bn•iness environment (p~O.OO\) Business environment (p-0.008) 
Integrity/competence Integrity/competence 
ofm~nagcmcnt (p-0.04) of management (p-O.OOl) 
Unusual pressures {p-0.04) Unusual pressures (p=O.Ol) 
Unusual occurrence/ Unusual occurrence/ 
transaction(p=O.OS} Tronsaction (p=0.04) 
Unsatisfactory records (p=O.OJ) Unsatisfactory records (p-0.04) 
Factors relevant to an EDP 
environment (p=O.Ol) 
Internal control NS Internal_ control NS 
Business environment (p-0.001) 
Internal control (p"'0.008) 
Integrity/competence of 
management (p=0.007) 
Unusual occurronce/ 
transaction (p"'0.03) 
Unsatisfactory records (!l"'0.Q2 
NS- Not stattsttcally stgmficant. 
In interpreting the significance of the relationships depicted in Table 32 it should be 
noted that no test was possible in the case of one red flag category, namely "market 
pressures" (declining industry, industry subject to complex legislation, volatile 
industry with numerous corporate takeovers) due toN"" 3. Also, as far as "factors 
relevant to an EDP enviroruncnt" is concerned, only four examples of that particular 
red flag were reported as ltaving alerted respondents and, consequently, no 
correlation test was possible with whether that red flag was applicable to the 
engagement or relevant to the irregularity. With the exception of internal control (p "' 
.072), a statistically significant relationship was found between all the remaining five 
,, 
,, 
,, 
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categories of red flags being considered both applicable to the engagement and 
relevant to the irregularity and alerting the auditor to the existence of an irregularity. 
However, it needs to be remembered that the respondents provided the data in 
hindsight. The following conclusions can be drawn from Table 32: 
i. Deticiencies in internal control did not alert auditors to the existence of an 
irregularity if those particular red flags were considered relevant to the 
irregularity, but did so if they were considered applicable to the engagement. 
ii. The red flags pertaining to unusual pressures only alerted the auditors to 
the existence of an irregularity if they were deemed applicable to the 
engagement. 
iii. The red flags comprising the "factors relevant to an EDP environment" 
category only alerted the auditors to the existence of an irregularity if they 
had been considered applicable to the engagement. 
Thus, it appears that the relationship between the applicability and relevance of a red 
flag and whether the auditor was alerted by it depends on the particular category of 
red flag. 
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4.2 Testing Locbbcckc ct aJ.'s assessment model 
Loc:bbecke and Willingham (1988) contrasted their model with the check list 
approach and they concluded that it is a logical model designed to intcmalisc the 
reasoning process to assess the likelihood of material management fraud. 
,, /:' \\ 
·,! They classified fraud indicators into conditions, motives, and attitudes. These differ 
slightly from Albrecht et al.'s (1995) and Cressey's (1986) classification as discussed 
in Chapter 4. As already pointed out in Chapter 5, Locbbecke et al.'s model suffers 
from one major deficiency: while the definition given of its "attitude" component 
refers to justifications, ratioilllli::utions for committing crime, the list of examples 
provided by Loebbecke et al. to illustrate this particular concept comprises company 
characteristics which are examples of opportunity to commit the crime. Therefore, 
Loebbecke et a!. 's attitudes can be included under their conditions component. The 
Loebbecke et al. model is thus shown to comprise two components for it fails to 
consider rationalisations. 
Using Loebbecke et al.'s Table 9, the red flags in the present study were classified 
into conditions, motives and attitudes (see Tables 33 and 34 below). It was necessary 
to distinguish between defalcations and management fraud in order to test the 
Locbbeckc ct al. fraud risk assessment model (see Tables 35·36 below). 
There were 87 material irregularity cases discussed by the respondents in Part II of 
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the survey. Using the definition of management fraud and defalcation in Loebbcckc 
ct a\., it was found that 73 (84%) of them involved management that manipulated the 
accounts in order to cover up another deception such as theft of cash, theft of 
equipment etc. and that a minority 14 (16%) involved personnel below management 
committing theft of cash or kickbacks (i.e., defalcations). 
Table 33: Comprehensive Listing of Indicators (Red Flags) Classified by 
Assessment Component for the Management Fraud Cases (N=73) 
Compoueut Applicable Releva11t Alerted 
Primarv Conditions 
Dominated decisions 82 101 10 
Ma'or transactions 8 18 4 
Related 
'" 
7 10 3 
Weak internal and EDP controls 67 95 31 
Difficult to audit transactions 48 59 16 
Nature of business susceptible to 25 20 7 
misaooronriation 
Weak internal audit 26 20 9 
Hardware and software failures 
-
-
-
Primarv Motivations 
Industrv Decline 25 23 14 
Emohasis on eamin!!s nroiections 13 11 1 
Inadeouatc refits 9 6 0 
Primorv Attitude 
Dishonest mana cmcnt 47 85 17 
Em hasis on camin s ro'ections * 13 11 1 
Personalitv anomalies 4 14 2 
Lies or evasiveness 35 48 10 
Failure to correct internal control 15 15 5 
weaknes 
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ToL1l Prima Indicators fcxcludin' * 411 525 149 
Secondar Conditions 
Hi h manarremcnt turnover 2 5 2 
Deccntraliscd omanisation 15 22 8 
Assets subiect to misaoorooriation 6 2 I 
Inexoerienced manauement 13 19 6 
Conflict of interest 5 8 3 
Raoid industrv change 7 9 3 
Understaffed accounting dcoartment 7 6 2 
Ineffective/ absent external regulation 6 8 2 
Non-existent/ineffective code of 14 13 3 
contact 
Seconda Motivation 
Ranid indu~trv chanuc "' 7 9 3 
Sensitive ooeratinl! results 10 8 5 
Adverse ]ega[ circumstances 4 4 2 
Secondarv Attitude 
Weak internal and EDP controls* 67 95 31 
Poor renutation 6 8 3 
Undue oressure on auditor - I I 
Disn:soectful at!itude - 2 
-
Conflict of interest "' 5 8 3 
Minimal plmming for installation of 2 I I 
hardware and software 
Inadequate detection procedures for I I -
svstem viruses 
Total Secondary indicators 98 117 42 
(excluding+) 
Total Pri~~ry and Secondary 509 642 191 
indicators cxcludin *\ 
•Indicators are present in preceding category. According to Locbbccke (personal 
communication), it is possible for an indicator to be in more than one category. For 
example, conflict of interest creates the situation conducive to committing fraud and 
it also indicates an attitude on the part of person entering into the conflict. 
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Data analysis also examined whether the indicators were applicable, relevant or 
alerted the auditor at the planning stage11 in order to dctcnninc the auditor's 
sensitivity to red flags, as was done by Loebbccke et al. 
Table 34: Comprehensiw Listing of Indicators (Red Flags) Classified by 
Assessment Component for the Defalcation Cases (N=\4) 
Component Applicable Relevallt Alerted 
Primar Conditions 
Domina! d Decisions 4 3 2 
Maier Transactions 
- I 
-
Related Partv - - -
Weak internal and EDP controls 14 19 3 
Difficult to audit transactions 2 3 I 
Nature of business susceptible to 4 4 I 
misa ro riation 
Weak internal audit 3 2 I 
Hardwa and software failures 
- -
-
Primal Motivations 
Indus! Decline 2 2 
-
Em basis on eaminrrs ro'cctions 0 
- -
Inade ua e nrofits I 
- -
Prima Attitude 
Dishonest mana emcnt 4 8 
-
Emphasis on eaminrrs ro·ections* 0 
- -
Persona!ihl anomalies 
- -
-
Lies or ovasivcness 3 4 
-
Failure to correct internal control 2 2 -
weakness 
Total Prima Indicators rcxcludin ., 39 48 7 
II As slated ctl!licr, plllllning is nssumcd to be o continuous proross. 
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Sr!condar Conditions 
Hi11h mana<>ement turnover 
- - -
Decentralised or<>anisation 3 2 I 
Assets subiect to misannronriation 
-
2 I 
Inexnerienccd mana"emcnt 4 5 
-
Conflict of interest - - -
Ranl.d industrv chan11e 
- - -
-.Uf-;~erstaffed accountin!! denanment 4 2 
-
ln~ffective/ absent external re!!ulation - 2 
-
Non-existent/ineffective code of I I -
contact 
Secondarv Motivation 
Ranid industrv chanoe * 
- - -
Sensitive oneratinP results 
-
- -
Adverse ]ega] circumstances 
- I -
Secondarv Allitude 
Weak internal and EDP controls * 14 19 3 
Poor renutation I I I 
Undue nressure on auditor 
- - I 
Disresnectful attitude 
- - -
Conflict of interest* 
-
4 -
Minimal planning for installation of -
- -
hardware and software 
Inadequate detection procedures for 
-
-
-
svstem viruses ,, 
~otal Seco~~ary indicators JJ 20 4 
excludin * 
" 
Total Pri~;;' and Sec,.~ndary 52 61 II 
indicators excludino * 
•Indicators are present m precedmg category, 
It is evident from Tables 33 and 34 that auditors were somewhat insensitive to the 
red flags when distinguishing between management and defalcation cases. For the 
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management fraud cases there were 642 traud indicators which were relevant and 
509 which were applicable to the 73 mana,gement fra•Jd cases but only 191 (29.8%) 
and 37.5% respectively alerted the auditors at the planning stage. Similarly, for the 
defalcation cases there were 68 ·~levant and 52 applicable fraud indicators but only 
17% and 21.1% respectively alerted the auditors at the planning stage. If auditors are 
not paying due attention to these indicators at the planning stage where the risk 
assessment is determined, it is a cause for concern. In support.,cf these findings, 
Loebbecke et a!., too, found that their model performed significantly poorer for 
defalcations than for management fraud (p.25). 
Tables 35 and 36 provide an analysis of Loebbccke et al.'s assessment model for 
both management fraud and defalcation cases respectively and its applicability in the 
87 material irregularity cases reported by the auditors in the survey. The second and 
third columns indicate the number and percentage of cases of material irregularity 
where the indicator was applicable to the engagement12 • The fourth column shows 
the number of these cases where the indicator was relevant to the irregularity. The 
fifth column shows the percent of cases where pursuing that particular indicator 
would not have directed the auditor to the fraud (i.e., Type I error%). The sixth 
column gives the number of cases where the indicator was applicable, relevant, and 
also alerted the auditor during planning. The final column indicates the percent of 
12 No% is provided for the columns Applicublc and Rdcvnnl, and Applicoblc Rclcvnnl nnd Alcr1cd so thn! tho 
I 
272 
cases where the indicator was applicable and relevant, but would have been missed 
by the auditor during the planning because it did not alert him/her (i.e., Type II 
error%). 
Table 35: Analysis of Applicability, Relevance and WhctiJcr the Auditors Were Alerted by 
the Indicators for the 73 Management Frauds Described by Them 
Primary AP % AP Type AP, Type 
Indicators & I REL, II 
REL Error & Error 
% AL % 
Conditions 
Dominated 82 llzil 82 0.0 30 63.0 
decisions 
Maior transactions 8 10.9 8 0.0 4 50.0 
Related 7 9.6 7 0.0 3 57.1 
Weak internal and 67 91.8 67 o.o 4 94.0 
EDP Controls 
Difficult to audit 48 65.8 48 0.0 16 66.6 
transactions 
Nature of business 25 34.2 20 20.0 7 6.0 
vulnerable to 
misaoorooriation 
Weak internal audit 26 35.6 20 23.0 9 55 
Hardware and 0 0 0 0 0 0 
software failures 
Total 26l . .., 252 4.2 :u J.l~O 
Motivation 
Industrv decline 25 34.2 23 8.0 14 39.1 
Emphasis on 13 17.8 II 15.4 I 90.9 
earnings 
nroicctions 
fnadeauate nrafits 9 12.3 6 33.3 0 10.0 
figures for Type I I!Ild Type II error resp<ll:!ivoly OWl be expressed as n %, as done by locblx:cko el nl. (1989). 
l3The roason !here is more lhllll lOO% in some condilions is because cneb condition includes more lhnn one red 
flog nnd in some cases more Lhnn one red flog per case was npplicnblc. 
II 
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Total 4'l 2-1.4 40 14.9 .15 62.5 
Atlitude 
Dishonest 47 64.4 47 0 17 63.8 
mammement 
Emphasis on 13 17.8 11 15.3 1 90.9 
earnings 
ro"ections"' 
Personality 4 5,5 4 0 2 50.0 
anomalies 
Lies or evasiveness 35 47.9 35 0 10 71.4 
Failure to correct 15 20.5 15 0 5 66.6 
internal control 
weakness 
Total J.1A 3.1..2 J.l.2 LJ! :!5 li&.& 
Total Primary • .l.J. 
""" 
:Jlll ... J2l 6lU 
Indicators 
(excluding"') 
Secondary 
Indicators 
Conditions 
High management 2 2.7 2 0 2 0 
turnover 
Decentralised 15 20.5 15 0 8 46.6 
orl!anisation 
Assets subject to 6 8.2 2 66.6 1 50.0 
mis-
' 
ro riation 
Inexperienced 13 17.8 13 0 6 53.8 
manall:ement 
Conflict of interest 5 6.8 5 0 3 40.0 
Rapid industry 7 9.6 7 0 3 57.1 
chanl!e 
Understaffed 7 9.6 6 14.2 2 66.6 
accounting 
de artment 
Ineffective/absent 6 8.2 6 0 i• ··.\ 2 66.6 
external rcll:ulation 
. 
__ 274 
Non- 14 19.1 13 7.1 3 76.9 
existcntlinclTcctivc 
code of cont11ct .. 
Total 75 .lJA 69 8.0 30 56.5 
Motivation 
Rapid industry 7 9.6 7 0 3 .57.1 
change* 
Sensitive operating 10 13.7 8 20.0 5 37.5 
results 
Adverse legal 4 5.5 4 0 2 50.0 
circumstances 
Total ll 9.6 ,. ,_, lO 41.4 
Attitude . 
Weak internal and 67 91.8 67 0.0 4 94.0 
EDP controls * 
Poor rcoutation 6 8.2 6 0 3 50.0 
undue pressure on 0 0 0 0 0 0 
auditor 
Disrespectful 0 0 0 0 0 0 
attitude 
Conflict of interest 5 6.8 5 0 3 40.0 
Minimal planning 2 2.7 I 50.0 I 0 
for insta!lation of 
hardware and 
software 
Inadequate I 1.4 I 0 0 0 
detection 
procedures for 
svstem viruses 
Total 8.l J.S.8 80 1.2 u 116.3 
Total Secondary 9.8 8.4 8ll 9.2 4! ru 
Indicators 
fexcludin1! lr) 
Total Primary ill!l 22.i 482 5.3 1M 6.5.51 
and Secondary 
Indicators 
(excludinl!: *) 
*IndiCators are present m precedmg category 
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Table 36: Analysis of Applicability, Relevance and Whether the Auditors Were 
Alerted by the Indicators for the 14 Defalcations Described by Them 
Primary Indicators AP % AP& Type AP, Type 
REL I REL, II 
Error & AL Error 
% % 
Conditions 
Dominated decisions 4 28.6 3 25 2 33.3 
Major transactions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Related party 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weak internal and EDP 14 100 14 0 3 78.5 
Controls 
Difficult to audit transactions 2 14.3 2 0 0 100 
Nature of business vulnerable 4 28.6 4 0 I 75.0 
to misappropriation 
Weak internal audit 3 21.4 2 33.3 I 50.0 
Hardware and software 0 0 0 0 0 0 
failures 
Total l1 ill 25 H z 7,2.Q 
Motivation 
Industry decline 2 14.3 2 0 0 100 
Emphasis on earnings 0 0 0 0 0 0 
projections 
Inadequate profits I 7.1 0 100 0 0 
Total l !L2 2 n~ Q l9.Q 
Attitude 
Dishonest management 4 28.6 4 0 0 100 
Emphasis on earnings 2 \4.3 0 100 0 0 
projections • 
Personality anomalies 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lies or evasiveness 3 21.4 3 0 0 100 
Failure to correct internal 2 14.3 2 0 0 100 
control weakness 
Total I\ .l.P 9 _1_8,2 0 IO_Q 
Total Primary Indicators 41 J.~,~ 3.(! g._~ 7 ?0 •. ~ 
(excluding •) 
276 
·. 
Secontlar lml/calllrs 
Co11dilion.· 
Hi h man •ement turnover 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Decentralised or •anisation 3 21.4 2 33.3 I 50.0 
Assets subject to 0 0 0 0 0 0 
misa ro riation 
lnexoerienced manac:ement 4 28.6 4 0 0 100 
Conflict of interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Raoid industrY change 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Understaffed accounting 4 28.5 2 so 0 100 
d_epartment 
Ine!Tective/absent external 0 0 0 0 0 0 
re ulation 
Non-existent/ineffective code I 7.1 I 0 0 100 
of conduct 
Total 12 9.5 9 25 1 88.8 
Motivation 
Raoid industry change " 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sensitive era tin results 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Adverse ]ega] circumstances 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Attitude 
Weak internal and EDP 14 100 14 0 3 78.6 
controls* 
Poor re utation I 7.1 I 0 I 0 
Undue rcssure on auditor 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Disresoectful attitude 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Conflict of interest • 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimal planning for 0 0 0 0 0 0 
installation of hardware and 
software 
Inadequate detection 0 0 0 0 0 0 
_procedure fors stem viruses 
Total L'i .1.5.3 l5 0 4 7J.3 
Total Secondary Indicators jJ 5.8 10 23.1 2 80.0 
fexclndin * 
Total Primary and ~· JJ.9 46 14.8 ' 80.4 Secondary Indicators 
(cxcludinl! *) 
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" Indicators arc present in preceding cutcgory 
Several observations can be made from Tables 35 and 36. As far as the management 
fmud cases arc concerned, two primary indicators that were applicable to the 
engagement for I J:l%14 and 92% of the cases were dominated decisions ami weak 
internal and EDP controls respectively (Locbbccke ct al's. equivalent ligures arc 75% 
and 90% respectively). Also Tables 35 and 36 reveals that Locbbeckc et al.'s model 
performs better for management fraud than for defalcation cases, thus supporting 
t.IJ.eir findings. Table 37 shows the utility of both primary and secondary indicators in 
alerting auditors to the existence of management fraud in both surveys. 
Table 37: 
Applicable 
Relevant 
Alerted 
Significance of Primary and Secondary Fraud Indicators in Alerting 
Auditors to the Existence of Management Fraud(%). 
Primary Primnry Sctondnry Sccond~ry 
(prCiCOI (Loebbotke (present (Lotbbecke et al.) 
study) d nt.) study) 
% % % % 
37 40 8 24 
95 90 90 75 
31 92 46 94 
Primary fraud indicators were apparent to the engagement and relevant to the 
irregul.arit:( to 11 similar degree as in Loebbecke eta\. Yet, nt the planning stage, the 
auditors in the present study were approximately three times less likely to be alerted 
I 
27R 
to the existence of management fruud by primary indicator~; however, they were 
more likely to be so alerted by secondary factors but still half as likely as the auditors 
in the Locbbcckc ct ul. study. 
In the present study it was found that most of the indicators (both primary and 
secondary) alerted the auditors to management fraud at least 34% of the time while 
weak internal and EDP controls did so only 6% of the time. It should be noted in this 
context that indicators pointing to weak internal controls alerted auditors more to the 
possible existence of management fraud (as shown in Table 31) than when combined 
with weak EDP controls. In Loebbecke et al.'s (1989:20-23) study "most of the 
indicators were apparent to the auditors during the planning at least 90% of the 
time", while three secondary indicators, namely "conflict of interest, incentive 
compensation and management's job threatened were lesser exceptions". 
Another significant difference between the two studies concerns Type I and Type II 
errors (see Table 38). 
1 ~ Sec ibid foomolc 13. 
I 
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Table 38: Type I and Type II Error in the Two Surveys 
l'n.ltnt •tudy l'rcnnt •tudy Lntbbecke Lotbbecke 
(mAnu~cmcnt (dcfalrotlD!Ii) ol ••• ct al. 
frond) (mana~em<nl {ddalcatlnns) 
fraud) 
% • • .. 
Type I error 5.3 14.8 16.9 23.2 
Type II error 65.9 80.4 7.8 17.1 
Bearing in mind that Type II error is the converse of Type I error, what this 
comparison shows is that, in management fraud cases, if the auditors in the present 
study followed a particular fraud indicator they would not have identified the 
management fraud in 5.3% of the cases (Type I error), while in 65.9% of the cases 
where the indicator was applicable and relevant they would have missed it during the 
planning stage because it did not alert them (Type II error), i.e., they would not have 
missed it in 34.1 %. In defalcation cases, if the auditors in the present study foilowed 
a particular fraud indicator, they would not have identified the defalcation in 14.8% 
while in 80.4% of th': cases where the indicator was applicable and relevant they 
would have missed it because it did not alert them (Type I! error), i.e., they would 
not have missed it in 19.6% of the defalcation cases. Thus, where the indicator was 
both applicable and relevant the Australian auditors would have identified it in 
34. I% of management frauds and 19.6% of defalcations at the planning stage. 
The Australian auditors were 3.18 times Jess likely than those in Loebbeckc ct al. 
(1989) to have pursued a particular red flag that would not have directed them to the 
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management fraud (Type I error). This is attributable to auditors in the present study 
being 8.4 times Jess sensitive at the planning stage to fraud indicators that were 
applicable to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity (Type II error). 
Similarly, in the de!Ulcation cases the auditors in the present study were 4.7 times 
less likely to have been alerted by a red flag at the planning stage that was applicable 
to the engagement and relevant to the irregularity (Type l! error). One conclusion 
that can be drawn from the comparison figures in Table 38 is that Loebbecke et al.'s 
auditors were characterised by a "play-it-safe" approach in their audit work in 
assessing the risk of management fraud or a defalcation being present. One possible 
explanation for the findings is that Australian auditors do not take the same approach 
to red flags as U.S. auditors. The Australian auditors surveyed appear to exercise 
significantly less vigilance at the planning stage as far as fraud indicators arc 
concerned in both management fraud and defalcation cases. Such a difference could 
well be due to the difference in audit experiencl;! of the auditors in the two studies 
and the different litigation environments1l. 
A basic premise of the Loebbecke et al. (1989) fraud-risk assessment model is that 
aU three components must be present for an irregularity to occur. More specifically, 
they reported that the three components (conditions, motives, and attitudes) were 
applicable and relevant in 86% of the management fraud cases and 78% were 
IS The participants in Loebbcokc et al. (1989) h•d twice as much audit experience and comprised p~r1ncrs only. 
The present study included 39% in manager positions and 28% partners. The remaining one· third were seniors 
(13%), supervisors (12%) and Msistant managers (8%) ""d C811 be snid to ho•c hnd less nudit experience thnn 
those surveyed by Locbbcckc ct nl. 
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applicable, relevant and alerted. This prediction, however, has not been borne out in 
the present' study. Tables 39 and 40 show that in only 22% of the management fraud 
cases were all three components applicable and relevant and in only 8% of the ca~cs 
were all three components applicable, relevant, and alerted the auditor. 
~'j 
Table39: Analysis of Indicators of73 Management Fraud Cases by Assessment Model Components Based on the Survey 
AI! three components pres~nt: 22 l6 72 32 35 8 6 
" 
12 13 
Average No. ofindit:ators 4.5 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.0 2.2 
Two t:omponents present: 25 115 12 II 8 36 ; 16 
Average No. of indicators 4.6 0.48 !.68 0.6 2.0 
One component present: 15 II 27 0 4 18 13 17 3 4 
Average No. of indicators 0 0.36 1.3 0.2 0.~ 
No component present: 29 21 63 
Total all m..,agement fraud cases: 73 214 81 73 6S 33 
Average No. of indicators 2.9 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.5 
Table40: Analysis of Indicators of 14 Defalcation Cases by Assessment Model Components Based on the Survey 
~ . ' ·I 
' 
0 
.g ~ u u 
'0 ~ ~ 
·g 
" 
0 0 0 0 
* 
z u 
' 
All three components present: 0 0 
Average No. of indicators 
Two components present: 
" 
2 3 0 5 
Average No. of indicators 1.5 0 2.5 
One component present: 57 8 14 0 14 2 4 
Average No. of indicators 1.75 0 0.13 2 
No component present: 29 4 86 
Total all defalcation cases: 14 17 0 6 
Average No. of indicators 1.2 0 0.42 0.3 
" 
" ' \ 
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As seen in Tables 39 and 40, there arc a riumbcr of ca~cs where conditions were not 
both applicable and relevant in Panel A and not both applicable, relevant and alerted 
in Panel 13. In other words, if a condition was applicable but not relevant or vice 
versa the case would have appeared in the no-component-present category. In 
comparing Tables 39 and 40 with Locbbccke et al.'s Table II it is evident that there 
are significant differences 
Out of the 73 management fraud cases only 16 (22%), contained indicators in all 3 
components of the assessment model. Of those ca~es in Panel B of the management 
fraud cases where the indicator also alerted the auditor, the percentage is 8% (in the 
Major Fraud Group cases it was 36% (see Chapter 5)). Loebbecke et al.'s figures 
were 66 (86%) and 78% respectively. 
From Table 39 Panel A it can be seen that the average number of indicators for the 
management fraud cases was 2.9, .6 and 1.1 for conditions, motives and attitudes 
respectively, where only applicable and relevant were considered. Where alerted is 
also considered, the number of indicators is .9, .3 and .5 from Panel B. These are 
very different to what Loebbecke eta!. found and which were 3.6, 2.9 and 2.9 for 
Panel A and 3.4, 2.6 and 2.6 for Panel B. The major reason for the difference is 
because Australian auditors noted that the indicators were relevant to the irregularity 
but were not applicable in the engagement, or did not alert them, As already stilted, 
the difference found may well be due to the fact that the Australian auditors did not 
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have us mw:h experience in detecting irregularities as their U.S. counterpurts. 
It is nevertheless evident, however, that, as also shown in Tables 35 and 36, on the 
basis of Tables 39 and 40 Loebbecke ct al.'s fraud-risk assessment model perfonns 
weaker in defalcations than management fraud. 
5.0 SURVEY PART II: CORRELATES OF FRAUD PRONENESS 
In order to expand the discussion in Section.4 above by utilising the data from Part II 
of the survey, attention will next focus on: (I) identifying fraud-prone industries, 
audit areas, and audit procedures indicating the presence of material irregularities; 
(2) profiling the offenders and to compare the picture that emerges with that yielded 
by the MFG study and reported in Chapter 5; and (3) expanding the Loebbecke 
model by revising the eclectic fraud detection model developed in Chapter 4 so as to 
incorporate the findings from the survey of auditors and to examine its applicability. 
To do this, it is imperative that one studies both the irregularity and the offender. 
Table 41 indica!es that in the majority of cases the material irregularity' involved 
";:, 
theft of cash. 
:·J 
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Tnblc4l: How the Irregularity wus Committed 
Type or Irregularity N % 
Thcfi of cash 46 52.9 
Window dressing 15 17.3 
Errors in financial statement 6 6.9 
Kickbacks 4 4.6 
Stock theft 4 4.6 
• 
Payroll fraud 4 4.6 
Kiting 3 3.5 
Conflict of interest I 1.1 
Breach of Parliamentary Rule I 1.1 
Insurance Fraud I 1.1 
Forging cheques I 1.1 
Tax a'Joidance I 1.1 
Total 87 100% 
Loebbecke et al. (1989:11) found that management fraud "typica!ly is committed by 
top management (including directors) and deifalcations are typically committed by 
persons at all levels in the organisation, although not directors to any great extent." 
Loebbecke et al, also indicated that in "many" instances there was collusion. 
,. 
' 
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Tuhlc 42: Position Held by the Offender 
Posilion Held 
Upper management 
Others below management 
Directors 
Other management in collusion with others 
Chief accountant 
Directors in collusion with others 
Top management 
Chief financial officer 
Chief executive officer 
Shareholders 
Total ' 
' 
"" 
,. (\ 
\") --,.; 
" 
<'-
" 
/'.;' % 
21 24.1 
13 14.9 I 
12 13.8 
13 14.9 
7 8.0 
6 
., 
6.9\ 
6 6.9 
.. 
5 5.7 
II 
2 2.4 
2 2.4 
87 100% 
'•) 
,,, .. 
• 
Table43: Who was Involved by Type oflrregularity 
Directors 
Shareholders 
Upper Management 
Others Top Management 
Others Below Management 
CEO 
CFO 
Chief Accountant 
Directors in Collusion 
wi!hO!he!" 
Other Management in Collusion 
with Others 
Total N 
Total% 
' 
4 6 
4.6 6.9 1.1 
• 
2 
9 
' 
10 
3 
2 
4 
3 
46 
52.9 
-~j 
3 1 12 !3.8 
2 I'-' 
3 2 2 21 1 2-1.1 
6 1 6.9 
2 13 1 l-!.9 
2 I " 
; ! 5.7 
2 7 s.o 
6 69 
6 l3 lH 
4 15 3 I 
' 
4.6 1.1 1.1 17.3 1.1 3.5 4.6 1.1 100 
Cross·tabulnting the type of fraud committed ami the company staff n:sponsiblc for it 
(see Table 43), reveals that of the management fraud committed by directors, 66% 
involved theft of cash and the rest window dressing. These results support the 
Loebbecke ct al. finding. On the other hand, while upper management commiucd 
43% theft of cash, the remainder included mainly window dressing, payroll fraud, 
stock theft, and kiting. Others below management also concentrated on theft of cash 
(77%) and kickbacks (15%). Directors were mainly involved in theft of cash (62%) 
and window dressing (25%). Finally, where management colluded with other staff or 
a third party, window dressing (46%) predominated. 
Cross-tabulating the type of fraud and the nmnber of accomplices, (see Table 44) it 
was found that theft of cash was usually committed alone (58%) or in collusion with 
one to two more people (35%). Whereas for window dressing, an equal percentage 
was committed alone (27%) or with one more person (27%). Tax avoidance, forging 
cheques, breaching parliamentary regulations and kiting were frauds committed 
without an accomplice. These findings should be considered with the knowledge that 
in 52% of irregularities detected the perpetrator acted alone, 21% with one 
accomplice, 13% with two, and 15% with three or more accomplices. For 
comparison purposes, in the MFG study it was found that the great majority (70%) 
of the offenders had no accomplices. 
Ill 
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Table 44: Number of Accomplices by Type of irregularity 
N or Accomplices " 
Type of Irregularity 0 I 2 3 4 Total % 
N 
Payroll fraud 2 I I 
' 
5.2 
Error in limmdal statement 2 I I 4 5.2 
Ta'< avoidance I I 1.3 
Theft of cash 25 8 7 I 
' 
43 55.8 
Kickbacks 2 I I 
' 
5.2 
Forging che 
"' 
I I 1.3 
Insurance fraud I I 1.3 
Window dressing 
' ' 
2 I 2 13 16.8 
Breach of parliamentary I I 1.3 
rules 
Kiting I I 1.3 
Stock theft 3 I 
' 
5.2 
Total N 40 16 10 2 9 77 
% 5!.9 20.8 12.9 
"" 
11.8 100 
Note; The totals for certain types of irregularities do not match the corresponding figures in Tables 41 and 43 
because when crosstabuloting with number of accomplices !here wen: mi,ing values, i.e., a few auditors 
responded to one but not to the other question. Ten of the 87 respondents provided no Information on whether 
there were n~ompliccs. 
Next, attention is turned to the profiling issue in order to test the applicability of the 
eclectic freud detection model of which the ROP model is an integral prut 
,., 
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Table 45: A Statistical Prolilc of Perpetrators Encountered by Auditors 
N % 
Gender: 
Male 79 90.8 
Female 8 9.2 
87 100% 
Age Group: 
25-35 years of age 13 !4.9 
36-45 53 60.9 
.. 
46-50 16 18.4 
50+ 5 5.8 
87 100% 
Education Standard: 
HighSchool 33 37.9 
Tertiary 25 28.7 
Professional 28 32.2 
Other I 1.2 
87 100% 
Marital Status: 
Married 78 89.7 
Single 5 5.7 
Divorced 3 3.4 
Separated I 1.2 
87 100% 
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As would b~ predicted using the eclectic fraud detection model, Table 45 shows that 
most perpetrators encountered by the n:spondcnts were males aged 36-45, married, 
and with post high school education. While the pir.ture of the perpetrators painted by 
the auditors surveyed is no different from that which emerged in the MFG study, the 
MFG offenders included more members of professional groups such as lawyers. This 
difference is attributable to the different ways by which the MFG comes to 
investigate a case of fraud. Interestingly, the type of person described by the auditors 
as having committed material irregularities is no different from the average common 
criminal (Farrington, 1993). 
Table 46: Sources of Financial Pressure on the Perpetrators 
Motives N % 
Lifestyle 35 40.2 
Gambling 12 13.8 
Personal financi;:! problems II 12.6 
Greed 9 10.3 
Drugs and alcohol I 1.2 
Combination of the above 19 21.9 
87 100% 
Table 46 provides further evidence for the ROP and the eclectic fraud detection 
model proposed. The results shown suppon the findings reported in Chapter 5, i.e., 
that financial pressure due to one cause or another underpins fraud offences by 
people in positions of financial trust within companies. The type of person depicted 
in Table 46, characterised by a hedonistic and erratic lifestyle that renders them 
I 
293 
prone to otlCnding, is in accordance with what one would have predicted un the ba~is 
of either Freud's psychoanalytic theory (in terms of a weak superego) or Eysenck's 
theory of crime and delinquency (in terms of antisocial personality disorder 
attributes) discussed in Chapter 2 and contained in the ROP model. 
Table 47: Auditors' Description of the Perpetrator's Characteristics 
Cilaractcristics N % 
Authoritarian " 34 39.1 
Extrovert 14 16.1 
Loner !0 11.5 
Normal 8 9.2 
Outgoing 7 8.1 
Unknown "4 4.6 
Ambitious 4 4.6 
Complainer 3 3.4 
Introvert 3 3.4 
87 100% 
Regarding the auditors' perceptions of the perpetrators' personality traits16, Table 47 
shows that authoritarianism is the most frequently reported type of personality. It is 
not, however, clear how this trait IS involved in the aetiology of fraud, Furthermore, 
it is not being claimed here that the auditors' perceptions of the perpetrators' 
authoritarianism would be borne out if n psychologist administered them a proper 
personality test. The auditors' descriptions of the perpetrators of the irregularitles 
need to be treated with caution because of their subjectivity and in view of the fact 
that these assessments were made after the fraud was identified. It would have been 
16 Such infQmwtion wnsnoL lncludod in the prosocutlon briefs surveyed in tho MFG study. 
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interesting to know if such assessments had been made at the planning stage of the 
audit whether they would have alerted the auditor. It would be safe, however, to 
sumtisc that even if an auditor assumed that someone was an authoritarian person it 
would not alert him/her at the planning stage to carry out additional audit procedures. 
This assumption is made based on the red flag findings reported above. 
The next issue is the industry in which the fraud was committed. Table 48 shows that 
more than half (56%) of the irregularities were committed against a public company 
and that most of them occurred in the manufacturing industry. Loebbecke et al. 
found "significantly more instances of management fraud in Manufacturing, 
Transportation, High Technology and Communication Companies and fewer in 
Educatibn and other institutions, which is consistent with their likely ownership 
character" (p.l 0). The fmding that Manufacturing is proned to management fraud is 
consistent with the results of the KPMG surveys. 
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Table 48: Industry and Status of the Company Where the -Material Irregularity 
was Committed 
Type of company N % 
Public comp;my 49 56 
Private comoanv 38 44 
87 100% 
lndust dcsi nation N % 
No industry designation 7 8.0 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 6 6.9 
Mining 3 3.5 
Manufacturing 22 25.2 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 3 3.5 
Construction 7 8.0 
Wholesale Trade 8 9.2 
Retail Trade 2 2.3 
Accommodation, Cafes, and Restaurants 3 3.5 
Transport and Storage 2 2.3 
Communication Services 2 2.3 
Finance and Insurance 8 C) 9.2 
Government Administration and Defence 3 3.5 
Health and Community Services 7 8.0 
Cultural and Recreation Services 2 2.3 
Personal and Other Services 2 2.3 
87 100% 
Table 49: Industry Category by Type ofirregularity Committed 
Payro!l Fraud 
Error in Financial 
Statement 
Tax avoidance 
Theft of cash 
Kickbacks 
Forging cheques 
Insurance fraud 
Window dressing 
Breach of 
Parliamentary Regulations 
Kiting 
Stock theft 
Conflict of interest 
TotalN 
Total% 
2 
5 
7 
8.0 
J 
2 
2 
2 2 9 5 5 
2 6 
6 3 22 3 7 8 
6.9 3.5 25.2 3.5 8.0 9.2 
2 2 5 
' 
2 3 2 2 s 
2.3 3.5 2.3 2.3 9.~ 
3 
3 7 I ' 
3.5 s.o 1 ~-3 
I ~-
II
H o.-= "-~ 
I ' I " I 6 I 6, 
l I u 
46 1 sz.9 
4 1 4.6 
I ' I u 
1 l 1.1 
I I 4 ! .:.o 
1 i 1 I 1.1 
I ~.3 I wo 
..... 
I 
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Crosstahulating the type of fraud and the industry designation of the comp~ny 
involved (see Table 49) it wus found that the types of fraud occurring in 
manufacturing were mainly: theft of Cll.'lh {40%), window dressing (27%), errors in 
financial statements (9%), payroll fraud (9%), whereas in finance and insurance it 
was theft of cash (63%), window dressing (25%), insurance fraud (I 2%). Regarding 
the difference between the types of frauds occurring in a public as opposed to a 
private company, it was found that 58% of cash theft occurred in public companies as 
opposed to 42% in private companies. Also, private companies had a higher 
incidence of payroll fraud (75%) whereas forging of cheques, conflict of interest, 
insurance fraud, and purchase of equipment for self only occurred in private 
companies. 
An interesting question is whether a relationship exists between the type of 
irregularity and the person detecting it. 
Table 50: Who Detected the Irregularity 
N % 
Client 29 33.3 
Auditor: 
Manager 17 19.5 
Senior 17 19.5 
Super1isor 10 11.5 
Partner 7 8.! . 
Assistant 4 4.6 ,, 
Fraud Auditor 2 2.3 
Whistleblowcr/ASC/ATO I 1.2 
87 100% 
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To a large extent, the finding in the present study (see Table 50) that auditors were 
the ones who detected most of the irregularities reported on reflects the fact that 
auditors were asked to answer questions about irregul!lritics they themselves had 
encountered. Crosstabulating the type of fraud and the person detecting 'the fraud, it 
was found that: the two authorities (ASC and ATO) identified theft of cash and stock 
but, as stated earlier, the client was the most successful in identifying theft of cash 
and kickbacks; the partner and manager were more successful in identifying theft of 
cash and, finally, seniors appeared to identify more window dressing than partners 
and managers11 • 
Another aspect is the audit area affected by the irregularity, which is reported in. 
TableClu. 
17 Bcrn~~tdl (1994a) found mll!lpgcrs more likely to detect fraud nnd he c~plllined it by saying that mnnllgcrs 
have higher mom! development ond lll'C nottechnlcnlly focused like the seniors. Davidson {I 994) disagr=ed with 
thb explilllalion, m~lntaining thnt mMogers nrc concerned with fcc constraints which have on impact an moral 
development. However, more research is required to resolve the Issue whether mnnngcrsarc indeed chnrnetcrised 
by a higher s\llge of morn] &:vc lopmcnL 
18 The audit nrca dassifh:ation depicted in Table 48 is different from that used in Loobbccke ct nl. This is because it 
was considered nppropriale to usc Schedule 5 clnssificntlon applicable in Australia nnd well known to the 
partlclpllllts. As they nlso found, there were multiple audit areas involved. However, in the present study Provisions 
nnd Cash were the main areas involved. 
I 
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Tnble51: i' Audit Area Affcdted 
Audit Area ~· 
__tL ~ (( ,, 
c~h 35 40.2 
Provisions 7,5 28.7 
Inventories J 3.5 
Combination of2-3 accounts 24 27.6 
87 100% 
Since theft of cash is the most popular type of fraud being committed, it follows that 
cash and provisions were mainly affected. As far as window dressing is concerned, 
provisions was the account mainly affected. Therefore, auditors need to pay 
,--, 
additional attention to these two audit areas because there is a higher audit (JSk. 
,, 
Pa)To!l Fraud 
Error in Financial 
Statement 
Tax avoidance 
Theft of cash 
Kickbacks 
Forging cheques 
Insurance fraud 
Window dressing 
Breach of 
parliamentary Rules 
Table 52: Type oflrregularity by the Procedure Indicating the Irregularity 
-;; ) 
<~.·~ 
~ 
-- ,_ 
2 4 4.6 
3 6 6.9 
1.1 
19 4 6 9 5 2 46 52.9 
3 4 4.6 
Ll 
l ?I Ll 
2 2 2 5 2 15}) 11.3 
'· 
Ll 
Conflictofinterest I I l.i 
Kiting I I I 3 3.5 
Stock theft I I I I 4 • -16 ~~~~--~~-7-r~+-~~-+~~~~~·~~ Total N 29 8 10 6 18 9 7 87 
Total% 33.3 9.2 I !.5 6.9 20.7 10.4 8.0 . 100 
-
= 
JOt 
Regarding which audit procedure indicated the irregularity, Tables 52 and 53 reveal 
.~at 33% of the irregularities were not discovered by the auditors. Whereas in 
Loebbeeke et al. the corresponding figure was a low 7.4%. Substantive tests were 
the most effective type of audit procedure to reveal the irregularity (Loebbeckc ct 
al.'s equivalent percentage is 56.5%), which is consistent with Loebbecke et al. 
Table 53: The Audit Procedure that Detected a Particular Material Irregularity 
Audit Procedure N % 
Not discovered by the auditor 29 33.3 
Substantive test of details 18 20.7 
Study of internal controls 10 11.5 
No procedure designation 9 10.4 
Preliminary analytical procedures 8 9.2 
Combination of audit procedures 7 8.0 
Analytical test of specific account 6 6.9 
87 IOn% 
Crosstabulating the audit procedure indicating the irregularity by the type of fraud 
involved (see Table 51), it was found that for the theft of cash 42% were not detected 
by the auditor; the remainder were detected by means of substantive tests of details 
(20%), study of internal control (13%), preliminary analytical procedures (8%) and a ·· 
combination of procedures for the rest. Substantive audit procedures were useful in 
identifying window dressing. Errors in financial statements, tax avoidance, insurance 
frauds and kiting were discovered by the auditor alone, whereas kickbacks and theft 
of cash were primarily not discovered by the auditor. These lindings are in line with 
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Locbbeckc ctlll.'s. 
The next issue inquired by the survey is the length of time of the client~auditor 
relationship (i.e., the number of prior audits) when an irregularity wa~ discovered, as 
well as the duration the irregularity had been committed17• 
Table 54: Relationship Between the Number of Years the Auditing Firm were 
the Auditors and the Time Period the Irregularity w·as Committed. 
Number of prior year-audits of client 
firm atJim~ of i..;ceularitv 
N % 
Years 
I IS 17.2 
2 IS 17.2 
3 18 20.7 
4 7 8.1 
5 
" 
.. 16 18.4 
>5 
" 
16 18.4 
87 100% 
Time .Period for which an irregularity N " % 
Wascom itted 
Years 
<I J2-, 36.8 
I 20 23.0 
~, ',' 2 19 21.8 
3 7 8.1 
4 3 3.4 
5 3 3.4 
5+ 3 3.4 
87 100% 
19 Pincus (1990) nnd Bernardi (199~11) both reported that fmud dct~ion will increase ll5 nn auditor's prior 
\ ·~ -~ 
I 
" 
/) 
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Table 54 shows that 55.1% of the irregularities were discovered within the first three 
years; i.e., a significant proportion of the irregularities were encountered by the 
respondents when auditing new clients. The fourth year of the auditor-client 
relationship appears to be a "slack" year as far as auditor-detection vf irregularities is 
concerned. lt would not be unreasonable to surmise here that after a spate of 
sucC'esses by the external auditor in detecting irregularities, the culprits "lie low", 
perhaps perceiving a high risk of being found out. When this dete!l"ent effect of the 
auditor's successes decreases enough, perpetrators of such illegal acts within 
companies are back in action! Another argument in the literature is that auditors 
become comfortable with their clients and start to trust them, possibly too much, so 
that 'they don't maintain a proper attitude of professional scepticism and they may 
under- audit. 
6,0 REPORTING FRAUD 
Given the reporting requirements set out in AUS210 (AARF,l995a) the findings 
regarding reporting of fraud come as no surprise. Slightly more than half (53%) of 
frauds detected were reported to the Board of Directors, 21% to the CEO and 2% to 
t~e audit committee. Considering that 56% of frauds occurred in public companies, 
one would have expected more reporting to the audit committec2u; similarly, one 
would have expected more reporting to the ASC; in fact, only 2% were reported. 
expec!n!lons concerning !he ox!stencc offrnud increase, This wns not directly !oslcd hy tho p~en! rcsonrcl!, 
;', 
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Five per cent were reported to the Major Fraud group arul the remainder to other 
authorities. Theft of cash was reported mainly to the Board of Directors (53%), or 
others (24%), namely financial controller, audit partner and Parliament. Window 
dressing was reported predominantly to the Board of Directors (57%) and the CEO 
(36%). Payroll fraud was equally reported to the CEO and Board of Directors. The 
other bodies to which auditors reported were the partner in charge, anti-corruption 
branch, in one incident the auditor confronted the perpetrator who admitted to it. 
7.0 USE OF FRAUD AUDITORS AND FORENSIC ACCOUNTANTS 
In view of the difficulty in and importance of detecting fraud, the use made of fraud 
/' auditors and forensic accountants is an interesting issue. Forty-five per cent of the 
respondents stated that their finn provided services by forensic and fraud auditors. 
Regarding the experience and qualifications held by these specialists, they were: 
Forensic accountants, mainly: chartered accountants (33%), chartered accountants 
and lawyers (13%), and registered company auditors and chartered accountants 
(33%). Fraud auditors were: chartered accountants (45%), chartered accountants and 
registered company auditors (43%) and, finally, some had experience as 
psychologists or criminologists -5% in each field. 
20 How~ver nat all componiC!I have on audit committee. 
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The forensic accountants and fraud a·uditol-s whO participated were of the opinion that 
had their services been used, fraud could have been prevented or detected earlier. The 
other respondents, however, did not share that opinion. As for the number of times a 
fraud auditor had been used in the last 12 months, it ranged from one (40%), to two 
(33%) whereas for a forensk accountant it was mainly: one (40%), two (10%), three 
(10%), ten (20%). These findings suggest that fraud auditors and foreru;ic 
accountants are not used very frequently. 
8.0 THE ECLECTIC FRAUD DETECTION MODEL REVISITED 
The results yielded by the survey of auditors add to the hroad range of information-
inputs into effective fraud-detection contained in the eclectic fraud detection model 
(see Figure 4) and show the model's applicability, More specifically, the findings 
obtained show that: 
used on their own, red flags are not particularly useful in alerting auditors to 
the existence of material irregularities at the planning stage; 
the different high-risk industries (e.g., manufacturing) where the auditor is 
likely to encounter different types of irregularities (e.g., management fraud, 
employee fraud, and error); 
the audit proccdure(s) likely to identifY a particular type of irregularity; 
the forms (e.g., theft of cash, window dressing) each type of itregularity is 
likely to take; 
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which audit areas (cash and provisions) arc high fraud~risk ones; and 
the lack of an e!Tcctivc internal control system and the absence of a code of 
corporate conduct arc significant correlates of an irregularity {including 
management fraud, employee fraud and errors) impacting materially on the 
accounts. 
In support of Albrecht et al. (1995) and Cressey (1986), the findings also stress the 
importance of the auditor being alerted to information about individuals within a 
company who are high risks of perpetrating an irregularity, including fraud, because 
they face a serious financial problem. The financial problem itself is most often due 
to a person in a position of trust Jiving beyond their means for one reason or another. 
The additional findings not contained in Figure 2 (i.e., particular high·risk audit areas 
and patterns in auditors' fraud detection) have been added to Figure 4 (see Chapter 7) 
so as to make it more comprehensive. The findings provide empirical support for the 
applicability of the eclectic fraud detection model. They do this by confinning the 
crucial importance of its various components (the audit firm; the auditor; and fraud· 
risk information, including the ROP Fraud model in Figure 3 - see Chapter 7) for 
more effective and efficient fraud·deteetion perfonnance by auditors. 
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9.0 CONCLUSION 
The survey was carried out in an attempt to reduce the gap in our knowledge about 
the nature of material irregularities (including management fraud, employee fraud 
and error) encountered by auditors in Australia. The 108 relatively experienced 
auditors who participated in the study reported having encountered a total of 768 
irregularities in the last five years. This indicat~·s it is relatively rare for auditors to 
encounter material irregularities when taking into account an auditor's total number 
of engagements. 
Part I of the survey found that the three most common types of irregularities 
encountered by the respondents during the last five years were: management fraud 
(39.7%), employee fraud (24%) and other illegal acts (19%). Differences in the 
findings obtained in the present study and those of Loebbecke et al. (1989} and 
KPMG (1995a) concerning, for example, management fraud and employee fraud, are 
probably due to differences in the sample of respondents used. The results indicate 
that there are patterns in fraud-detection with respect to the six types of irregularities 
encountered by the auditors (see Table 22). The present study found that: for ca~h 
and every type of irregularity there is at least one high-risk industry; the irregularity 
is likely to take one fonn rather than another; and a particular audit procedure is more 
likely to alert an auditor to the existence of a particular irregularity. Finally, two 
308 
significant correlates of u material irregularity are the Jack of an effective internal 
control system and a code of corporate conduct. The importance of effective internal 
contra! system and a code of corporate conduct in fraud prevention is provided for in 
the ROP model (opportunity component) constructed and successfully tested in the 
MFG study. The significance of the same two factors was emphasised by the KPMG 
(l995a) fraud survey, 
The irregularities about which the respondents answered questions put to them in 
Part I of the survey were not unimportant since 39.7% involved management fraud. 
This fmding is of interest in view of the fact that financial statement fraud accounts 
for about half the litigation cases against auditors in the U.S. (Palmrose, 1987). 
Interestingly, directors were as likely as other management to perpetrate management 
fraud. Differences were found between the types of management frauds encountered 
by auditors in the Loebbecke et al. (1989) study (assets overvalued or incorrectly 
valued) and in the present one (window dressing). Differences were also found 
between the two studies regarding the types of industries more frequently involved in 
management fraud. However, manufacturing ranked nwnber one in both studies. In 
Australia, trusts and fund management and construction appear to be plagued by 
management fraud the most. As far as the audit procedure that alerted the auditors to 
the irregularities is concerned, management review and/or tests of controls emerge as 
the most likely ones to do so while in Loebbecke et al, it was substantive testing. 
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Employee fraud, comprised 24% of the total number of irregularities, and it most 
often took the fonn of expenses recorded incorrectly and was more frequently 
reported in manufacturing. The respondents detected employee fraud largely as a 
result of management review and/or tests of controls while in Loebbecke et al. it was 
substantive testing. As with management fraud, both the lack of effective internal 
controls and a code of conduct were statistically significantly associated with the 
employee fraud impacting materia!ly on the accounts, especially in manufacturing, 
government administration and defence, and in finance and insurance. 
Previous researchers have concerned themselves exclusively with management fraud 
and employee fraud. The fact that there has been no previous research into othe!" 
illegal acts, other acts, and other illegal misstatements means that no comparisons of 
findings are possible, Other illegal acts made up 19% of the irregularities 
encountered by the respondents in the last five years. Due to the small number of 
cases in other acts and other illegal misstatements, caution is warranted in 
interpreting the findings obtained about those two types of irregularities. The most 
frequent other illegal acts encountered Were non-compliance with accounting 
standards and breach of security and insurance industry regulations. Other illegal acts 
were most prevalent in finance and insurance and manufacturing. Substantive testing 
and/or statutory record review was the audit procedure most likely to alert auditors to 
the existence of other illega1 acts. Once again, the industries that had a high incidence 
of other illegal acts were the ones more likely to lack a code of conduct. In those 
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cases, the other illegal acts impacted materially on the accounts. 
A small proportion (4°/r) of the irregularities encountered by the respondents 
involved other acts which occurred mainly in the trusts and fund management 
sectors. Auditors were alerted to the existence of other acts largely as a result of a 
review of records. Non-compliance with a trust deed was the one other acts that had a 
material impact on the accounts. As in the case of the other irregularities mentioned, 
other acts were associated significantly with an ineffective internal control system 
and the absence of a code of conduct. 
Intentional but not fraudulent or other illegal misstatements made up 6.7% of the 
irregularities reported. These were likely to occur in the trusts and fund management 
sectors. They took the form of the accounts "not adding up" and came to light mainly 
following a review of financial statements and/or review of accounting records. 
Finally, errors accounted for 6.25 % of the total number of irregularities. Trusts and 
fund management and the manufacturing industry had the highest incidence of errors. 
The most common type of error detected was financial statement errors. Errors were 
largely detected as a result of a review of financial statements. Errors provided 
another instance where the absence of a code of conduct and an effective internal 
control system correlated significantly with the error impacting materially on the 
accounts. In support of Entwistle and Lindsay (1994), it was also found that 
manufacturing is also an error~prone industry. 
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Summing up the findings obtained by the survey, the following industries are prone 
to the following irregularities: management fraud and employee fraud 
(manufacturing); employee fraud (government administration and defence); other 
illegal acts and other acts (finance and insurance); errors (trusts and fund 
management). 
In addition, the six irregularities examined tend to take the following forms: 
management fraud (window dressing); 
employee fraud (wrong expense claims and stealing of cash); 
other illegal acts (non-compliance with accounting standards or legislation); 
other acts (non-compliance with a trust deed); 
other illegal misstatements (accounts not adding up), and 
errors (fipancial statement errors). 
One of the aims in carrying out the survey was to test Loebbecke et nl.'s (1989) 
assessment model. It is for this reason that this chapter discusses at considerable 
length, how the results of the present study compare with those of Loebbecke et a!. 
In contrast to what Loebbecke eta!. reported, one of the significant findings obtained 
in the survey is that red flags are of limited usefulness to auditor.'! in detecting 
irregularities, including fraud, In only a minority of cases, the auditors \\r~re alerted 
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to the cxi~tcncc of an irregularity, by a red flag indication. This is despite the fact that 
the majority of red !lags were both applicable to the engagement and relevant to the 
irregularity. The relationship between the applicability and relevance of a red flag 
and whether the auditor was alerted to the irregularity depended on the particular 
category of red flag indicators. 
The utility of red flags at the planning stage was also examined, distinguishing 
between management fraud and defalcations, and classifying red flags in tenns of the 
three components of Loebbe..-ke et al.'s fraud-risk assessment model, namely 
conditions, motives, and attitudes. In comparison to their U.S counterparts, 
Australian auditors appear to be less vigilant at the planning stage and too often were 
not alerted to the existence of a material irregularity by one or more red flags. It is 
not possible, however, to conclude as to the reason(s) for the difference found 
between the auditors in the two study surveys. Future research should investigate the 
hypothesis that cultural differences impact on auditors' decision making (see 
Yamamura, Frakes, Sanders, and Ahn, 1996). In support of Loebbecke et a\. it was 
found that dominated decisions is a major indicator of material irregularity. Overal!, 
however, the survey results show that fraud-risk assessment utilising red flags is not 
effective. 
In comparing the findings from the two studies some differences between the 
auditors who participated in them need to be borne in mind. Loebbecke et al.'s 
I 
313 
auditors were from one finn only and were partners. Compared to the auditors in the 
present study, they were significantly older, a factor that explains the fact that they 
had twice as much audit experience (in years). The participants in both studies, 
however, were included in the research because they wac experienced in detecting 
irregularities. Loebbecke et al.'s auditors had an average number of engagements of 
3.1 where an irregularity had been encountered and/or had encountered an 
irregularity in 1.3% of the total number of engagements they had worked on. By 
comparison, the auditors in the present study who came from various firms across the 
country and had only been in the position of (predominantly) manager or partner for 
three years, had an average of 5.2 engagements where an irregularity had been 
e!:.>:ountered and/or had encountered an irregularity in 19% of their total number of 
engagements. However, the auditors in the present survey were 4.5 times less likely 
than their counterparts in the U.S. study to have encountered an iaegularity 
themselves. Often an irregularity would be detected by a combination of audit 
procedures, whereas in Loebbecke et al. an irregularity was most often detected by 
substantive testing. 
It should be noted at this point that substantive testing was the audit procedure used 
by the respondents in the present study to detect a material irregularity, encountered 
within the last 12 months in Part II of the questionnaire. The same finding was also 
obtained for other illegal acts (sec Section J.labove). However, whereas in 
Loebbecke et al. (1989) it was substantive testing which detected management and 
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employee fraud in the present study it was management review and/or tests of 
controls, and management review respectively. ·!be last conflicting finding may be 
attributable to the different sample of respondents used or a shift in audit approach by 
audit !inns. 
The present study found that more than half of the irregularities were detected during 
the first three years21 (and especially in the third year) of an engagement and that 
auditors were not likely to discover it. The survey highlights the crucial importance 
of auditors not ceasing to be vigilant however long they have been auditing a 
company's books. Auditors in the survey reported a material irregularity mainly to 
the board of directors and did so especially when it involved theft of cash and 
window dressing. 
A major weakness in the Loebbecke et a!. fraud risk assessment model is that its 
"attitudes" component contains a contradiction between the way it is defined and the 
examples given for it. Therefore, their model does not provide for offenders' 
rationalisations- a component for fraud to occur. 
The survey findings call into question one of the basic premises of Loebbecke et al.'s 
model that all of its three components (conditions, motives and attitudes) of the 
assessment model need to be present for management fraud to occur. In addition, 
21 Loebbecke ol nl. found !hal most lrrcgulariLies occurred in compru~ies !hoi hod bcon nudil~d for 1·10 years. 
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their model has been shown by the survey results to pcrfonn weaker in defalcations 
than in management fraud. While the findings from the present survey lend some 
support to Locbbccke et al.'s model, they also c!l.St doubt on it. It is argued, therefore, 
that the Loebbecke et al. model should be revised in light of a major inherent 
weakness with one of its components and the contradictory findings obtained. 
Regarding the profile of the perpetrators generated by the auditors' responses, it is 
very similar to that constructed in the MFG stud/2 • The personality attribute of 
"authoritarian", however, is not part of the MFG profile and has been added to Figure 
3 because it can be argued to be synonymous with "dominated decisions" which has 
been found to be a useful red flag. Management were the main perpetrators of the 
material irregularity, were characterised as authoritarian males, were aged 36-45, 
married with high school or higher educational qualifications, who lead lifestyles that 
seem to lead them to committing such material irregularities as fraud. However, as 
already pointed out, the participating auditors' description of the perpetmtors needs to 
be viewed with caution. 
Finally, the findings reported in this chapter provide empirical support for the 
eclectic fraud detection model developed in Chapter 4. The survey emphasises that 
audit experience alone is not sufficient to improve the auditors' fraud-detection 
performance as they seem to seldom encounter irregularities. In addition, the use of 
22 The major fmud offenders in Chapter S were in the ago group 31-45. 
,; 
' i: 
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red flags on its own is not enough for effective fraud detection by auditors. By 
reporting patterns in the kinds of relationship between different industries, different 
irregularities, different ways that alerted the auditors, and different audit procedures 
that appear to detect them, the survey of auditors has added new knowledge to fraud 
risk assessment. TI1e findings support the general profile of fraud offender 
constructed on the basis of the MFG study, but also emphasise the importance of a 
person having a vice such as gambling as a good indicator of their being a fraud risk. 
The survey also identified having an authoritarian personality as indicative of crime-
proneness. The eclectic fraud detection model was borne out by the findings of the 
survey. Furthennore, the results of the survey help to revise the model and to make it 
even more useful to auditors by showing that fraud-risk assessment has to be 
multifaceted if it is to achieve its objective. In the light of the evidence, it can be 
concluded that the fraud detection model proposed in Chapter "/ is more likely to be 
useful to auditors as it makes good the deficits in Albrecht et al.'s (1995); Cressey's '"· 
(1986) and Loebbecke et al.'s (I 989) models. 
The results of the survey challenge Loebbecke et al.'s (1989) assertion that all three 
of their model's components must be present for fraud to occur, As in the cases of the 
profile of the major fraud offender, the proposed fraud detection model weaves 
together features and patterns identified at different levels, namely: the economic 
environment, the particular industry, the company, particular financial areas within 
the company and particular individuals holding positions of financial trust where 
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they cnn effect fraud. Hence, the ROP Fraud model is an essential component of the 
revised eclectic fraud detection model (see Figure 4, Chapter 7). The fraud-detection 
model depicted in Figure 4 informs auditors that: particular fraud~·P'ronc industries arc 
characterised by five different types of irregularities; that particular kinds of audit 
procedure are more likely to identify particular kinds of irregularities, as wei! as what 
factors alert auditors to different irregu]ariti':S in the different industries. This 
additional knowledge enables the model developed in Chapter 4 to be further refined 
and makes it more useful to auditors in a more practical way, by providing specific 
guidance on what to look out for and how to approach it in planning their audit and 
carrying out a fraud risk assessment. 
The research findings should benefit auditors as far as fraud indicators are concerned, 
and assim them to enhance their audit effectiveness. It is also hoped that the research 
results reported below can be used to identify ways of detecting, preventing and 
reducing major fraud within companies more effectively and efficiently than at 
" 
present. 
The next chapter describes the refined models of why people commit fraud and of 
fraud detection and considers in what sense the present thesis can be said to be 
making an original contribution to knowledge in the fields concerned. 
'I·' 
DISCUSSION OF THE ROI' FRAUD MODEL AND THE FRAUD 
DETECTION MODEL 
Fraudulent activity such as management and employee fraud arc examples of 
irregularities that can have a material impact on the financial statements. Such frauds 
are very costly for both the entities defrauded and society at large and are also 
significant for the auditing profession. In Australia, the detection and prevention of 
irregularities rests with management. This thesis has argued that the ability to detect 
fraud is vital to auditors, even though audjtors in Australia do not have a legal duty to 
detect irregularities, including fraud, but only to audit with reasonable skill and care. 
This is because of: (I) the legal liability auditors can face when they fail to detect 
fraud; and (2) the fact that fraud detection is an imp>:~rtant component of the 
expectation gap and audit beneficiaries want an expanded role for the auditor as 
society's corporate watchdog. Auditors are under increasing pressure to accept 
responsibility for detecting material fraud. 
Since auditors cannot become experts at fraud detection through audit experience 
alone, they need to utilise the relevant knowledge about why people corrunit fraud that 
is avail!ible in such other disciplines as psychology, sociology and criminology. The 
review of relevant theoretical perspectives and available empirical evidence in those 
disciplines identified a number of fraud correlates regarding the oflendcr's personality 
&!tributes, thus making it possible to talk in terms of fraud-prone individuals, i.e., 
persons possessing certain personality traits and who are motivated to corrunit fraud. 
319 
'!11e notion of fraud-proncrwss has been lacking in various framl-detcction models put 
forward to assist auditors in ass~ssing the risk of fraud when planning their amlit. 
Results reported in this thesis show that the existence of an opportunity for, and 
financial pressure on, someone to commit fraud arc not enough to account for 
individual differences in who docs or does not commit management or employee fraud. 
The thesis has also identified and evaluated a significant amount of knowledge 
regarding specific ways of improving auditors' ability to detect fraud. This includes 
being aware of company-level and financial-area-level correlates of fraud-proneness, as 
well as a broad range of approach<!s to fraud detection put forward in recent years. It 
needs to be emphasised in this context that different approaches to fraud detection by 
auditors are best thought of as supplementing one another. 
1.0 A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF THE AETIOLQrv OF FRAUD (ROP 
FRAUD MODEL) 
The study of 50 major fraud cases prosecuted by the MFG, examined the applicability 
of the proposed ROP model ofthc aetiology of fraud (see Chapter 5). The results ofthe 
study support the basic premise of the model (see Figure 3) that fraud is generally 
committed as a result of a combination of factors, namely the existence of a crime-
prone person with a motive (P), an opportunity (0) and the possession by such a 
person of rationalisations (R) that make it possible for him/her to commit the crime 
once or repeatedly (see Figure 3). TI1e MFG study cast serious doubt on the validity of 
the Loebbecke et a\. (1989) model because it fails to take into account one's 
rationalisations for committing fraud. The ROP model wns revised in the light of the 
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results or the study nnd highlights the importance of both "situational Jilelors" aml 
"company characteristics" in operationally defining the "opportunity" component of 
ROP. The MFG study results also confinncd that the "person" component of ROP 
consists of two inseparable parts, namely "motive" and "crime-prone personality". 
Finally, the findings obtained confirm the crucial importance of"mtionalisations" for 
fraud to occur. 
The profile constructed on the basis of the literatwe discussion and the results of the 
MFG study comprises information at two levels: firstly, at a general level, the culprit is 
likely to be a male first offender, aged 31-45, occupying a position of trust, who needs 
to solve a fmancial problem (or, :;imply, is motivated by greed), often acts alone, 
breaches that trust and commits a spate of deception offences defrauding a number of 
victims; secondly, the profile incorporates a taxonomy of offenders that comprises a 
detailed account of twelve offender typologies. 'The profile is significantly more 
detailed than what has been reported by other authors ru1d includes a minority of 
offenders who are professional predators (sec the motive component of Figtu·c 3). The 
offender profile constructed would be useful to auditors if used in conjunctio;~ with 
other relevant knowledge about fraud risk, such ns different industries and financial 
areas. The profile constructed ought to be used in combination with (1) the knowledge 
concerning the statistically significant inter-relationships found between offence, 
offender and victim characteristics; and (2) the eclectic fraud-detection model reported 
in Chapter 6 (see Figure 4). 
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l11c lindings obtained show that the modus operundi (deceptive action) of serious fi-aud 
offenders is very much tlu: same whether they operate in Austrulia or in the U.S. and 
that the MFG-prosecuted offenders were very prolific. 
1.1 Additional issues addressed by the two studies and incorponttcd in the 
ROPmodel 
Reflecting on the importance of opportunity, most (94%) of the offenders victimised 
someone they knew. The fact that approximately one-third of the offenders had a 
criminal record (that was especially the case with managing directors) points to the 
importance of careful screening of applicants for positions of financial t.-ust, including 
background checks, in order to reduce the risk of fraud victimisation (see "Company 
characteristics" in Figure 3). 
The finding that about one-third of the offenders had accomplices means that for such 
offenders the decision to commit fraud follows a group discussion, a very important 
factor not previously discussed by other authors in this area, a factor catered for in the 
ROP model (see "Company Characteristics" part of the "Opportunity" component of 
Figure 3). In a sense, the availability of one or more other crime ·prone person(s) can 
be considered an opportunity to collude in order to perpetrate fraud by, for example, 
beating the internal control system. 
The findings from the survey of auditors support the geneml profile of a fraud offender 
constructed on the basis of the MFG study, but also emphasise the importance of a 
person having a vice/motivation, such as gambling, as an indicator of their being a 
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fraud risk. The survey also identitied having an authoritarian personality a~ indicative 
of crime-proneness (sec "Crimc-l'ronc Personality"). The results of the survey do not 
support L{)ebbeckc ct al.'s (1989) assertion that all three of their model's components 
(conditions, motives and attitudes) must be present for management fraud to occur. In 
addition, their model has also been shown to be weaker in defalcations than in 
management fraud. There is, therefore, a need for the Locbbecke et al. model to be 
revised in the light of the doubt cast upon it by the tindings of the research reported in 
Chapters 5 and 6. In the light of the evidence, it can be concluded that the ROP model 
is more likely to be useful to auditors, as it makes gocxl the def1cits in Loebbeckc ct 
al.'s model. 
Contrary to what Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) General Theory of Crime predicts, 
most major fraud offenders were not immersed in crime in the sense of being recidivist 
career offenders. The offenders surveyed can, however, be said to support Gottfredson 
and Hirschi's theory to some ext~nt in so far as they evidenced low self-control and 
exploited opportunities available to them. The MFG study indicates that a diversity of 
people commit fraud for a variety of reasons and in different circumstances, and who 
the offenders are is not random. In other words, the offenders studied comprise a 
number of typologies of major fraud offenders, many of whom experienced situational 
pressures (e.g., high personal debts, tinancia! losses) and who rationalised their 
offending to make it acceptable to them, and thus to continue to perceive themselves as 
successful professionals in their fields. Also, it should not be forgotten that solicitors, 
accoW'!tants and bank managers, to name but a few, operate in an occupational culture 
that values wealth and corporate success, considers failure quite unacceptable and at 
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the same time provides opportunities for major fraud. 
The ROP model sets out the difTcrcnt ways in which fraud becomes possible. These 
are: when a crime-prone individual under financial pressure or with other motives, 
perceives at least one opportunity to commit fraud; when the individual has both the 
knowledge to commit the crime (alone or in collusion) and to conceal the fraud; and, 
finaHy, the individual possesses the rationalisations needed to justify to him/herself 
committing the offence once or repeatedly. The need to locate the three components of 
ROP in a broader socioeconomic context is emphasised. Rationalisations constitute by 
far the most vital of the three components that make up the psychological process of 
infonnation processing and decision making that precedes an act of fraud. The model's 
eight assumptions listed in Chapter 4 were borne out by the MFG study. 
It is acknowledged earlier on in this thesis that the methodology used in the MFG and 
the survey of auditors ha~ its limitations. These limitations include the fact that the 
offenders' rationalisations were studied after the offenders were apprehended by the 
police and convicted by the courts. It is therefore, not certain whether the same 
rationalisations existed before the offences in question or whether they could be used to 
predict fraud. Also the fact that some types of irregularities plagued one type of 
industry mther than another may well be due to some industries (e.g., manufacturing) 
having more companies. 
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Without ignoring the limitutions of the two studies, the findings show that it is no 
longer justifiable to tulk about major fraud offenders as a homogeneous population and 
cmplmsisc •.he need to desegregate sub-categories of such ofTcndcrs. lbc MFG 
offenders surveyed made many decisions, both about their everyday life, their business 
activities, about who and how to deceive in order to obtain money and whether to act 
alone or with one or more accomplices. More specifically, for the majority of them 
who are not profeSllional conmen, there is the original decision to solve their financial 
problem by committing fraud, but there is also the decision to continue committing 
fraud or to desist. 
Whether the sentences imposed by the higher courts on such offenders serve the 
purpose of individual and/or general deterrence is impossible to say on the basis of the 
studies carried out. However, examination of voluntary statements made to the police 
by the offenders concerned indicates the following: a tenn of imprisonment of five 
years or less is unlikely to be a deterrent because they fancy their chances of not being 
apprehended; if charged, they believe they "can beat the charges" against them and, 
even if they are incarcerated, they know they would be unlikely to serve their full 
sentence. Without a subjective perception by serious fraud offenders that (I) there is a 
high risk of being detected, prosecuted and convicted; and (2) that the likely penalty 
upon conviction will be !>evere enough, deterrence becomes a questionable moral 
justification at the sentencing stage. 
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2.0 ECLECTIC FRAU!) UETECTION MODEL 
In support of similar conclusions reached on the basis of the findings from the survey 
of auditors reported in Chapter 6, the findings obtained in the Major Fraud Group study 
suggest that audito·:S played but a rather limited role in the detection of the frauds 
involved. The fraud detection model, which includes the ROP model as one of its 
components (see Figure 4}, shows how auditors can improve their fraud detection 
ability. Given that most frauds involve financial pressure on an individual and that 
factor plays such an important part in contributing to fraud taking place, a simple 
income-expenditure assessment of professional people in positions of trust should help 
to identify potential/actual major frauds. Future research should also consider fraud in a 
variety of officially-known and self-reported offenders in order to identify the factors 
that best explain their specific nature and prevalence. There is a need to desegregate 
fraud in order to be able to integrate information about individual offenders, their 
modus operandi and clues in their "distorted stories", as well as to assist auditors to 
narrow their search for major fraud offenders and to dete<:t fraud. 
It is not claimed that anned with the criminal profiling results obtained auditors can 
identity an offender and significantly increase their_ fraud-detection efficiency. This is 
simply because, on the basis of existing knowledge in this area, it is just not possible to 
predict accurately who in a company will commit or has been committing fraud. What 
the ROP model can do is to increase an auditor's sensitivity to fraud-risk and focus 
his/her attention on persons who are potential fraud risks. 
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llte survey of Austmlian auditors' experience in detecting material irregularities 
including fmud fowtd that for auditors encountering material irregularities is a rare 
event and that the use of red nags is not particularly helpful on its own. l"bercfore, 
<' ,, '( 
auditOrs c:hlnot rely on red nags or audit experience alone in their endeavours to 
improve their fraud detection effectiveness. It is hoped that the eclectic fraud detection 
model constructed will go some way towards enhancing auditors' fraud-detection 
ability. 
The irregularities about which the respondents answered questions put to them were 
important, since 39.7% involved management fraud, the kind of fraud most likely to 
land auditors in costly litigation suits in the courts. The survey of auditors has added a 
new dimension to fraud-risk assessment by: (1) reporting patterns in statically 
significant relationships between different industries, different irregularities, different 
ways auditors were alerted, and different audit procedures that appear to detect such 
irregularities; and (2) identifYing two significant correlates (absence of an effective 
system of internal control and a code of conduct) of an irregularity having a material 
impact on the financial accounts of a company. Furthennore, the research reported in 
Chapter 6 is the first time such issues have been addressed with reference to four kinds 
of irregularities, namely other illegal acts, other acts, intentional non-fraudulent 
misstatements and errors. 
~\ The eclectic fraud detection model was supported by the fmdings of the survey. The 
" results of the survey were used to revise the model and make it even more useful to 
auditors by showing that fraud-risk assessment has to be multifaceted if it is to achieve 
' 
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its objective. As in the cases of the profile of the major fraud offender, the fraud· 
detection model weaves together features and patterns identified at different levels. 
These levels are: the economic environment, the particular industry, the company, 
particular financial areas within the company and particular individuals holding 
positions of financial trust where they can effect fraud. Hence, the ROP model is an 
essr.ntial component of the fraud detee;tion model. The survey of auditors indicates that, 
unlike their counterparts in the U.S., auditors in Australia appear to be less vigilant at 
the planning stage and too often fail to be alerted by one or more red flags to the 
existence of a material irregularity. The survey findings also highlight the crucial 
importance of auditors not ceasing to be vigilant however long they have been auditing 
a company's books. 
Th"e fraud detection model constructed also highlights the importance of having a 
competent, ethically-minded auditor, who is well versed in the aetiology of fraud, in 
management deception strategies and counter deception strategies, and who enjoys the 
fiill support of hisll:er finn as far as fraud detection is concerned. Additionally, an 
auditor should: have a good bird's eye view of the company's environment and · ~'l.temal 
control system, be alert to infonnation about both individuals within the company who 
are high risks of potential fraud and the company's relationship with outside parties. 
Finally, the auditor should be aware of and guard, against his/her own unintentional 
biases in carrying out the audit. 
(! 
\ 
' 
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Wilhout ignoring its limitations, what the research reported in Chaptcrs.,5 and 6 can do 
is to increase the fraud awareness of auditors. Together with empirically obtained 
knowledge about other sets of red flags pointing to vulnerable types of 
industriesl~nmpanies as well as vulnerable areas within particular types of 
industries/companies, the red flags inherent in the ROP model provided above can at 
best be used to alert an auditor to a greater likelihood of fraud and thus negate an 
auditor's sense of complacency. 
3.0 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research should, explore further the patterns identified between offence, 
offender, victim and criminal justice characteristics with a larger sample of such 
offenders, including self-reported (as opposed to officially-known) fraud offenders, in 
order to replicate the two:component criminal profile of a fraud offender reported 
above. It could also examine the applicability of the two models with a larger and more 
representative sample of management and employee fraud cases and auditors 
respectively and test experimentally the use by auditors of red flags contained in the 
fraud-detection model ptoposed in Chapter 6. This could help ascertain the actual 
usefulness of the two proposed models to auditoro in detecting fraud. Another approach 
would be to utilise interviews with fraud offenders to shed some light on the various 
' 
decisions that are necessary for fraud to occur. Finally, there is a need to replicate the 
MFG findings by measuring fraud offenders' level of self control using the instrument 
developed by Grasmick et al, (1993). 
331 
No single thesis can nsk all the relevant questions, let alone provide satisfactory 
answers to them. The author hopes the resenrch contained in this thesis provides some 
much-needed answers to two basic but important contemporary issues/questions for 
·auditors, namely why people commit management and employee fraud and h~w 
auditors can become better at detecting such fi'audulent activity. 
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Appemlix I 
16 September 1995 
Surveys by KPMG 1995) and Deakin Australia (1994) have found that the cost of fraud by 
persons in positions of trust in our society is astronomical. Auditors are often sued for 
negligence to the tune of billions of dollars as a result of failing to detect material irregularities. 
Despite the importance of fraud, researchers in Australia have paid scant attention to it. 
In an effort to increase our understanding of fraud I am carrying out a national questionnaire 
survey of auditors' duties to detect and report irregularities. The purpose of the survey is to 
better understand the various types of iiTegularities that are being committed in Australia by 
white-collar crime offenders and, in the context of AUP16 (AUS210) to identifY the type of 
indicators present in an audit that should alert the auditor to the existence of irregularities. It is 
estimated that the questionnaire will take approximately twenty minutes to complete. The 
survey results will be made available to all respondents who wish to receive them, together with 
a token of appreciation to recompense the participants for the time spent to complete the 
questionnaire. 
Please rest assured that all data collected will be analysed anonymously and treated as strictly 
confidential. Respondents' details will be detached from the questionnaire as soon as it is 
I'Q:ived so as to maintain the confidentiality of the participants. 
I would greatly appreciate both your endorsement of the survey and advising your finn's 
auditors (those who have completed their PY or are at the Senior level) and fraud auditors or 
forensic accountants if there are any. If your firm consents to participate you will be sent the 
questionnaire through the mail at the end of October. 
Finally, please note that Commander A. Bowles, of the Major Fmud Group, Victoria Police, is 
endorsing the questionnaire and a letter to that effect will be sent with the questionnaire. 
I shall be contacting you by phone within the next two weeks regarding this letter. 
Thanking you in anticipation. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Maria Kapardis (ACA), M. Bus. 
Senior Lecturer in Accounting. 
I 
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26 October 1995 
Dear participant, 
I am a Senior Lecturer in Accounting, and I am currently conducting research into 
Auditor.;' duty to detect, deter and report management fraud. 
Part of the research utilises a structured questionnaire to be filled in by pmctising 
auditors/fraud auditors/forensic accountants/internal auditors in Australia. It is 
estimated it will take one about twenty minutes to complete the questionnaire. I would 
be grateful for your participation. 
As you know, the cost to society of such irregularities as fraud is astronomical, and 
there is a controversy surrounding the role of the auditor in detecting and reporting 
such offences. It is also evident that audit firms are sued for exorbitant damages for 
alleged failure to detect and report irregularities. Interestingly, auditing research has 
paid scant attention to fraud and auditors. 
The suiVey consists of three parts: 
Part I: Summary infonnation about each of the irregularities with which you 
have had experience, during the last five years. This infonnation is needed to 
assist in the understanding of auditors' experience with material and immaterial 
irregularities, in terms of frequency of occurrence, nature, and impact on the 
financial statements of the clients involved. 
Part II: Detailed infonnation about one material irregularity selected by you is 
required. The purposes of gathering this information are: 
(a) to contribute to the understanding of irregularities at a detailed level, and 
(b) to determine the presence of irtdic11tors ava(lablc to the auditor before the 
irregularity was discovered (in terms ofthe AUP16 (AUS210) factors). 
Part III: Demographic data about you and your experience. 
It is hoped the research will benefit you personally in terms of identifying fraud 
indicators, and gaining knowledge that should assist you to enhance your audit 
effectiveness. Society in geoeral will also benefit because the research conccmcd will 
identifY ways of detecting, preventing and reducing such white-collar crime as fraud. 
fia""""""'"'a&a 
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Jf you arc interested in receiving an executive summary of the results and a gili 
voucher as a token of appreciation to recompense you /Or the time spent to complete 
the questionnaire please fill in your details in the n~xt page. I would greatly appreciate 
it if you rettml the completed questionnaire by 30 November, 1995. 
Rest l!llsured that your response will remain anonymous as your details will be detached 
from your response when it is first received and will be treated as strictly confidential. 
Furthennorc, in order for the research to comply with the requirements of the 
University's Ethics Committee the statement in the next page would need to be filled 
in by you. 
Any questions concerning this project can be directed to Ms. Maria Kapardis of 
Victoria University of Technology, Department of Accountancy and Law on (03) 9365 
2549, fax (03)9365 2525. 
Thanking you in anticipation. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Maria Kapardis (ACA), B. Ec., M. Bus. 
Senior Lecturer in Accounting 
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cc--:--;-------c--.;:=c-::::c:c.o= have read the information on the previous 
page and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to 
participate in this activity, realising I may withdraw at any time. 
I agree that the research data gathered for this study may be published provided I am 
not identifiable. 
Participant or authorised representative Date 
M.KAPARDIS 26.10.1995 
Investigator Date 
If you would like to receive a copy of the executive summary together with a gift 
voucher as a token of appreciation to recomperu;e you for the time spent to complete 
the questionnaire please fill in the details below. Please return the questionnaire by 30 
November. 
Name: 
Finn: 
Address: 
Major Fraud Group 
2nd Floor 
549 St. Kilda Road 
MELBOURNE :l004 
16 October 1995 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
I write to strongly support Mrs Maria KAPARDIS applied research into fraud 
detection and prevention. 
The research has the formal approval of the Victoria Police and the full co-
operation of the Major Fraud Group. 
I am of the view that the results of Mrs. KAPARDIS' research will make an 
original and substantial contribution to lmowledge and will be of practical use 
to both the accounting profession in general and auditors in particular as well 
as to law enforcement agencies. I therefore urge you to participate in this 
study. 
 
A.J. BOW!:ES, LL.B. 
Commander 
Major Fraud Group 
9 9 
WORLD POLIC. 
a fiRE DAM~' 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
PARTJ 
If as an auditor you have encountered any irregularities during the last 5 years please 
provide summary infonnation about each type of material and immaterial irregularity 
experienced: 
lrrcgu/arilies comprise; jra11d. mlwr illeKal <I<'IJ. <!I her a<·t.•, intentional hill notfrcmd;!/onl or all1•r 
illegal mlss/aiM!Mis, and errors. 
1. How many times have you come across material and immaterial irregularities 
in your experience as auditor? 
material _____ _ immaterial ... ------
2. Please provide swnmary information about each material and immaterial 
irregularity encow1tered by filling in tables A-F below. 
A code ofconductlethicslpracllce Jla/cs where people In an organimlion stand ill relation to eor:h 
other and to the orgfmisatioll ilse!f and il ~xpresses a moral dimen.sion to the activities of 1/ie 
business. It should co>·er areas /Ike disciplinary oct ion.•, whislleb/m,ing etc. 
A. Management Fraud {i.e., an act whkh involves the use of deception to oblllin an illegal advrnnage by 
management) e.g., e.>~pense account, conflict of interest, kickbacks, purchase for personal use, theft 
of invcnlmyfplant, lapping and kiting, information, false financial slalemcn15, phantom vendors, 
unnccess urchase diversion of sales roduct substitution alent infrin cmen other 
• O.:scribc the #Times Industry what effective code of material irregularity encountered the client alencd internal conduct financial 
operated 
'" 
controls existed impact on 
'" ''" "" 
~. 
account.; 
''" 
I 
2 
3 
4 
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B. Employee frnud {311 act wh'ch involves the U>~ of deception 10 obtain an illegal advl!lllagc by an 
employee) e.g., chc<[UC forgery, expense u~:count, conflict uf interest, kickbacks, purcha<c for 
pcrsonnl usc, theft of invcnlorylplalll, petty ca1h fraud, lapping and kiting, information, patent 
r· • m rm cmcnt ol cr. 
' 
Describe the //Times Industry what effective code of malcr;ul 
irregularity cncountel"l'd the client alerted internal conduct financial 
opcmtcd 
'"" 
controls exi~ted impact on 
'" 
y/o ylo the 
accounts 
y/o 
I 
2 
3 
4 
' 
C. Diller Illegal Acts {i.e. acts which involve non-comp!\auce with laws and regulations which may, or 
moy not, result in misstatements including omissions of amounts or other disclosures from an entity's 
accountin records or financial rc ·~ 
' 
Describe the #Times Industry what c!Jcdivc code of material 
irregularity encounl~red th~dient alerted internal conduct financial 
opemted 
''" 
controls exi1ted impact on 
'" 
y/o y/o the 
accounlS 
y/o 
I 
2 
3 
4 
I 
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D. Other nels which contrnvcnc the cotlslitution of un entity including non-compliance with tru•t deed< 
d d . I f or memomn urn an III!IC CS 0 (l'-'!ICmliOir 
' 
Describe the II Times lndumy what cffcc1ivc code or material 
irregulnrity cncuumcrcd the client ulcrtcd internal conduct linandal 
operated 
'"" 
controls existed impact nn 
in 
''" ''" 
the 
account; 
yfn 
I 
2 
3 
4 
E. Intentional, but not fraudulent ot' other illegal misstalcmcniS which include omissions ofamouniS or 
other disclosures from an enti s accountin records or financial re 
"'· 
' 
Describe the #Times Industry what effective code of material 
irrcgulwity encountered the client alerted internal conduct tinanciul 
operated you controls existed impact on 
'" ''" ''" 
<ho 
accounts 
''" 
I 
2 
3 
4 
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F. Errors which nrc unintentional mistakes in. or umissiuns of umounts or nthcr di<clnsurcs from, 
linnncialre orK 
" 
Describe the II Times Industry whm cfli:ctivc code of 
irregularity encountered the client ulc11cd internal conduct 
opcrntcd 
'"" 
controls existed 
in 
''" ''" 
I 
2 
3 
4 
PARTII 
Please provide detailed information about ONE material irregularity 
(i) detected by youD, 
(ii) or your finn 0, 
(iii) or one that you have worked on D (please tick as appropriate. 
1. Please describe how the irregularity was committed 
material 
financial 
imp1cton 
the 
accounts 
''" 
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2. Who was involved in the irregularity (please tick) 
Director(s) D 
Shareholder D 
Middle management 0 
Others below management 0 
Other top management 
CEO 
CFO 
Chief Accountant 
3. Please tick tbe appropriate industry and status of the client. 
Public Company D Private Company 
No industry designation D 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0 
Mining 0 
Manufacturing 0 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 0 
Construction 0 
Wholesale Trade 0 
Retail Trade 0 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 0 
Transport and Storage D 
Communication Services D 
Finance and Insurance D 
Property and Business Services 0 
Government Administration and Defence 0 
Education 0 
Health and Community Services 0 
Cultural and Recreational Services 0 
Personal and Other Services D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
4, Audit Areas affected by this irregularity (please tick more than one box, if 
applicable): 
Cru;h 
Receivables 
Inves!ments 
Inventories 
Other Current Assets 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Share Capital D 
Reserves 0 
Retained profits or accumulated lossesO 
Related Party transactions 0 
Property, plant and equipment D 
Intangibles 0 
Other Non-Current Assets D 
Creditors and borrowings 0 
Provisions D 
Other Current Liabilities 0 
Non-Current Liabilities 0 
Other (please specify)-------------
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5. How long luul your firm been the auditor of that client when the 
irregularity was di~covcrcd'! 
6. Over what time period had this m:1tcrial irregularity been committed (e.g., 
3 months, or 5 years). 
7. Please tick the audit procedures first indicating the irregularity. 
Not discovered by auditor 
Preliminary analytical review 
Study/evaluation of internal control 
Analytical tests of specific accounts 
Substantive tests of details 
Use of the checklist in AUPI6 
No procedure designation 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
8. Who detected the irregularity concerned (please w~.k). 
Assistant D 
Manager D 
Senior D 
Partner D 
Supervisor 0 
Fraud auditor 0 
Other(please specify•)------------
9. If a "fraud auditor" had been part of the audit team do you think the 
irregularity would have been discovered earlier. 
10. 
A fraud audiiOr Is $Omcone other than t/le jillllndal m1dl/or wha Is i11va/ved /11 delecling a11d 
preventing fraud. 
Yes 0 No 0 
Profiling of the Perpetrator 
A Sex M D F D 
B. Approximate Age ___ 
C. Educational Standard: 
High School D Tertiary D Professional D Other D 
D. Marital Status: 
Married 
Divorced 
0 
0 
E. Vices of the perpetrator: 
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Single 
Separated 
0 
0 
Gambling 0 Greed 0 
Drugs/Alcohol D Lifestyle D 
Personal Financial Pressures 0 
Other (please specify)---------
F. Please provide a brief description of the perpetrator's main personality 
characteristics (e.g., authoritarian, introvert, loner, etc) 
G. Please outline other impressions you have of the perpetrator 
H. Number of accomplices: 
One 0 
>ThreeD 
Two 0 
NIA 0 
Three D 
11. Once detected to whom was the irregularity reported ? (you may tick more than 
one box) 
CEO 0 DPP D 
Board of Directors D Audit Committee 0 
ASC D Major Fraud Group 0 
Other ___________ _ 
Please indicate which of the following "Red Flags"(fraud indic:ttors) cxislctl with 
respect to the matcrinl irregularity discussed in the pn'Vious section. 
Pfease llote:Only lick ifyour tmswer is yes and you might have more than one tick 
Btuiness Environment (lied Flug) (Red Flag) (Red Plug) 
Applicable lo 1/e/ewwl/o Alorlod me 
tlw ,,, d"ring the 
engage me II/ Irregularity plannin;: 
phu.m 
Nature of the business is susceptible to 
misappropriation 
Unduly influential circumsL1nccs 
Pressure to meet forecasts 
Weak management integrity 
Ineffective/ non-cKistcnt regulation by external 
parties 
Survival of company dependant on irregularity(ies). 
Ineffective or non-existent code of conduct 
Tnmsactions with related parties not at arm's length 
Unusual trnnsactions with compaJJics registered in 
tax havens 
Liquidity pressure 
I 
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fill~ mal C<llrtro/ S1n1~11m: (lledi'1aW (fledHa/i) (!led Nul:) 
Appft<'Uhfe lo 1/e/cvollllo Alerted me 
'''" 
tlte during the 
""!:"l!"lllellf irregularity plunning 
phase 
Orgnnisation is decentrnliscd without adequate 
monitoring 
MEI11ngement override 
Ineffective management 
Luck of segregation of duti<:.< 
Weak internal controls 
Excessive authority vested in a senior officer 
Poor systems 
Ineffective internal audit 
' 
Integrity/Competence of Management (Red Flag) (Red Flag) (Red Flag) 
Applicable to Relevant to Alerted me 
lhe •• during the 
engagement irregularity plilllning 
phase 
Domineering management 
Complex corpomtc structure 
Continuing failure to correct internal control 
weaknesses 
High executive staff hi mover 
Significant/prolonged understaffing of the 
accounting department 
Frequent changes ofla1o,yers 
The client has engaged in opinion shopping 
The auditors experience wHit management indicates 
a degree of dishonesty 
Internal audit is improperly staffed 
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Unusunll'rcssures wilhin un en!i!y (l(cd Flag) (J(cd Flag) (Red Flag) 
llpJrlicabJe !o l~clcv~n! !o lllencd me 
!he !he during !he 
cngagcmcll! irregularity planning 
pha1c 
lnndequatc working capital 
DctcriorJ!ing quality of crunings 
A need for a rising profit 
A significant investment in an industry noted for 
rnpid change 
Entity heavily dependent on a prn:luct or a customer 
Management displays an overly aggre,ssive altitude 
toward financial reporting and forecasts 
Pressure e~erted on accounting personnel to 
complete financial reports in unusually short periods 
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Unuslml Occurrcnccsfrrnns.1ction> (Red Flag) (Red !'lag) (Red Flag) 
Applicable to RcJcvaJl\ to Alerted me 
the the during the 
engagement lncgularity piWlning 
phase 
Unusual bal:utce date trnnsa>lions 
Payments for services that appear exccs~ivc in 
~~ntion to services provided 
Payments for goods which appear to be above/below 
market price 
Evidence offillsified documents 
Large Cash payments 
Payments made to local or overseas officials 
Problems with regulatory aulhorities 
Ignored advice by legal adviser 
Evidence ofunduly lavish styles by officm or 
employees 
lnvesligations by police 
Unsatisfactory Rccardsf!>roblem.l in Obtaining (Red Flag) (Red Flag) (Rerl Flag) 
Sufficient Appropriate Audit Evidence Applicable to Relevant to Alerted me ., lite during the 
engagement irregularity planning 
phase 
Inadequate accounting n:cords 
Inadequate d(tCUmentation 
Excessive number of differences between a~counting 
records and third party confirmations 
Evasive, unreasonable or unsatisfactory n:sponscs by 
management to inquiric! 
New client without sufficient infonnatfon from 
predecessor auditor. 
Conflicting audit evidence ond inexplicable changes 
in operating ratios. 
Signilicanlly fewer responses to confimmtion 
requests than expected 
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Markel Pressures (!ted Flag) (Red Fl3g) (Hcd FJ"g) 
Applicnblc ln Rclcvuot to Alerted nw 
the the during the 
engagement irregularity plilllniog 
phase 
Declining industty 
lnduslly subject to complex legislation 
Volatile industry with numerous corpornte take·ovcrs 
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Factors Relevant to an EOP Environment (lied Flag) (fled Flag) (!ted Flag) 
llpplkable to Relevant to Alerted me 
the 
"" 
during the 
engagement irregularity plannin~ 
phase 
Minimal plannh1g for tile installation of new 
hardware 
Inadequate computer skills amongst relevant entity 
staff 
Inappropriate hardware or software to pcrfonn 
important functions 
Poor physical or logical a~cess controls 
lnadcquntc or inappropriate file ac~css hierarchy 
Lack of clear audittrnil and lnlnsaction log 
Hardware failures, including excessive amounts of 
'down-time' and resultant input backlogs 
Software failures 
Failure to restrict access to software and 
documentation to authorised personnel 
Progrnm changes that arc not docun1cntcd, approved 
and tested 
Inappropriate data and program storage media 
Inadequate detection proccdarcs for system viruses. 
Inadequate ovcrnll baiB.Ilcing of computer 
transactions and data bases to the financial accounts 
Shared or non-specific ownership of data 
i! 
,·. !I 
'· ,, 
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" !'ART II)/ 
DEM~),GRAPI-llC DETAILS 
TO BE COMPLETED BY ALL RESPONDENTS 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
State residing 
ACTDQLDDNSWD 
Male D 
Current Position: 
Financial Auditor 
Forensic Accountant 
Public Sector Auditor 
NTD SAD TASD VICD WAD 
Female 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Fraud Auditor 
Internal Auditor 
(4) Number of Years of experience as an auditor------
D 
D 
(5) Position in the Partnership (e.g., senior, supervisor etc)-----
(6) Number of Years in current position _____ _ 
(7) Approximate number of engagements worked on------
(8) Industry speciali.~ation as an auditor (YOU MAY TICK MORE THAN I) 
No industry designation 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
Construction 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 
Transport and Storage 
Communication Services 
Finance and Insurance 
Property and Business Services 
Government Administration and Defence 
Education 
Health and Community Services 
Cultural and Recreational Services 
Persona! and Other Services 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
0 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
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(9) Ty11C of nudit firm you work in. 
Big6 
Small finn 
D 
D 
Medium Ti~r 
Not Applicable 
(10) Tick if your prncticc pTovidcs, 
D 
D 
Fraud auditor D Forensic accountant D 
If no then plcnsc go to question 13. 
(11) Qualifications of fraud auditor 
Chartered Accountant D 
Psychologist D 
Company Auditor 
Criminologist 
Other (please specify)-----------
(12) Qualifications offorcnsic Accountant 
D 
D 
Foremic Accoull/ani/I one who is /n\'0/ved ill !he in;oesligaiioJJ ~11d ll•e gatheri"g of evidence foro claim ar 
court uctlon. 
(13) 
Chartered Accountant D 
Psychologist D 
Lawyer D 
Company Auditor 
Criminologist 
Other(plcase specify)-----------
D 
D 
Times in the last 12 m1i.~ths you/ your clients required the seTViccs of a fraud 
auditor rOI-ensic accountant _____ _ 
,, 
,, 
i,' 
Appendix II 
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS AND BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION 
State residing Victoria {40%), Queensland {17%), NSW (15%), South Australia 
(15%), Western Australia {8%), ACT (3%) and Tasmania (2%). 11Jc participants were 
predominately males (85%) holding manager position (39%), partner (28%), senior 
(13%), supervisors (12%), Assistant managers (8%). 
i. Current Position: % ii. Number of years 
as an auditor experience as an auditor: 
Years % 
Financial auditor 82 3-10 58 
Public Sector auditor 7 11-15 17 
Fraud auditor 7 16-25 17 
Internal auditor 4 >25 8 
iii. Number of years in iv. Approximate Number of 
in current position: engagements worked on 
Years % No. of engagements % 
1-3 62 10-50 48 
4-8 24 51-100 27 
9-15 7 >100 25 
>15 7 
____ I 
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Most seniors were ut that position !Or one ycnr mainly (94%), similnrly for man:~gcrs 
who had been at that position !Or twelve months (60%), or tW() years (35%). The 
partners who responded had a spread of number of years at that position, 30% lOr the 
first year, 27% for two years, 18% for the third year and 25% for the fourth year. 
v. Industry specialisation: vi. Type ofnudit firm participant 
worked in. 
No industry Big Six 73 
designation 19 Medium Tier 16 
>3 industries 67 Small Firm 4 
Finance and Insurance 6 Public Sector 6 
Manufacturing 4 Internal Auditor 
Mining 2 
Public sector 2 
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Appendix Ill 
Coding Guide Used for the MFG Study. 
' ',', ii. 
Gender; 
marital status; 
age in years; 
ethnicity; 
occupation; 
_;? 
i( 
iii. 
iv. 
v. 
vL main types of fraud committed; 
vii. number of non fraud offences charged; 
viii. type of non fraud charges; 
ix. fraud charges summary; 
x. under what law fraud charges; 
xi. number of fraud charges; 
xii. number of victims; 
xiii. relationship with victims; 
xiv. number of accomplices; 
xv. who suspected the fraud; 
xvi. versatility of offender; 
xvii. how many months did it take to prosecute; 
xviii. motivation; 
xix, type of plea; 
xx. pre-trial status; 
xxi. legt~lly represented or not; 
xxii. 
xxiii. 
xxiv. 
XXV. 
xxvi. 
xxvii. 
type oflegal representation; 
court of first instance; 
main sentence imposed; 
severity of sentence; 
prior offence; 
amount involved. 
